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“There are hooks on the post .. He is hooked on like dead meat in a butcher’s shop. His eyes
are bandaged — not that it really matters, for he is already blind” (Memoirs of Brigadier General
Crozier 1930).
1 Introduction
Whether the death penalty deters is a classic legal and economic question that remains
unanswered (Nagin and Pepper, eds 2012; Ehrlich 1975; Donohue and Wolfers 2005).
What makes causal estimates challenging is that jurisdictions with death penalty differ
from those that do not in ways that independently affect levels of crime, and executions are
frequently delayed and hidden from public (Katz et al. 2003). Yet, as a skeptic of existing
death penalty research stated, “if I was allowed 1,000 executions and 1,000 exonerations,
and I was allowed to do it in a random, focused way ... I could probably give you an
answer.”1 Such a scenario is thankfully unlikely to occur, but the British Army experience
during World War I may have been a close approximation. This paper uses quasi-random
application of the death penalty, whose randomness was unbeknownst to the soldiers, to
test whether executions deterred—or spurred—desertion.
British WWI executions were designed for maximum deterrence—immediate, brutal,
and often carried out by fellow soldiers from the deserter’s battalion. Promulgation would
occur on the same day, with many condemned soldiers paraded in public (Putkowski and
Sykes 2007, p. 18). Relatively clear high-frequency variation randomizes whether (a person
sees that) a crime leads to execution. Two preconditions for any deterrence are perceptions
of risk of criminal sanctions (Apel and Nagin 2011; Lochner 2007; Sah 1991; Nagin and
Pepper, eds 2012; Donohue and Wolfers 2005; Cohen-Cole et al. 2009; Manski and Pepper
2011), and whether capital crimes were premeditated. Deserting, quitting, sleeping, etc.,
occurred away from the front line (Peaty 1999, p. 200, 201, 206). Unlike cowardice (if a
soldier turns his back on the enemy and runs away), desertion was subsequent absence
from the scene of danger with intent of avoiding danger (Peaty 1999, p. 199).
Sentencing has undergone several intellectual revolutions—retribution, rehabilitation,
deterrence, community policing, and fairness. In parallel to the behavioral economics
revolution, legitimacy is perceived to impact criminal behavior more than sentencing
severity. Legitimacy does not affect behavior if only deterrence drives the response to
law (Becker 1968); but, as many argue, “if [citizens] regard legal authorities as more
legitimate, they are less likely to break any laws, for they believe that they ought to follow
them, regardless of potential for punishment” (Tyler 2006, p. 4). The existence of a large,
subordinated minority—the Irish—allows exploring this channel. Like minorities elsewhere
(Donohue 2013; Alesina and La Ferrara 2014), the Irish were disproportionately sentenced
1Does Death Penalty Deter? A New Debate, N. Y. Times, Nov. 18, 2007.
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to death—but conditional on the sentence—they were equally likely to be executed, which
allows separately identifying the role of legitimacy in non-compliance to law.
Section 2 describes courts martial, executions, and desertions. Convinced of the deter-
rent power of the death penalty (Oram 2003, pp. 39, 69; Putkowski and Sykes 2007, p. 11;
Babington 1983, p. 19), British military officers sentenced over 3,300 soldiers to death,2
but only a small fraction were executed. Commanders were reluctant to execute soldiers
who might still make some contribution (Oram 2003, pp. 2, 4; Moore 1975, p. 70) and
wary of popular anger.3 These two concerns, balanced against the desire to deter, led to
an almost literal decimation of around 12%. Figures 2A and 2B show each division line up
along the 12% line, where the number of death sentences is the X-axis and the number of
executions is the Y-axis. Figure 3A shows the constancy in the execution rate over time.4
Historians assess the execution decision to be a pitiless lottery. Moreover, commutations
disappeared into the night.5 Soldiers whose sentences were commuted (to prison terms or
hard labor after the war) returned to the trenches (Oram 2003, p. 69). No news of death
sentences reached soldiers (not even to the sentenced) except in the case of execution.
Some soldiers even did not believe executions took place (Johnson 2015, p. 110), which
eliminates awareness of randomization from the outset.
Section 3 models the soldiers’ reactions. That desertion was punishable by execution was
common knowledge (Appendix Figure 1). Diaries, letters, and memoirs record the emo-
tional impact of executions. Observing the execution has two theoretical effects: soldiers
updated beliefs about the conditional probability of execution as well as the perceived
legitimacy of authorities. Legitimacy is modeled as the perceived morality of following
the law or not. Would-be deserters weigh the benefits of desertion against economic costs
(probability of execution), social costs (shame), and psychological costs (violating duty)
(Beckett and Simpson, eds 1985). A soldier only motivated by economic costs will be less
likely to desert following an execution, but social and psychological costs can outweigh
economic costs. Building on Bénabou and Tirole (2012), sanctions convey information
about the number of rule-violators in general equilibrium. Shifts in beliefs about the
number of rule-violators affects the legitimacy of the authority. If social/psychological
costs fall far enough for one group, then those who desert might be admired for refusing
2Lower panel of Figure 1 shows executions (downward ticks) and commutations (upward ticks).
3During the war, under questioning by Parliament, the Under-Secretary of State for
War, Harold Tennant, stated: “It is not in the public interest to give statistics” for
those shot overseas. Hansard HC Deb. vol. 72, col. 1935, 01 July 1915. Retrieved from
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1915/jul/01/courts-martial-death-sentences
4Execution rate was higher in 1914 due to small numbers of death sentences issued and lower in 1918.
Rates are smoothed using penalized splines. Alternative methods yield similar findings.
5Email on December 24, 2007 from Gerard Oram.
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to submit to an unjust regime. This may be one reason why we regard “lawbreakers” such
as Nelson Mandela, Rosa Parks, and Sophie Scholl as heroes. Their apprehension and
treatment by authorities contributed to the collective view of the unjustness of the legal
authorities they resisted. Backlash (spurring of desertion) can arise only if the sanctioner
lacks full information on social/psychological costs (Chen and Yeh 2014c). Extending the
model to two groups with different conceptions of duty renders opposing responses to
state-imposed sanctions in different communities (Chen and Yeh 2014a). In this paper,
even a fully-informed sanctioner yields backlash by one group and compliance by the
other. Backlash may be a reason why insurgencies flourish when the crime is “resisting
the state”; insurgency is when state legitimacy is in question and the (inverted) social
shame response to nominally criminal behavior is likely to be strongest. Courting pun-
ishment by authorities to highlight the injustice and illegitimacy of those authorities was
a stated strategy of Martin Luther King, famously in his letter from a Birmingham jail:
“I am in Birmingham because injustice is here... Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice
everywhere.”6 The period before the Irish War of Independence of 1919-1921 is likely one
where Irish would have felt less loyalty to the British. To be sure, not all Irish would have
felt less loyalty—religion may have been an important distinction—but I cannot distin-
guish between Catholics and Protestants in my data. I investigate birthplace instead and
find that Northern Irish were less loyal than soldiers born in Britain. All groups of Irish
were subordinated and explicitly denigrated by their non-minority counterparts (Oram
1998, 2003, pp. 9-10), so “Irish” refers to both groups.
Section 4 previews the eleven data sources that I digitize and link together (details
are in Appendix A-C due to space constraints). The British kept detailed administrative
records (and, unlike the records of France and Germany, were not largely destroyed in
World War II7). Court martial records were not released for 75 years, but since their
release, historians have pieced together (1) the universe of death sentences, executions,
and commutations (Oram 2003). The high number of death sentences was due to the belief
it was critical to maintain discipline (since branding and flogging were outlawed in 1879).
I link this data to absentee lists collated after roll call every morning or more frequently
and circulated among the military police searching for deserters. Lists are preserved in
the British National Archives in (2) surviving war diaries, (3) Police Gazettes, and (4)
handwritten trial registries of apprehended deserters. Virtually all deserters were caught
because the British fought on foreign lands geographically separated by water. I link these
6http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/documentsentry/annotated_letter_from_birmingham.1.html
7Conversations with Putkowski during November 24-26, 2011. There is one analysis of German desertions
(Jahr 1998), but other countries lack dates and locations of executions, commutations, and absences.
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data by military unit and date using the (5) Order of Battle,8 which I digitize to obtain
troop movements—both physical and organizational—e.g., battalions moving to another
division (Appendix B and C). I employ the (6) Soldiers Died in the Great War database
of all casualties (which always mean deaths, since I have no database on injuries) to
measure point-in-time unit combat danger. The Order of Battle of Divisions provides (7)
commanding officers at each unit level and date and (8) lists of battles for each division,
which I use to point-in-time geolocate each military unit. Additional covariates, such as
soldiers’ birthdates, enlistment dates, enlistment location, and birthplace, are preserved
in (9) surviving portions of the Service and Pension Records—also known as the “Burnt
Documents”9 and “Unburnt Documents”10—which I link by soldier’s name to the other
datasets.11 I use (10) a dictionary of Irish surnames to identify soldiers of probable Irish
ethnicity. Any measurement error on “true Irishness” would tend to bias towards zero the
difference in the effects of executing British vs. Irish soldiers. As shorthand, I interchange,
“Irish soldiers,” “soldiers with Irish surnames,” or “soldiers with male Irish ancestry”. I
will also interchange “British” with “non-Irish”, but it just means soldiers who lacked
Irish surnames. Finally, I use the (11) Medal Rolls Index, which contains virtually all
soldiers who served, to validate the use of the surname dictionary vis-à-vis official statistics
regarding Irish enlistment. Some government sources quote national statistics that refer to
Irish birthplace, while others refer to Irish regiments. Secondary references are not always
clear, so I follow the historical citations to the original source.
Next, I evaluate the use of Irish surname as a marker of Irish identity in Appendix D
(due to space constraints). First, I verify that deaths are representative of the enlisted pop-
ulation, rendering the casualties database my geographic baseline. I show that Northern-
Irish born were twice as likely to desert as British-born soldiers, and that British-born
soldiers with Irish surnames were 20% more likely to desert—but British-born without
Irish surnames 15% less likely to desert—relative to the average soldier. Thus Irish iden-
tity was retained even for subsequent generations amid extensive migration from Ireland
that spread Irish surnames across Great Britain in the 19th century. Also, I show the pro-
portion of soldiers with Irish surnames is the same across the three absentee data sources,
a consistency that is not present for Irish regiment. I show that 27% of soldiers in Irish
regiments were born in Britain, which renders regiment a poor marker of Irish identity.12
Section 5 quantitatively assesses execution randomness. Over two death sentences per
8Order of Battle. The Long, Long Trail (Baker 1996). Retrieved from http://www.1914-1918.net/oob.htm.
960% of the original 6.5 million Service Records were destroyed in a WW2 bombing raid on London.
10The Pension Records were not affected.
11I can only use age in balancing and robustness checks, due to missing data.
12Prior research relied on regiment since analyzing addresses “would take a lifetime” (Oram 1998, p. 59).
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day precluded careful consideration by the Commander-in-Chief who made the final de-
cision on every case. His daily task involved sending over 600 men on average to death
every day, so the fate of a single “criminal” would not have had much consideration.
Some historians believe in strong randomization, but others argue that Irish soldiers,
non-commissioned officers, and those seen as physically weak or undesirable were more
likely to be executed (Oram 2003, pp. 9, 56, 61, 74). Others surmise that certain units
were targeted for perceived indiscipline (Babington 1983; Putkowski and Sykes 2007, p.
17; Putkowski and Dunning 2012, p. 212). I show that execution decisions are uncorrelated
with Irish ethnicity, rank, and age and uncorrelated with unit-level casualties, desertion,
execution rates, commanding officers’ fixed effects and ethnicities, timing with respect to
major battles, distance to the coast or to Germany, seasonality, and army type. I show
the sequence of execution decisions within a unit is statistically indistinguishable from a
random string of 1s and 0s. In doing so, I consider metrics of the Commander-in-Chief
targeting perceived indiscipline (long runs of executions), feeling that certain units were
“due” for an execution (negative autocorrelation), or addressing “groups of bad apples”
(positive autocorrelation). Irish execution decisions are also consistent with randomiza-
tion. My analysis sample includes 466 Irish and 1,942 non-Irish death sentences.
Section 6 adopts the language of potential outcomes: I observe what happened in a
particular Army division following an execution — I would like to know what would have
happened if that same unit had instead experienced a commutation (Rubin 1974). How-
ever, the within-unit design means that each division is essentially serving as its own
control. This method is problematic if past events in a unit’s history continue to affect
outcomes in later time periods. I thus develop three sets of analyses. The first set of anal-
yses assumes a strong form of SUTVA (stable unit treatment value assumption) where
only the most recent event matters. This is a reasonable assumption based on theoreti-
cal models of rational inattention (Sims 2003; Caplin and Dean 2015) and experimental
research indicating that recent events are more salient (Kahneman 2011; Hertwig et al.
2004). The second set of analyses assumes a weak form of SUTVA and parametrically
models the effects of previous events. I explore whether or not the results are robust to
the inclusion of prior events in the model specification. The third set of analyses uses a
day-by-day maximum likelihood model of absence, where each unit has some probability
of experiencing absence on any particular day. I model how this probability depends on
all previous death sentences, their outcomes, and distance in time—this combines the ef-
fects of salience and the execution rate. Notably, the distribution of past events identifies
exogenous shifts in the local execution rate in different divisions (represented by gray
lines in Figure 3B, even in the 400-day time frame of the War Diaries) which can be used
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to separately estimate the impact of the execution rate—across many events— from the
impact of execution salience—the most recent event. To put this in context, random vari-
ation in the sequence of executions creates exogenous temporal variation in how strict the
death penalty is applied, which is similar to existing studies using variation in execution
rates (but summarized critically by Donohue and Wolfers (2005)).
Section 7 presents results. Casualties are positively associated with desertions, which
align priors. Executing Irish spurred rather than deterred absences. In the temporally
dense War Diaries, Irish executions increased the hazard of absence by 2-3 fold out of
a median time of 2 weeks to the next absence; and after Irish executions, 19% of the
immediately following absences were Irish whereas after a British execution, 11% of the
next absences were Irish. After commutations of either ethnicity, 13% of the next absences
were Irish, consistent with randomization and no commutation news reaching soldiers. The
day-by-day framework also finds that Irish executions spurred Irish desertions.
There is mixed evidence of deterrence. If there is deterrence, it is the execution rate—but
not the execution salience of the most recent event—that deters. To be sure, the differ-
ences between this study and contemporary criminal justice scenarios are vast, so a more
nuanced understanding of the differences is warranted for rigorous policy lessons. One
way to interpret the British experience during WWI is that it provides a low-bar test for
the death penalty. Finding a deterrence effect would not be a strong argument, leaving
aside moral issues, that the death penalty is good policy. Yet a negative result showing no
deterrent effect might have more policy salience since executions took place almost imme-
diately—in a manner purposefully designed to maximize their deterrent effect. Desertion
is also certainly not analogous to murder, and criminals weighing potential homicidal
undertaking are certainly different from soldiers weighing military desertion. However,
all else equal, more executions should deter absences, and if we find this not to be the
case, then we may doubt a behavioral response to contemporary death penalty, which is
still in place for over 60% of the world’s population. This is despite a lack of empirical
evidence regarding the effects of the death penalty on compliance with the law. I provide
evidence of a mechanism for legal compliance beyond deterrence that has received less
attention in the formal literature, and that state-imposed sanctions can undermine state
legitimacy. Understanding this fully is important for policymakers who are concerned with
multiculturalism and integration of subcultures.
2 Historical Background
This section analyzes the historical record, which motivates the theoretical model and
empirical framework. I focus on France and Flanders, the location of 322 of 346 soldiers
executed during World War I (The War Office 1922, p. 648). I describe the data generating
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process of desertion, apprehension, courts martial, conviction, sentence, and execution or
commution (Figure 4). Three key discussions for identification are: 1) random executions,
2) unawareness of randomization, and 3) (estimated) costs and benefits of desertion.
2.1 Beliefs about Death Penalty The military made penalties common knowledge.
“It is well known ... to all soldiers that desertion in the face of the enemy is liable to be
punished by death” (Under-Secretary of State for War Harold Tennant, quoted in The
Western Gazette, 28 January 1916). In some cases, soldiers who went absent, stayed away
because of the fear of being shot (Babington 1983, p. 30; Putkowski and Sykes 2007, pp.
108-111). When recruits joined the army, they were informed that the death penalty could
be inflicted upon anyone who deserted while on active service (Moore 1975, p. 50).13
Most British military officers from the World War I-era viewed the death penalty as
essential to military discipline. Senior officers were, seemingly without exception, death
penalty advocates, viewing it as their only recourse for maintaining discipline after cor-
poral punishment, such as branding14 and public flogging, was outlawed as inhumane in
the preceding half-century (Oram 2003, p. 38). Sir Neville Macready, a former B.E.F.
Adjutant-General, stated “if you abolish the death penalty you might as well abolish the
army.”15 General Horace Smith-Dorrien wrote, “There is a serious prevalence of desertion
to avoid duty in the trenches, ... and I am sure that the only way to stop it is to carry
out some death sentences” (Oram 2003, p. 69; Babington 1983, p. 19).16 Courts martial
records also indicate many instances where military officers wrote, “the state of discipline
of this unit requires an example” (Department of Foreign Affairs 2004, p. 38).17
Regardless of whether death sentences were used in a pro-active manner,18 the execu-
tion rate appears constant around battles (Figure 3A) and uncorrelated to the severity
13Peacetime norms of a 2-year maximum sentence for desertion were obviated (Bowman 2006, p. 47).
14Soldiers were branded on their torso with a capital “D” (Oram 2003, pp. 21-26).
15Jahr 1998, p. 314.
16Australians were subject to the death penalty only for mutiny, desertion to or treacherous dealings with
the enemy, but by law, could not be executed (Peaty 1999, p. 210), and had the highest absence rates.
17In recommending execution of a convicted deserter under his command, Brigadier General Douglas-
Smith wrote, “There are still a few cases of this desertion and the full penalty is the only means
by which it can be stopped” (4 Jul. 1915, trial proceedings of Private H. Burden, 1st Northumberland
Fusiliers, WO 71/424, Retrieved from https://blindfoldandalone.wordpress.com/the-prosecuted/names-
a-g/burden-3832-private-herbert-3832-1st-northumberland-fusiliers/).
18Military commanders may have used the death penalty to forestall desertions (Oram 2003, p. 38).
Oram (2003) shows a time series of courts martial and casualties and suggests that death sentences
peaked shortly before the start of British offensives but not German offensives (which would be less
foreseeable by British commanders). Oram (2003)’s visual pattern is reproduced in Figure 5, with
peaks in death sentences before British but not German offensives. However, no clear pattern emerges
in Figure 1, which smooths the data differently and adds more battles. Neuve-Chapelle, Somme, and
Third Ypres (i.e., Passchendaele) were British offensives; First Marne, Second Ypres, and Second Marne
were German offensives; and Verdun was a major engagement between French and German troops.
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of battle—Figure 6 Panel A displays casualties of German-initiated battles in red and
of British-initiated battles in blue. Panel B displays all death sentences (red) and all
executions (blue) and Panel C smooths the same data. If executions were being used
pro-actively, we should have seen a sharp increase in executions before British-initiated
offenses. Likewise, across divisions, execution rates appear constant. The Guards Divi-
sion and Regular Army divisions were considered more professional, and used repeatedly
in battle.19 In Figures 2A (displaying War Diaries absences) and 2B (displaying Police
Gazettes B.E.F. absences), the 12 Regular army divisions are indicated in red circles, the
14 Territorial divisions are indicated in tan circles, and the 30 New Army divisions are
indicated in navy circles. The Territorial Army (which began as local part-time militia
and were nicknamed “Saturday Night Soldiers”) and New Army divisions were less pro-
fessional.20 As Figures 2A and 2B show, the Territorial Army and New Army divisions
received fewer death sentences, but the execution rate was similar.
2.2 Desertions Many desertions were prompted by ‘Dear John’ letters from loved
ones or news about ill children.21 Deserters may have been optimistic and believed that
they would be unlikely to be caught, or conversely, believed the battle environment to be
more dangerous than it actually was. Importantly, soldiers would not know of impending
offenses.22 Infantry soldiers would typically have only 12-24 hours advance notice, even
if they were in the front line or reserve trenches. Furthermore, when it came to a major
offensive, they could not have anticipated anything about the scale of preparations until
the artillery barrage commenced, at which point there would no doubt about what was
going to happen.23 Casualty totals were kept strictly secret (Ferguson 2008).
There was relatively little opportunity to desert on the front—a soldier would be shot
immediately—moving soldiers was like squeezing toothpaste and the battle police were
always close behind.24 Barriers both prevented men from leaving the front line and col-
lected stragglers for redistribution to their units forward (Sheffield 1996, p. 76).25 The
deserters who were shot immediately would not be in the lists of absentees collated after
morning roll calls, which are more likely to include the soldiers who deserted overnight.
19Conversations with Putkowski and email on November 20, 2011. Divisions with good reputations re-
ceived regular front-line or assault actions, while those with poor reputations were used less often or
stationed in quieter sectors (Oram 2003; Department of Foreign Affairs 2004, p. 18).
20Both included conscripts after March 1916.
21The arrival of such letters should be uncorrelated with the execution decision of a previous deserter.
22Email from Putkowski on October 8, 2008.
23Email from Putkowski on October 8, 2008.
24Conversations with Putkowski during November 24-26, 2011.
25Behind the front line, the formations generally went as follows: battle police, straggler posts (separately
arrayed by brigade, division, corps, and army, one behind the other), traffic control and military police
patrols, and furthest from the front line, examination posts.
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Battalions generally rotated 10 days in the front, 10 days in reserve, and 10 days at
rest every month.26 Because soldiers were moved at night,27 the opportunity to desert was
maximum during rotation. Though some soldiers fled during battle and were later con-
victed of desertion (Babington 1983), desertion can be considered relatively cool-headed
in contrast with another capital crime—cowardice in the face of the enemy (Peaty 1999,
p. 199).28 The fact that desertions often took place far from the front line lead some
historians to conclude that desertions cannot be deemed the result of shell shock (Peaty
1999, pp. 200, 201, 206). A soldier who went missing during battle would be categorized
as a straggler (not a deserter).29 However, to the extent that the desertions in my data do
reflect shell shock, the desertions motivated by shell shock would be captured in the error
term, which should be unrelated to randomness in the execution decisions. A larger error
term would also make it more challenging to identify any significant effect of executions.
2.3 Apprehensions Essentially all absentees were caught and arrested within two
weeks.30 Jahr (1998, 2014) confirms this conclusion by analyzing the infantry records of
seven divisions. He finds that many soldiers’ absences ended after 1 or 2 weeks, but a
few soldiers were not caught for at least four weeks. The prevalence of British and French
military police in forward areas, and French civilians’ general unwillingness to risk helping
a deserter, rendered a deserter’s discovery a virtual certainty.31
The high rate of apprehension is consistent with available statistics, which indicate that
the number of absentees and deserters is close to the number of trials for absentees and
deserters. The desertion rate at home and abroad was 10.26 per 1,000 men,32 so that in an
26Conversations with Putkowski during November 24-26, 2011. The same 1:1:1 ratio (“4 days in the front
line, then 4 days in close reserve and finally 4 at rest”) is found in The Long, Long Trail (In the
trenches. (n.d.). LLT. Retrieved from http://www.1914-1918.net/intrenches.htm), although this varied
enormously depending on conditions (e.g., weather and availability of adequate reserve troops). Front
line action can be subdivided further. Of the 120 days of front line action a year, “perhaps only 5-10 days
were in intensive action [while] 60-100 days involved front-line trench activities without being in action”
(The infantry battalion. (n.d.). LLT. Retrieved from http://www.1914-1918.net/whatbatt.htm).
27Conversations with Putkowski during November 24-26, 2011.
28For a list of definitions, see Graham-Harrison, ed 1907, p. 267, Retrieved from
http://archive.org/stream/manualofmilitary00greauoft#page/267/mode/1up (with free login).
29Email with Putkowski on January 26, 2008.
30Email with Putkowski on January 3, 2008.
31Most British soldiers only had a rudimentary knowledge of French, and civilians would rarely risk
knowingly helping a deserter because it was an offense for which they could be jailed or severely
punished. Deserters were viewed as being, if not dangerous, a nuisance because they were compelled to
live off the country, scavenging and stealing food, money, or clothing. Of those deserters who evaded
detection for an extended period of time, most either enjoyed assistance from civilians or holed up in
one of the larger Army bases. This latter strategy, however, was only successful at the beginning of the
war when bases suffered from greater disorganization. Email with Putkowski on January 3, 2008.
32“Post-war statistics show that the overall desertion rate between 1914 and 1918 was 10.26 per 1,000
men - so that in an army of 1 million men, there were over 10,000 absentees ... The size of the problem
was already becoming apparent by mid 1915, when instructions were issued by the War Office, drawing
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army of 5.4 million serving in France and Flanders, there were roughly 55,400 deserters.33
The estimated number of deserters may be too high, since the fog of war — stragglers,
missing in action, poison gas, prisoner of war — would make it very hard to pin down the
true number of deserters.34 In addition, officers were required to report absences to the
Police Gazette “as soon as it is known that a soldier has absented himself,”35 which may
further increase overcount. Historians are doubtful that officers would conceal absences:
officers were certainly not going to allow anyone to accuse them of “bending” the rules
because doing so would lay them open to being charged with an offense of not obeying
routine orders.36 If a deserter was captured far from his unit (e.g., by military police or
an officer from another unit), a report would be sent to the commander of the division,
and the resulting publicity would require the lower level commander to “acknowledge
publicly his soldiers’ crimes or to make an example” (Corns and Hughes-Wilson 2007, p.
89).37 Thus if there was overcount of absences, the true number of absentees and deserters
(nominally 55,400) would be closer to the number of trials (44,395) and consistent with
attention to the fact that there had been 1,251 desertions from the Expeditionary Force and over 20,000
desertions from the new army, reserve and other regular units.” Corns and Hughes-Wilson 2007, p. 216.
Since 146,730 members of the army were struck off as deserters from Aug 1914-March 1920 at home and
abroad (https://archive.org/stream/statisticsofmili00grea#page/82/mode/2up. Free login available.),
I infer that Corns and Hughes-Wilson (2007) was referring to deserters at home and abroad.
33This number may be higher if desertion rates were higher in France and Flanders than in the UK or
other theatres of war (e.g., Mesopotamia, Egypt and Palestine, Salonika, Italy, and Gaillipoli).
34Defenses at trial included wandering into German trenches, being fired upon overnight and getting
separated, an exploding latrine, or oversleeping in a dugout (Department of Foreign Affairs 2004).
35“When there is good ground for supposing an absentee to have deserted, the report should be rendered
within 24 hours after the absence has been discovered, but in no case should it be delayed beyond
5 days.” The King’s Regulations and Orders for the Army (1914). London: His Majesty’s Stationary
Office, Para. 514, p. 117. After 21 days, an absentee was presumed to be a deserter and a court of
inquiry called regarding “the illegal absence of a soldier.” King’s Regulations (1914), Para. 673, p. 149.
36Absence was formally noted in the company disciplinary book and would have been apparent in parades.
There were circumstances when a soldier’s excuse was accepted (e.g., illness) but it was up to the unit’s
commanding officer and the latter had to bear in mind that appearing “soft” would adversely affect his
own military reputation and promotion prospects. Email with Putkowski on February 20, 2015.
37Apprehension may be even higher due to prosecutorial discretion. There is no direct evidence of officers
actively concealing absences, though there is evidence that whenever possible, commanding officers did
not report minor infractions outside their regiments (Corns and Hughes-Wilson 2007, pp. 88-90; van
Emden 2010, p. 4259 of Kindle e-book). The commanding officer of a unit had wide discretion in any
matter of discipline. Under Section 46 of the Army Act, the commanding officer could often deal with a
case summarily by selecting a charge that was within his powers to punish (such as “Conduct to the Prej-
udice of Good Order and Military Discipline”, Graham-Harrison, ed 1907, pp. 298-299 (Army Act Sec-
tion 40), Retrieved from http://archive.org/stream/manualofmilitary00greauoft#page/298/mode/1up.
A free login is necessary for viewing.), and imposing up to 28 days detention, Field Punishment, or
forfeiture of pay, rather than escalating the matter to a court martial. Selective prosecution, whether
due to officer whim (Sheffield 1996; Burrage 1930; Turner and Haigh 1969) or limited bandwidth around
major battle, have led some to describe military discipline as “negotiable” (Rubin 2013). However, com-
mander discretion was limited to trivial violations such as a late return back from a pass, drunken
behavior, dirty rifle, or being unshaven on parade. Email with Putkowski on February 20, 2015.
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deserters being invariably caught.38 (Soldiers shot on the spot would reduce both the
number of official deserters and the number of trials equally.39)
To put this in historical perspective, only 40% of deserters during the U.S. Civil War
were caught, and deserters faced a negligible risk of death if arrested (Costa and Kahn
2003). 14% of Union army soldiers deserted during the American Civil War, compared to
1% for the British Army during World War I. In addition, British Army deserters were
not subject to the death penalty during World War II, and the desertion rate was high
enough that the Army wanted to reintroduce the death penalty in 1942 but politically
could not do so (Bond et al. 2010, p. 213).
2.4 Trials Courts martial in the field (Field General Courts Martial, henceforth FGCM)
took place in private (Babington 1983, p. 13).40 Private trials thus left the typical soldier
with little news about death sentences or about deserters until an execution was pro-
mulgated, and so they would be unaware of randomization. Soldiers who deserted in the
UK while their unit was based in France and Flanders would be returned to their unit
and tried by FGCM.41 Typically, these soldiers had failed to return to the front after
furlough42 or after convalescence in the UK.
The usual defense was a plea of extenuating circumstances (Graham-Harrison, ed 1907).
Convicting a soldier for desertion required showing of intent (Corns and Hughes-Wilson
2007, pp. 44-5; Oram 2003; Department of Foreign Affairs 2004, p. 7). Intent to desert
would be presumed if there was evidence to indicate intent of not returning (e.g., wear-
ing civilian clothes or failing to report for a key deployment) or if the soldier had been
38Official records indicate 44,395 courts martial for absentees or deserters, of which 7,361 were for desertion
and 37,074 were for absence (The War Office 1922, p. 667), which suggests that at least 80% were caught.
39The estimated number of deserters may be too low: some soldiers who tried to run away were driven
back by officers threatening to kill them on the spot (Moore 1975, p. 66), and some actually were killed
on the spot, with rumors of unjust executions circulating among soldiers (Oram 2003, p. 15).
40Most desertions in France and Flanders were handled by Field General Courts Martial (FGCM), which
were less formal and easier to convene than a full General Court Martial (GCM). The GCM was
generally reserved for officers, while the vast majority of deserters were non-officers. The FGCM was
comprised of at least three officers, the president holding the rank of major or above. The court could
only pass a death sentence if all members agreed (Department of Foreign Affairs 2004, p. 7). Prosecution
was handled by the accused soldier’s adjutant and defense handled by a junior regimental officer.
41There was also the District Court Martial (DCM), which handled UK desertions and absence without
leave for (a) draft dodgers after conscription began and (b) those who deserted while their unit was
based in the UK. Including these, the total number of soldiers and officers tried for desertion or absence
at home or abroad was 126,818 from August 4, 1914 to March 31, 1920 (The War Office 1922, pp. 83-89).
The 31,390 desertion and 51,249 absence DCM trials are not my subject. The DCM could only impose a
maximum sentence of two years of imprisonment. Historical discussions of sentences for desertion often
do not distinguish between DCM and FGCM, and make ambiguous statements, e.g., 46% of desertion
trials in July 1915 resulted in sentences of less than three months (Corns and Hughes-Wilson 2007, p.
216). Citations to War Office statistics may not distinguish between DCM and FGCM trials.
42Officers had 3-4 furloughs a year; elite soldiers could get 10 days/year. All soldiers eventually received
a furlough with 1 year’s service, but leave would be cancelled if there was a military engagement.
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absent for 21 days.43 However, “in any case of doubt as to whether [desertion or absence
without leave] has been committed, the court should find the accused guilty of the less[er]
offense.”44 The offense of absence did not typically receive the death penalty.
Historians were previously unsure whether soldiers convicted for desertion were invari-
ably sentenced to death in FGCM trials.45 Only Jahr (1998)’s statistical analysis of 7
divisions (analyzing the same data source that I digitized) found that all FGCM trials
for desertion resulted in conviction, but not every trial resulted in a death sentence.46
My analysis of all 144,609 FGCM trials, of which, 13,309 are for desertion, is consistent
with Jahr—all but 3% of soldiers tried for desertion were convicted, but a small fraction
(13%) received the death sentence.47 If the true conviction rate is somewhere near 100%,
then the official statistics of 7,361 desertion trials and 2,004 desertion death sentences,
suggests a death sentencing rate near 27%. (Since FGCM trial registrars were handwritten
and hand-entered, my FGCM numbers may not match the official statistics.)
Regardless of the reason for issuing a death sentence, what is important for causal
identification is whether executions, conditional on death sentences, are quasi-random.
To put it another way, commutations serve as a control for factors associated with a
death sentence when I examine the impact of executions.
Neither soldiers at the time nor British military historians knew about the low rate of
death sentences for convicted deserters. I found only three pieces of the historical record
that are relevant and they have ambiguous interpretation. First, on a deserter’s charge
sheet, an officer recommends the death sentence because the soldier had absented him-
self shortly after another soldier’s conviction and lesser sentence was promulgated: “I am
firmly of the opinion that the crime was deliberately committed with the intention of
avoiding duty on the Redan, more particularly as he absented himself shortly after the
case of another soldier had been promulgated for a similar crime. The Officer commanding
the man’s Company is of the same opinion. Sentence was remitted in the case mentioned
to 2 years Hard Labour” (WO 71/450.). However, a conventional reading of the evidence
would suggest that what was promulgated was a conviction for absence (as opposed to
desertion) that resulted in a 2 years hard labor sentence.48 In a second record, a First Di-
43Someone missing for 21 days was presumed to be a deserter (Putkowski and Sykes 2007, pp. 13-14;
King’s Regulations and Orders for the Army, 1914, Para. 673, p. 149, Para. 514, p. 117).
44Retrieved from http://archive.org/stream/manualofmilitary00greauoft#page/19/mode/1up. Graham-
Harrison, ed 1907 III.20, p. 19. A free login is necessary for viewing.
45Email with Putkowski on February 20, 2015 stating the difficulty in knowing what happened to convicted
deserters who were not sentenced to death as no one knows and it is otherwise speculation.
46By the end of 1917, sentences of over 5 years of imprisonment constituted an increasing share, while
death sentences constitute a decreasing share of sentences for desertion.
47449 (3%) of desertion trials resulted in “not guilty” and 1720 (13%) resulted in a death sentence.
48Crimes of absence and desertion are described separately in the General Rou-
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vision brigadier wrote: “Every infantry officer of experience will confirm my opinion that
there comes a point when men will risk imprisonment or penal servitude rather than carry
on their ordinary duty. They know that long sentences inflicted in war are whittled down
as they pass up the military hierarchy and that if a sentence is not ended before the end of
the war they may look forward to an amnesty at the end of hostilities” (Babington 1983,
pp. 18-19). This quotation does not speak to the question of whether soldiers knew that
death sentences would be whittled down as they passed up the military hierarchy (and
therefore the existence of lesser sentences for desertions). Moreover, this writing occurred
before the Suspension of Sentences Act (March 1915) that ensured any imprisonment or
penal servitude, the topic of the quotation, would be served after the war. As for acquit-
tals, they were not published in the general routine orders, nor were they promulgated on
parade (Committee to Enquire into the Law and Rules of Procedure Regulating Military
Courts-Martial/Chairman Lord Darling 1919, para. 87). Returns would not be formally
announced. A third source is relevant to whether the low rate of death sentences for con-
victed deserters was public knowledge: “In a trial of a member of His Majesty’s Forces, in
which a conviction results, the result is always made public by means of the promulgation
of the finding and sentence.”49 However, military regulations stated that informing the
offender and no one else of the charge, finding, sentence, and confirmation will be suffi-
cient promulgation to satisfy this rule (Army Act s. 53, note). Moreover, it is unlikely that
the 130,936 FGCM convictions were circulated to the entire army—over 90 convictions a
day would be unlikely to be remembered if circulated across the entire B.E.F.50 Widely
circulating a large number of convictions that did not lead to death sentences would be
inconsistent with repeated admonishments that “it should be remembered that on active
service the usual penalty is death” for leaving post, cowardice, sleeping on post, and vi-
olence to inhabitants among other offenses (GRO signed by Smith-Dorrien, Commander
of 2nd Army B.E.F. France and Flanders, February 11, 1915 WO 95/646).51
tine Orders (GRO)—a sample of which is available at archive.org, e.g.,
https://archive.org/details/21stInfantryBattalionPartIiOrders1915-1919 and Appendix Figure 12C.
Appendix Figures 12D and 12E display the relative frequency of these words.
49Undersecretary of State for War Military Harold Tennant, Hansard HC Deb. vol. 82 col. 2911, 1 June
1916. Retrieved from http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1916/jun/01/courts-martial-1.
50My and Jahr (1998)’s findings of the low rate of death sentences for convicted deserters appear not to
have been publicly known, suggesting little attention was paid to these convictions even if circulated.
51Unit orders disseminated disciplinary information from higher to lower formations and divided into
Part 1 and Part 2. Part 1 Orders addressed training, parades, tasks, duties, movements, attacks, and
warnings about behavior. These were announced on parade and posted on notice boards. Part 2 Or-
ders recorded everything affecting individual soldiers’ status, pay, fines, punishments, promotion, and
posting to other formations. These were circulated to the paymaster and officer in charge of records.
A sample of the Part 2 Orders has been transcribed, but most Part 2 Orders were destroyed in WW2
bombings. A few samples are available for the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 21st Infantry Battalion:
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I have not come across any primary or secondary source mentioning public knowledge
of low rate of death sentences for convicted deserters, which would have been incredibly
demoralizing if widely known.52 Therefore, soldiers had no way to know that executions
were random and had no doubt about executions of deserters.
2.5 Affirm or Commute? After a death sentence was issued, each of that soldier’s
commanding officers (in the battalion, brigade, division, corps, and army) had to submit
his opinion to confirm or commute based on three factors: 1) a soldier’s fighting character
and general behavior, 2) discipline within his unit, and 3) whether the crime had been in-
tentional. Once the paperwork was complete, the Commander-in-Chief made the ultimate
decision, which some historians characterize as a “pitiless lottery” (Babington 1983).53
The leading alternative hypothesis, that the Irish were disproportionately targeted and
executed, does not hold up, conditional on the death sentence. In my data, 19% of death
sentences and 17% of executions were of Irish soldiers.54 Likewise, divisions that had more
Irish were not disproportionately targeted.55 The data further reject speculations that sol-
diers who previously had a (suspended) death sentence were more likely to be executed,
or that officers received special treatment.56 One newspaper article alleges “frontline eu-
https://archive.org/details/21stInfantryBattalionPartIiOrders1915-1919 (free login). The sample shows
a long daily list of soldiers across many pages (Appendix Figure 12B). A word search for “deserter”
yields several men “struck off” the rolls after a court of inquiry and a search for “desertion” yields
courts martial sentences and men put back on the rolls as returned “from desertion”. In contrast, Part
1 Orders are often under a page and a subset marked as “published for information” (Appendix Figure
12A). Part 2 Orders were unlikely to be read on parade. Email from Putkowski on May 28, 2015. Unit
orders meant to be confidential were not allowed to be distributed (The War Office 1914a, p. 58),
which is consistent with returns not being formally announced. See also The War Office 1914b, p. 33,
https://archive.org/stream/pt1fieldservicer00greauoft#page/32/mode/2up.
52Email from Geoff Bridger on October 24, 2015.
53Identical extenuating circumstances were accepted or rejected (Department of Foreign Affairs 2004, p.
3). Over 2 death sentences per day precluded careful consideration by Commanders-in-Chief (Oram
2003, p. 55). Each dossier had a one-page summary, outlining the offense, character, fighting qualities,
disciplinary record, unit performance, and lower-level officers’ opinions on whether to execute. Officers
at the corps and army level could seal a man’s fate, while lower-level officer recommendations (division
and below), whose career concerns disincentivized reporting indiscipline, were basically ignored (Oram
2003, p.129; Babington 1983, pp. 78-79, 103). In most cases the court martial, in passing a sentence of
death also recommended mercy (Oram 2003, p. 127). The Commander-in-Chief’s disregard of clemency
recommendations (Babington 1983, pp. 78-79) contributes to the retrospective view of executions as
a pitiless lottery. No official commutation goals appear to have existed—no written statements and
insufficient evidence of coordination of commutation fractions across all theatres or time.
54Overcount of Irish via surname dictionaries applies to both death sentences and executions.
55In Figures 2A and 2B, the green proportion of vertical tick marks for each division represents the Irish
proportion of soldiers. Irish-heavy divisions do not appear to deviate from the 12% line.
5692% of commutations and 95% of executions are of first-time death sentences. Some suggest class bias
(Oram 2003; Department of Foreign Affairs 2004). Officers, who typically came from the elite (Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs 2004, p. 12), constitute 4.4% of death sentences and 7% of executions. Other
observers claim the opposite bias: Commander-in-Chief Douglas Haig ordered more officers be exe-
cuted (Burke 2001, Retrieved from http://theguardian.com/uk/2001/feb/11/jasonburke.theobserver),
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genics” to explain a spike in death sentences of men from the 35th Division, because
it was composed of unusually short men (Burke 2001). However, Figure 11 shows that
while there was a spike in death sentences in the 35th Division, there was no spike in the
execution rate. I present a full set of statistical tests in Section 5.57
Collective confirmations may have been decided jointly and be non-random. Comman-
ders did appear to execute soldiers in pairs, for example, in the cases of two friends
deserting together (see Putkowski and Sykes 2007, p. 64). In the data, all executed sol-
diers whose trials were held on the same day and came from the same division were also
from the same battalion, and with one exception, they were also executed on the same
day.58 Chi-square tests also reject the independence of decisions in the rare instances of
British and Irish soldiers being sentenced to death on the same day and in the same di-
vision. Therefore, based on the assessment of the history and the data, I treat multiple
observations of executions on the same day in the same division as one execution when I
assess serial correlation in execution decisions, and do the same with commutations.
2.6 Commutations Soldiers convicted of desertion were typically detained, awaiting
final sentence (Babington 1983).59 The final decision occurred within two weeks. Com-
muted sentences were suspended and served after the war, and the soldier sent back
immediately to the trenches.60 Military authorities were always very anxious to ensure
that either a spell in jail or detention was not viewed by soldiers as a way of avoiding front
line service. I do not have the date of commutation in the court martial registers. I there-
fore impute commutation dates in three ways: 14 days from trial, the nearest-execution’s
length of time between death sentence and execution date, or trial dates only.61
Commuted sentences basically slipped into the night.62 Men were not told immediately
but conditional on death sentence, officers were not significantly more likely to be executed.
57Even strict randomness is not necessary, if the reasons to execute are uncorrelated with desertion.
58In 70% of the cases of commuted soldiers from the same division and whose trials were on the same
day, the soldiers came from the same battalion. Chi-square tests with simulated p-values reject the
hypothesis of independent decisions regarding death sentences on the same date and division.
59Major Christopher Lowther (Assistant Provost Marshall 1917-1919, Member of Parliament
for North Cumberland 1918-1922), Hansard HC Deb. vol. 127, pp. 1603-4, 13 April
1920. Retrieved from http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1920/apr/13/new-clause-death-
sentences-appeal#column_1603. In some cases, they were immediately thrown back into the trenches
(Oram 2003) with the information that the sentence was being reviewed.
60Through good conduct, soldiers with sentences to be served after the war could re-
duce or completely eliminate their sentence. Undersecretary of State for War Military
Harold Tennant, Hansard HC Deb. vol. 70, pp. 1212-3, 8 March 1915 (available at
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1915/mar/08/army-suspension-of-sentences-bill).
61Commuted sentences could be hard labor, penal servitude, imprisonment, being tied to a fixed object
for several hours per day (“crucifixion”), or rank reduction; sometimes they were “quashed” (vacated).
The soldier would be returned by military police or soldiers picking up reinforcements. Email from
Putkowski on November 20, 2011. Since commutations were not known, I do not use this data.
62Email on December 24, 2007 from Gerard Oram.
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what was their sentence – just that they had been guilty. This is supposedly because
the sentence only became legal when it was confirmed by the Commander-in-Chief. The
judges serving on a court martial had to swear “not to divulge the sentence of the court
until it is duly confirmed.”63 A commutation is not an acquittal. According to the Army
Act, s. 54(3)64, acquittals were to be read out in open court. However, if he was convicted,
a soldier would not know the nature of the conviction (e.g., on the charge of desertion,
whether he was convicted for desertion or for the lesser offense of absence without leave)
or sentence until the night before they were promulgated (Babington 1983, pp. 15, 17).
Officers would likely not have wanted to publicize commutations for fear of subsequent
indiscipline in their unit and career concerns of perceived indiscipline.65 Official statistics
on death sentences, commutations, and executions were not made public until April 1920
(Corns and Hughes-Wilson 2007, p. 407).66 Compared to the plentiful primary sources
in diaries, letters, and memoirs indicating that executions were known, there is scarce
evidence that commutations were known. The two exceptions to the rule are first-hand
accounts from the Western Front of announcements of commutations of death sentences
(Carrington 1965, p. 128; Arthur 2002, p. 173). Historians are doubtful regarding these
accounts.67 The first memoir is not correct in the recollection of crimes and dates.68
The second account is written in a first-hand perspective but without primary source or
interview.69 A second-hand source attests that a convicted soldier would know about their
death sentence before the execution or commutation decision: he would receive a secret
envelope with the death sentence along with the information that the sentence was liable
to revision by higher authority.70 This would likely have only occurred after April 17, 1918
63Graham-Harrison, ed 1907, pp. 318-9, Retrieved from http://archive.org/stream/
manualofmilitary00greauoft#page/319/mode/1up. A free login is necessary for viewing.
64Graham-Harrison, ed 1907, p. 322, Retrieved from http://archive.org/stream/
manualofmilitary00greauoft#page/322/mode/1up. A free login is necessary for viewing.
65If soldiers knew about their own commutation, they would not want others to know. Known deserters
would face social censure or worse. A Regimental Medical Officer wrote: “To gratify a mawkish human-
itarianism two or three score mean fellows are encouraged to slip away every time there is risk to their
skins, so more and more average men learn to shirk with impunity; attacks fail, and losses run into
untold thousands, because the most dutiful of our men are not backed up” (Dunn 1987, p. 410).
66The Darling Report in Nov. 1919 revealed 89% of death sentences were commuted but not the numbers.
67Email from Putkowski on July 10, 2013.
68Carrington reports 3 deserters sentenced to death whose penalties were commuted to 3 months field
punishment. But in Carrington’s unit, 3 death sentences were given out on June 11, 1916, all for Quit-
ting–not deserting–and all commuted to 2 years hard labor. Three death sentences in other battalions
in his regiment were commuted to 3 months field punishment, but the death penalties were handed
down on February 7, 1915, before Carrington’s unit arrived in France on March 22, 1915.
69Arthur’s account is more literary rather than historical. Email from Putkowski on July 10, 2013.
70Christopher Lowther (Assistant Provost Marshall 1917-1919, Member of Parliament for North Cum-
berland 1918-1922), Hansard HC Deb. vol. 127, pp. 1603-4, 13 April 1920.
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when the Under Secretary for War, Macpherson, announced that those sentenced to death
would be informed of the sentence prior to confirmation, rather than after confirmation,
as had been the previous policy (Peaty 1999, pp. 208-209).
I have not found any general routine order that mentioned a commutation—or a lesser
sentence—for a convicted deserter in primary or secondary sources. Despite the potential
for commuted death sentences to be widely known for cases other than desertion,71 there is
nothing written of public outrage over commuted death sentences. Executions were likely
the only news about death sentences transmitted to the typical soldier. The fact that
there are no dates of commutations preserved in news circulars provides further evidence
consistent with there being no public announcement of commutations of death sentences,
and that commuted sentences basically did slip into the night, with little awareness of
randomization.72 In addition, some soldiers did not believe executions took place at all
(Johnson 2015, p. 110), so their beliefs would be updated from a null prior.
2.7 Executions Executions typically occurred within a few days after a confirmation
and the morning after the decision reached the soldier, within two weeks of the original
death sentence.73 After confirmation of a death sentence, there would be a special parade
of the condemned man’s unit on the evening before the soldier’s execution, during which
officers from the unit read extracts from the evidence at his trial, the findings and sentence
of the court, and the order of confirmation by the Commander-in-Chief. Promulgation was
to take place in front of as many men as could be made available (Babington 1983). Often,
promulgation involved the entire battalion, sometimes other battalions in the brigade, but
probably not the entire division, whose encampment could stretch for 15 miles.
Executions were usually carried out by a squad from the victim’s battalion,74 often
witnessed by the entire battalion or whatever companies were at hand.75 Hearsay, rumor,
and newspapers (Sellers 2003) spread the word, once the shocked members of a firing
71Some GRO mention commuted death sentences for other crimes. However, GRO would be circulated
in writing only to officers (usually a Captain) and unlikely to be passed to troops. A subset would be
announced on parade, usually three per day, and written orders posted outside company headquarters
or guardroom. Email from Putkowski on May 27, 2015. Execution threats were repeated: “for the
following offences, it should be remembered that on active service the usual penalty is death” even
when commutations were mentioned (GRO signed by Smith-Dorrien, Commander of 2nd Army B.E.F.
France and Flanders, February 11, 1915 WO 95/646; Routine Orders signed by Major General H.F.M.
Wilson, Commander of 4th Division, B.E.F. France & Flanders, March 23, 1915 WO 95/1449).
72The government kept death sentences quiet, and records were not public for 75 years. There are only
soldiers’ speculations that soldiers who would otherwise have been executed were instead compelled to
take part in the forefront of the first available raid or assault on the enemy.
73Email from Putkowski on February 4, 2008.
74If the soldier did not die in the initial volley, an officer was on hand with a pistol to provide the coup
de grâce (Department of Foreign Affairs 2004, p. 8).
75Email from Putkowski on December 24, 2007.
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squad shared their feelings with comrades (Corns and Hughes-Wilson 2007). The number
of references to executions in diaries, letters and memoirs is testament to their impact.76
By mid-1916, public spectacles like this declined for a number of reasons and, in some
Army areas (e.g., the Ypres Salient and the Somme), a prison or detention center was used
for the execution of men from many units, and the firing squads were not always composed
of men from their own battalions.77 While this presumably weakens any treatment effects,
the condemned soldier’s fellow soldiers would learn about the execution, even if they did
not personally witness it. News about all executions was also formally circulated via Part 2
of Army Orders, so that the name, unit, offense, nature, time, and date of punishment was
circulated throughout the theatre of operations. The details were read aloud on parade
and were pinned up on notice boards (Sellers 2003). To the extent that soldiers paid
attention to executions elsewhere, this would also tend to weaken the treatment effect
since the treatment and control groups become more similar. By 1918, those executed
were unlikely to have involved more than those immediately at hand for the killing or
supervising the ritual.78 Accordingly, the analyses that examine the day-by-day response
to executions end the timeframe in January 1918.
Infrequency of executions likely made them more salient. My data indicate that a typ-
ical Regular infantry, New Army, and Territorial Force division saw 2.5, 1.25, and 0.5
executions per year, respectively. Only a small handful of soldiers were involved in the ex-
ecution or eyewitness to the body.79 Despite or because of the small number of executions
actually observed by the typical soldier, an officer was quoted as saying, “it was only fear
of death that kept them at their posts” (Moore 1975, p. 62).
As a point of comparison, an estimated 2,000 French soldiers were condemned to death
and 35% executed. The French army required their divisions to march past the dead
body.80 30,000 to 40,000 French soldiers in two-thirds of the divisions were involved in
mutinies (Englander 1998, pp.192, 196-197; Beckett 2007, pp. 306-307). I next turn to the
76For many soldiers, the experience of witnessing an execution and the fear generated by the rumors
circulating in the trenches were a profound part of the wartime experience (Oram 2003). One soldier
wrote about shooting his comrades, “It’s the only thing I look back on in my military career with
shame.” A witness to another execution wrote, “I witnessed a shooting. ... It shook me a bit” (Sellers
2003). Another wrote, “The discipline out here is very severe. Men found absent or drunk or found out
of bounds are tried by Court Martial and several men have been shot for straying away from camp.
One was shot this morning” (Adamson 1997). “The Corporal was shot in Happy Valley. For discipline’s
sake his whole Battalion was paraded to witness the proceeding. Other Battalions of the Brigade were
close by. The Battalion was called to attention, and the firing party were ordered to fire” (Dalton 1986).
Sometimes eyewitnesses felt sorry for the firing squad, likely not what the army intended.
77Email from Putkowski on December 24, 2007.
78Email from Putkowski on September 23, 2015.
79I cannot distinguish effects on firing squad, eyewitnesses, and those who heard about executions.
80Email from Putkowski on November 4, 2012.
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question of whether observing executions could deter or spur desertions.
2.8 Duty, Shame, and Honor Soldiers’ motivations differed. Patriotism drew some
while monetary considerations like unemployment drove others (Beckett and Simpson,
eds 1985). Annual pay for soldiers was twice the pay of agricultural laborers, at least circa
1886 (Karsten 1983). At the war’s onset, pamphlets and posters used social pressure to
increase enlistment. Women’s groups encouraged their members to give white feathers
(the sign of the coward) to men who appeared to be of military age to shame them into
service (Gullace 1997). Recruitment posters also emphasized duty.81 Duty, shame, honor
were relevant even after conscription commenced in March 1916, as over 50% of conscripts
successfully filed for exemption (The War Office 1922).
The Irish were less likely to be motivated by duty, shame, and honor.82 An 1898 letter
from an Irish recruit said, “ ‘if her [Victoria] or her leaders ever turns with cruelty on
the Irish race, I will be the first that will raise my sword to fight against her,’ and in
this regard he was sure that he would have ‘plenty of Irishmen at my side, for they are
known to be the bravest race in the world.” ’ (Karsten 1983). During World War I, British
commanding officers made explicit references to the Irish race as inferior and degenerate
(Oram 1998, 2003, pp. 9-10) and Irish soldiers, in turn, perceived contempt and disregard
from the British officers (Jahr 1998) and harsh treatment by the High Command for
executing so many Irish (Walker 2007, pp. 63-64). Of the 206,000 Irishmen who served in
the British forces (Campbell 2005; Jeffery 2000, pp. 6-7), one out of every 600 received a
death sentence (Department of Foreign Affairs 2004, p. 12),83 whereas of the 5.2 million
British who served (The War Office 1922), one out of every 2000 received a death sentence.
This disproportionate sentencing (which could reflect discrimination or different rates of
indiscipline), in conjunction with separatist events back home, such as the Easter Rising
of 1916 that left 450 dead and 2,614 wounded in Dublin (Foy and Barton 2001, pp. 210-
81Examples of Parliamentary Recruiting Committee posters: http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/14592
and http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/28450.
82From August 1914-December 1915, 7.8% of Irish men, 24.2% of English and Welsh, and 26.9% of Scots
aged 15-49 enlisted. After January 1916 to the end of the war, an additional 3.8% of Irish, 22.1% of
English and Welsih, and 14.6% of Scots aged 15-49 enlisted (Public Record Office 1920). Irish numbers
are lower partly due to politics. Although recruiting in Ireland had “almost ceased” by mid-1916,
conscription in Ireland, deemed as “politically unacceptable”, was never introduced (Perry 1994, p. 81).
83“Death sentences can be grouped into countries by reference to the regiment (emphasis added) in which
each soldier was serving, thus enabling a comparison with the numbers recruited.” p. 10. The report
relies on Oram (1998), p. 59: 134,202 men were recruited from Ireland and 239 men in Irish regiments
were sentenced to death. If regiment proxies for nationality, then 1 in 561.5 Irish were sentenced to
death. Oram uses regiment to proxy for ethnicity since, of the 125 executed soldiers’ parent’s addresses
in the Imperial War Graves Commission database, 95 are within the traditional recruitment area of the
executed man’s regiment. He concludes that regiment proxies for origin in at least 76% of the cases.
Perry (1994), p. 69, identified the nationalities of all Irish regiment fatalities and reports 30% were born
outside Ireland. Appendix D analyzes all fatalities using Google Maps.
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211),84 suggests that the Irish felt less of a duty to fight.85 Even before the Easter Rising,
U.S. newspapers noted cases of Irish officers deserting to fight for the German forces.86
Germany also attempted to supply arms to Irish nationalists for the Easter Rising.87
Irish identity was retained throughout service. Customs such as the wearing of shamrock
sprigs on St. Patrick’s Day were distinctive features of the Irish regiments, and sources
of their pride and espirit de corps (Karsten 1983). Identity considerations likely increased
the cost of following the law for the Irish soldiers who traded off the duty to fight with
the material consequences for desertion. If punishment is perceived as unfair, then it
can reduce the legitimacy of authority and the “ought” justification for following the
law. The most extreme sanction available to authority was the death penalty. Since the
death penalty was such a visible and extreme form of punishment, we might expect more
executions to lead to a decrease in perceived legitimacy of the authority and consequently
more Irish desertion. While the Irish were only 3.9% of UK soldiers in France and Flanders,
they received 13.2% of death sentences according to official statistics (see Campbell 2005;
Jeffery 2000, pp. 6-7; Oram 1998, p. 59). Using surname dictionaries, I identify Irish
soldiers among 21% of the desertions, 20% of the FGCM desertion and absentee trials,
19% of the death sentences, and 17% of the executions. Even if surname dictionaries yield
an over-estimate of the Irish proportion by 50%, adjusting for this would indicate that the
Irish deserted at 3.5 times the rate of the non-Irish (4% of soldiers but 14% of deserters).88
2.9 Battle Conditions and Mortality While casualty rates were high, they were
not as high (on average) as the probability of death conditional on desertion. Deserters
were absent from the trenches for 4 weeks (2 weeks in hiding plus 2 weeks in detention).
Of the 7,361 trials for desertion, 2,007 resulted in a death sentence, and of these, only
84Some attribute a drop in Irish recruitment to the Easter Rising, though a substantial drop began even
before the Rising as noted in government reports (Cmd 8168 1916; House of Commons HMSO; Report
on Recruiting in Ireland 1914-16, Cmd. 8168, vol. 39). The drop in recruitment led to the disbandment
of 48% of Irish battalions and the remaining Irish battalions becoming comprised of only 56% Irish by
the end of the war (Perry 1994, p. 69) as commanders began refilling divisions with people from any
geographic background after the devastation of the Somme in order to prevent villages losing an entire
cohort in a single battle (Fitzpatrick 1996). This also renders Irish regiment a poor analysis unit.
85This may still be true even after conscription began in March 1916 (Easter Rising being in April).
86Chi. Daily Trib., Mar. 20, 1916; Appendix Figure 2.
87News of the Rising took several weeks to reach the front. Some Irish suffered increased hostility (Leonard
1996) and Parliament became more reluctant to see Irish battalions being bailed out after the Rising
(Perry 1994, pp. 70, 81). But the Rising did not weaken Irish morale (Denman 1992); loyalty to regiment
and comrades insulated them from changing attitudes at home (Perry 1994, p. 89). When Germans
opposite the Munsters held up signs indicating that Dubliners were being shot by “British” troops, the
Munsters sang “God Save the King” (Karsten 1983). Appendix Figures 10A-10C shows no discontinuity
on Irish desertion at April 29, 1916, the date the Easter Rising ended, using local polynomials.
88Appendix D analyzing birthplace also reaches the conclusion that Irish soldiers were less inclined to
fight. Previous historiography on Irish outcomes has not been conducted at the individual level.
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12% were confirmed, so on net, a soldier had a 3.3% chance of dying because he deserted
during this month. The other 96.7% of the time, a deserter would be sent back to the
trenches and face the same continuation probability of death.
Using the number 552,471 for British deaths in France and Flanders and assuming a
constant 11,500 soldiers dying per month, then a soldier had a 0.5%89 chance of dying in
any given month. Soldiers may also desert to avoid debilitating injury. I work backwards
from aggregate statistics to calculate the monthly debilitation rate. The peak strength of
the British Army in France and Flanders was 2 million, and 5.4 million saw some service in
this theatre. Assuming 2 million served each year and a constant replacement of soldiers,
then the typical soldier’s length of service was 1.5 years. If the probabilities of debilitating
injury or death in any given month are independent across months, and 50% of soldiers
are out of commission by 18 months, then a soldier had a 4% chance90 of leaving in any
given month. Then we can allocate 3.5% chance of debilitating injury in any month.
In total, 12% of soldiers were killed serving on the Western Front, while an additional
37.6% were wounded (Urlanis 2003; The War Office 1922, p. 246).91 Considering that for
every front-line infantryman there were about three soldiers in support (artillery, supply,
medical, etc.), then almost all fighting soldiers sustained some form of injury: If we assume
that fighting soldiers, rather than support soldiers, constitute all of the casualties then,
we may estimate that a soldier continuously in active and fighting mode faced a 48%92
chance of being killed over his entire length of service and a nearly 100% chance of being
injured.93 But, on the margin, during the month of absence, a soldier would avoid 0.5%
chance of death (on average) and face 3.3% chance of execution.
To be sure, the chance of dying was maximum at the front, so if my calculations of the
casualty rate are conservative at the moment of desertion, the low overall rate of desertion
(1%) is perhaps all the more surprising since the local probabilities might appear to favor
desertion in every case. This in turn might suggest that duty or legitimacy played a more
important role than material considerations (Beckett and Simpson, eds 1985). The degree
of discipline and duty is suggested by a soldier’s recollection of a man with a wound in
the head asking for permission before falling out of line (Lt. Colonel John Lucy 1938).
8911,500 divided by 2 million = 0.5%.
90To see this, (1-0.04)^18 = 50%.
91Disease was World War I’s greatest killer. Medical services were primitive and there were no antibiotics.
Poor sanitary conditions in the trenches led to dysentery, typhus, and cholera. In comparison, only 5%
of soldiers were killed during the Second Boer War and 4.5% during World War II.
92One fighting solder with three supporting soldiers yields 4 x 12% = 48% probability of death.
934 x 37.6% > 100%. Many soldiers received more than one injury during the course of their service.
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3 An Economic Theory of Legitimacy
3.1 Model A soldier makes the decision to fight (f = 1) or desert (f = 0). Assume
that a soldier weighs the benefits of desertion, B (avoiding 1 month in the trenches,
etc.), and the costs of desertion, broken down into: 1) Economic costs, C, including the
probability of being executed, p; 2) Psychological costs, vi, from not meeting one’s duty
(i = I for Irish; B for British); and 3) Social costs, ∆i, the inference that others make
about the soldier’s loyalty conditional on his action: ∆i ≡ E (vi | 1, i) − E (vi | 0, i).94
Agents put a positive weight µ on ∆i. B and p are the same for both groups.95
Following Bénabou and Tirole (2012), I assume an inverted-U shaped distribution of
loyalties vi with cumulative distribution function G and density g. vi is assumed to be
always positive because of strong group loyalty developed in army units. I introduce a
taste-shifter, θi, the perceived public good of fighting for the British crown (θI < θB).96
The soldier makes the decision to fight by maximizing: U (f, i) = (vi + θi)f + (B −
C (p))(1−f) +µE (vi | f, i). Then if f = 1 : U (1, i) = vi + θi +µE (vi | 1, i) and if f = 0 :
U (0, i) = B −C (p) + µE (vi | 0, i). Normalize the benefits to deserting as c = B −C (p),
so: if f = 1 : U (1) = vi + θi − c+ µE (vi | 1, i) and if f = 0 : U (0) = µE (vi | 0, i).
This expression provides a cutoff rule, since if a soldier chooses to fight f = 1 at some vi,
then he would also choose f = 1 at any v > vi, holding others’ actions fixed in equilibrium.
This is because social and economic motivations are fixed, while the psychological moti-
vation increases. The cutoff rule for ethnicity i will satisfy: v∗,i + θi − c+ µE (vi | 1, i) =





G(v∗) . A fixed point solves the equation: v
∗,i + θi − c+ µ∆ (v∗,i) = 0.
A sufficient condition for a fixed point is if 1 + µ∆′ (v∗,i) > 0. If ∆ (v∗,i) is increasing,
then any tendency that increases the number of deserters (shifting the cutoff v∗,i right-
wards) faces the counterveiling force that raises the social esteem of fighting. The more
that soldiers perceive others to be deserting, the greater honor there is to being a fighter.
94∆i is analogous to esteem (Ellingsen and Johannesson 2008) and can include self-image (Bénabou and
Tirole 2011; Chen et al. 2014c; 2015b; 2016), if soldiers believed fog-of-war prevented identification.
95Casualty rates and the probability of execution conditional on absence were the same. The number of
Irish deaths was 27,405, so their 13.3% casualty rate out of 206,000 enlisted is similar to the overall
casualty rate of 12%. The Irish Divisions (the 10th, 16th and 36th) were not disproportionately targeted
for harsh assignments. I cannot rule out the possibility that the Irish were assigned to harsher locations
and better fighters. Also, soldiers with Irish surnames constituted 21% of the desertions and 17% of the
executions. In any case, B and p only affect the cutoff rule, which is already allowed to be group-specific.
96Over 50% of conscripts successfully filed for exemption (The War Office 1922). Appendix Figure 11A
shows no impact of conscription on the British share of UK deserters (e.g., during training). Instead,
Appendix Figure 11B shows a marked reduction in the Irish share of UK deserters after the Easter
Rising. I suspect the Easter Rising reduced Irish enlistment, so fewer would desert during training
(perhaps to prove their loyalty). Home rule was suspended for Ireland in 1914. Irish served often for
economic reasons; only a small fraction to demonstrate their loyalty to the British crown (Myers 2013).
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If ∆ (v∗,i) is decreasing, then desertion has strategic complementarities. The more that
soldiers perceive others to be deserting, the more normalized it becomes, and the more
likely he will desert as well. Since executions affect c, which affects the cutoff v∗,i, there
is a social multiplier:
∣∣∣∂v∗,i∂c ∣∣∣ = 11+µ∆′(v∗,i) .97
A soldier’s response to an execution depends on three expressions:
g(v∗,i)
G(v∗,i)











∣∣∣∂v∗,i∂µ ∣∣∣ = g(v∗,i)G(v∗,i) ∆(v∗,i)1+µ∆′(v∗,i) . I assume µ is constant in what fol-
lows,98 but my data cannot rule in or out direct shifts in preference parameters.99
3.2 Deter or Spur? In the absence of social and psychological considerations, an
exogenous increase in p yields fewer desertions.
Fact 1 If µ = 0—the decision is only based on C(p), then executions can only affect c,
and increases in p yield fewer desertions.
Suppose social and psychological considerations are present, but executions only affect
c. The social multiplier reinforces the deterrent effect of executions, but the degree of
reinforcement differs.100 In my application, the New Army saw less battle (lower c) than
the Regular Army, shifting the cutoff rule to the left. If ∆′ < 0 and ∆′′ > 0, the New
Army would see greater deterrence than the Regular Army.101
Fact 2 If µ > 0, then executions have a social multiplier effect: greater deterrence in
communities where non-compliance is rare.
Thus far, executions only lead to deterrence. Spurring (backlash or delegitimization)
occurs only with an expressive effect of executions on θi or µ. θi could fall by increasing
the perceived number of deserters or decreasing the perceived fairness or value of the
public good. If expressive effects exceed deterrence, then spurring occurs.
97Jewitt’s (2004) lemma shows the shape of ∆ mirrors the density g: if g is everywhere decreasing
(increasing), then ∆ is everywhere increasing (decreasing). If g has a unique interior maximum, then
∆ has a unique interior minimum. This is because adding a small mass around the cutoff will shift one
truncated mean more than the other. Illustrative Figure 7 is adapted from Bénabou and Tirole (2012).
98Even the Easter Rising did not increase (instead it decreased) Irish desertions in Figure 11B (Police
Gazette desertions mostly in the UK) and Figure 10B (B.E.F. desertions). Nor do we see an increase
in Irish desertions in the three different absentee datasets (Appendix Figures 10A-10C). Even Irish
proportion of death sentences and executions were unaffected (Appendix Figures 10D-10E), further
rendering unlikely a channel for differential treatment and µ shift.
99A complementary interpretation allows Irish executions to reduce vf,I . The difference is semantic.
100This assumes that ∆′ < 0 and ∆′′ > 0 for which there is some evidence (Besley et al. 2015; Jia
and Persson 2015). It also assumes that sanctioners rationally impose sanctions and that potential
law-breakers rationally update on the cutoff, so an execution causes the cutoff to decrease.
101Heterogeneity in deterrence would be inconsistent with µ = 0 and executions only affecting θi.
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Fact 3 The key expression for delegitimization is,
∣∣∣∂v∗,i∂c ∣∣∣ ∂c∂E + ∣∣∣∂v∗,i∂θi ∣∣∣ ∂θi∂E + ∣∣∣∂v∗,i∂µ ∣∣∣ ∂µ∂E < 0,
where E represents execution (or execution rate).
Executions could also reduce µ, but there are various reasons why this empirically
appears not to have been the case. The Easter Rising did not weaken the morale of Irish
soldiers (Denman 1992), so it may be that ∂µ
∂E
= 0, which simplifies expressions. Also, we
can suppress the social multiplier terms in the conditions for delegitimization.
Fact 4 If ∂µ
∂E





Next, it is helpful to be precise about the effects for the ingroup and outgroup.







Soldiers may respond differently to executions of ingroup members. If executions of













and British would be deterred
















Since it is reasonable to think that an execution of a soldier of either ethnicity affects




> 0), we can then make the following statement.




> 0, then Irish executions spur Irish
desertions but deter British desertions, while British executions deter both.
In sum, without the legitimacy term θi, in previous models of law and norms (Bénabou









the magnitude, but not the sign—deter or spur—of the response to executions.
3.3 Commander-in-Chief’s decisions The optimizing Commander-in-Chief tak-
ing into account the delegitimizing effects of executing Irish on Irish desertions might
choose to execute Irish less and British more. Yet if this were to occur, Irish soldiers might
perceive that the commander was not executing Irish, which would reduce the deterrent
effect of the death penalty and reduce the effective p, leading to more Irish desertions. Fur-
thermore, if British officers perceived that Irish death sentences were disproportionately
commuted and perceived it as unfair, then ∂θB
∂EB








> 0. Thus, an optimizing commander might randomize between executing Irish
and executing British, and perhaps execute Irish at a lower rate to minimize the spurring
of Irish desertions while maximizing the deterrence of British desertions.103
To be sure, spurring can also occur if the Commander-in-Chief systematically made mis-








1+µ∆′(v∗,i) . Regardless, the decision-
making becomes a game where the targets of deterrence must weigh the likelihood of
being executed, conditional upon individual characteristics. As a result, a rational pun-
isher must consider this reaction when setting his decision-rules, and deterrence becomes
intimately tied to beliefs about how rules are applied and how beliefs evolve over time.104
4 Data
A full description of the data and the merging process is presented in Appendix A-C.
Death Sentences: My data includes 3,342 sentences and final decisions (Oram 2003).
Figure 8A plots the distribution of crimes for those sentenced to death, and Figure 8B
plots the distribution of crimes for commuted and confirmed death sentences.
War Diaries: Absentee lists are partially preserved in monthly war diaries. The bulk of
what was preserved is from July 1916-June 1917. Military units took roll call and atten-
dance every morning (or more frequently). Absentees would be aggregated and circulated
as a printed list for the armies at the front.
Police Gazettes: A separate absentee list is preserved in the Deserters and Absentees
(D&A) supplement to the (weekly) Police Gazette from 1914 to 1918. Compared to the
War Diaries, the D&A supplement records are much more complete. However, they include
absentees both at Home (where it was much easier to desert) and Abroad. The latter
would be marked in notes, e.g., “from B.E.F.” (e.g., see the “Marks and Remarks” column
in Appendix Figure 4). To provide a sense of data quality, Figure 9A shows the plot
of all 126,818 absences at Home or Abroad. The sharp spike in 1914 the day after the
assassination of Archduke Ferdinand suggests that quite a few soldiers were reluctant to
go to war. Other spikes are at Christmas, when I suspect soldiers are reminded of family.
FGCM: A third source of absentees is preserved in handwritten FGCM trial registers,
recording roughly 144,609 trials. There are 28,754 trials for absence and 13,309 trials for
desertion. The number of death sentences across all crimes was 2,858; the number of death
sentences for accused deserters was 1,730. These data are registers (Appendix Figure 5),
not the trial proceedings themselves, which do not exist except for executed soldiers. I
merge and analyze the FGCM data assuming that the absence occurred one month earlier.
103The optimizing Commanders-in-Chief could also be modeled as having a distaste for Irish (Rao 2014;
Chen et al. 2016c; 2016d), executing Irish more and spurring Irish absences.
104Different groups’ normative commitments evolve onto separate paths (Chen et al. 2010; 2011; 2014).
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Casualties: I utilize the Soldiers Died In the Great War database containing 658,555
casualties to proxy for point-in-time danger by unit and by date. Interactive version of
this data can be viewed at http://tinyurl.com/hwx2ctf and http://tinyurl.com/j7wqt3n
where casualties are compared with the execution rate.
Surnames: A list of 426 Irish surnames identifies soldiers of probable Irish ethnicity.
Irish effects would be underestimated if surnames miscategorize.
Service and Pension: These were obtained from Ancestry.com, comprising roughly 2
million and 1 million non-unique records. Age is only recorded in the capital sentences
data for soldiers who were executed, but age is recorded here for non-executed soldiers. I
check for correlation between the execution decision and soldier’s age.
It is necessary to choose an analysis unit.105 According to historical accounts, the division
commander was the highest-level commander whose commutation recommendation was
ignored (Oram 2003, p.129; Babington 1983, pp. 78-79, 103). If higher-level commanders’
discretion was impactful, then division is the highest level appropriate for analysis.106 To
be included in the analysis, units must contain at least 1 execution, 1 commutation, and
1 absence, which also compels using division as the lowest level appropriate for analysis.
From the War Diaries data, I identify 676 usable matches preserved mostly from July
1916 to June 1917–roughly one-third of the war. The upper panel of Figure 1 plots the
distribution of matches from 700 to 1100 days after the assassination of Archduke Fer-
dinand on June 28, 1914. The median time between trial and next recorded desertion at
the division level is about two weeks. From the Police Gazettes, I identify 3,009 B.E.F.
deserters for all four years of the War; 1,319 of these are mergeable. From the trial data,
I identify 45,824 usable matches (4,365 desertion trials) for all four years. By match, I
mean that a soldier’s battalion needs to be merged to his division, point-in-time.
Order of Battle: Battalions changed divisions throughout the war. I develop a time
history of each battle unit and the movement among divisions and brigades. A sample
appears in Appendix Figure 13. Appendix C documents how the Order of Battle was
entered. I entered 7,800 associations between battalion to brigade to division, and 770
associations between division to corp to army. Appendix B describes the merging.
All datasets were scanned digitally and then checked, with the remaining non-scannable
entries entered by hand. The inability to merge by name precludes balancing checks based
on data stored in datasets other than the death sentences.107
Medal Rolls: I use Medal Rolls Index (WO 372) to make assessments about the Irish
105While there are exceptions, in general, the sequence of military units listed from lowest to highest was:
Battalion → Regiment → Brigade → Division→ Corps → Army → Army Group.
106A division consisted of between 18,000 and 19,000 men (Corns and Hughes-Wilson 2007, p. 108).
107The one exception is age, because age is already included for all executed soldiers.
26
surname dictionary by comparing against the official statistics regarding Irish enlistment,
which I am able to do since the Medal Rolls Index contains roughly the universe of all
enlisted soldiers: 5,424,254 unique soldiers and a total of 7.8 million records.
Officers: I digitize a dataset of the 2,992 commanding officers and general staff officers
for division, corps, army, and general headquarters and the dates of their assignments and
reassignments (Becke 1935-1944). I merge these data into the Order of Battle.
Battles: The Order of Battle also contains battles and divisions associated with each
battle (towns). The towns can be entered into Google Maps, which provides geographic
coordinates. I make the albeit simple assumption that divisions travel linearly and incre-
mentally between battles to interpolate the rough location of each division on any date.
Finally, these coordinates yield calculations of distances between divisions, distance to
the English Channel, and distance to Berlin, which serve as additional controls. This data
allows estimating the approximate location of each soldier on the day of his absence.
I also use Google Maps to geolocate the enlistment towns, birthplaces, and residences of
soldiers for analysis in Appendix D, where I make five inquiries: 1) Assess how closely Irish
surname and Irish birthplace align, 2) Assess the relative loyalty of Irish and non-Irish
by birthplace, 3) Assess differences between being born in Ireland or Britain vs. being
enlisted in Ireland or Britain vs. having Irish vs. non-Irish surname, 4) Assess quality
of geolocation, and 5) Assess population representativeness of casualties. Differences in
distance-in-time to Irish roots can be related to differences between having male Irish
ancestry vs. having Irish birthplace. Those born and raised in Britain with Irish male
ancestry may be more loyal than those born and raised in Ireland, but those having male
Irish ancestry may be less loyal than those without male Irish ancestry even among soldiers
born and raised in Britain. I compare my statistics with the prior historical knowledge.
5 Assessment of Randomness
5.1 Are Decisions CorrelatedWith Observable Characteristics? Table 1 shows
the results of several regressions of observable characteristics for death sentences.108 No
specification reveals a relationship between Irish ethnicity and probability of execution.
Figure 10A illustrates that Irish soldiers were not disproportionately executed, conditional
on the death sentence. Moreover, the first column of Figure 10A shows that the Irish were
not disproportionately sentenced to death relative to the proportion of Irish absences.
The first bar shows the relative share of Irish soldiers in the War Diaries’ absentee lists.
Figure 10B shows there were no time periods when Irish capital sentences were dispro-
portionately confirmed, for example, after the Easter Rising. This result is confirmed in
the set of interactions between year and Irish displayed in Table 1 in Column 5.
108R-square increases in specifications including age because of the dummy for missing values.
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Column 2 shows that Privates were not disproportionately executed, and in fact, they
were somewhat less likely to be executed than officers. Column 3 shows that age does
not predict the execution decision. Column 4 shows that year fixed effects are jointly
significant. There appears to be a decline in execution rates over time, which is consistent
with Figure 3A. Year fixed effects will be included in the analyses in Section 6. As for
other time dimensions like seasonality and day of week, Columns 6 and 7 report that
neither month fixed effects nor day of week fixed effects are jointly significant. Column
8 shows that division fixed effects are jointly significant—division fixed effects will also
be included in the Section 6 analyses. Column 9 shows that the type of army—Regular,
New, or Territorial, with Regular being the baseline category—do not predict execution
rates. Column 10 shows that log of casualties do not predict execution rates. All log
values are calculated as 1+ the underlying variable. Casualties do not predict execution
rates regardless of whether it is measured in levels (e.g., measured 1-29, 30-59, or 60-89
days ago or 1-29 days in the future relative to the trial date) or in first-differences to
address potential serial correlation in casualties. Column 11 shows that distance to coast
and distance to Berlin also do not jointly predict execution rates. All regression analyses
restrict to death sentences occurring in France & Flanders before the end of World War
I. Death sentences recorded from the Labour Corps were also removed. Sample size varies
for army and distance specifications because not all divisions were assigned to an army,
and distance data is unavailable before the first battle and after the last battle.
Table 2 Panel A shows the results of several regressions of unit-level factors such as officer
identity and recent military indiscipline (i.e., number of military trials, death sentences,
or executions). Panel A shows that fixed effects for Brigade unit, Corp unit, and Army
unit are not jointly statistically significant. Fixed effect for officers—General Officer Com-
manding (GOC) for Brigade, Division, Corps, Army, and General Headquarters, and First
General Staff Officer (GSO) of Division, Corp, Army, and General Headquarters109—are
also not jointly statistically significant with the exception of division commanding offi-
cer which is significant at the 5% level. We may expect one or more significant effects
given the large number of tests reported. Officers and units that appear with less than 10
frequency were categorized in a separate “other” category.
Joint significance test of fixed effects for whether the officer is Irish and the soldier is
Irish do not reveal systematic differential execution probability of Irish soldiers when their
officers are British. The latter result is not due to the lack of Irish officers.110 Lagged mea-
109Brigades did not have first staff officers.
110The proportions of Irish commanding officers for soldiers who deserted or had trials are 9% for Brigade,
12% for Division GOC, 11% for Division First GSO, 7% for Corps GOC, 15% for Corps GSO, 15% for
Army GSO, 19% for General Headquarters GSO, and 0% for Army GOC and Commanders-in-Chief.
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sures (30 and 60 days ago) of log of military trials, log of death sentences, and execution
rates also do not reveal significant relationships with the current execution decision. All
regressions include fixed effects for division, year, and Irish surname.
Table 2 Panel B examines autocorrelation in execution decisions. The string of events
within each unit are stacked and the first event within each unit was excluded as a depen-
dent variable. If more than one event occurred on a day within a unit, the average outcome
was calculated. All regression models include year fixed effects and the leave-one-out (i.e.
excluding the current decision) mean execution rate of the unit.111 Separate ordinary least
squares stacked autocorrelation regressions with different levels of aggregation (division,
brigade, corp, army, army type, and global) do not show significant autocorrelation.
Table 3 repeats the exercise for all capital sentences regardless of crime. An exception to
the randomization hypothesis is that murderers were more likely to be executed relative
to other capital sentences, while privates were less likely to be executed. The lower panel
of Figure 8B shows that the overwhelming majority of executions were for deserters.
Table 4 repeats the specifications from Table 2 and two sets of fixed effects are jointly
significant at the 10% level out of 16 tests. Analyses of Tables 1 through 4 in logit or
probit specifications yield similar inferences. Finally, I report the same exercises for Irish
capital sentences in Appendix Tables 15 and 16.112
5.2 Is the Sequence of Decisions Within a Unit Non-Random? Even if con-
firmation decisions are uncorrelated with observable individual and environmental char-
acteristics, they may be correlated with unobservable time-varying characteristics within
a division, such as time-varying perceived indiscipline, officer fixed effects, or lower-level
groups or units of bad apples that may be correlated with subsequent absences. Confir-
mations may be mean reverting. Figure 11 shows that for each of the divisions separately,
while there are concentrated periods of death sentences, there do not appear to be con-
centrated periods of executions. Two animated graphs to explore relationships over time
are available at http://tinyurl.com/jbvws3f,113 which displays the cumulative measure,
and at http://tinyurl.com/gszd8m2,114 which displays “last 120 day” measures.115
111Including division fixed effects would bias the estimated relationship between the current and previous
decisions because the fixed effect is controlling for the mean (which includes the dependent variable),
inducing negative autocorrelation between any two decisions (Chen et al. 2015b).
112Besides murderers being more likely to be executed, another two tests have p < 0.05 and four tests
have p < 0.1 out of 28 individual tests and 29 joint tests of significance.
113https://dl.dropbox.com/u/64329541/divMotionChartcumSum2.html. Safari or Internet Explorer
works best for viewing, and loading of scripts may need to be manually toggled.
114https://dl.dropbox.com/u/64329541/divMotionChartrollMean2.html.
115In the graphs, the axes can be chosen by the user. For example, the user can choose to display
executions, execution rates, casualties, absences, death sentences, and time. Each division is labeled
with the actual divisional number. The diameter of the circle around each division is proportional to
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Figure 12A shows a static final snapshot indicating that execution rates in a division are
uncorrelated with total casualties in that division. Figure 12B shows another snapshot
indicating that execution rates in a division are uncorrelated with total absences (i.e.,
military discipline) in that division. This pattern is also visible in Figures 2A and 2B; the
circle sizes correspond to the number of absentees recorded in the War Diaries and Police
Gazettes respectively. The circle sizes are unrelated to deviations from the 12% line.
Figure 12C shows a snapshot of the “last 120 day” animation indicating that death
sentences and executions are positively and tightly correlated. Figure 12D shows that
absences and casualties in the last 120 days are also positively (though less tightly) cor-
related. This pattern is consistent with soldiers deserting more when battlefield danger is
high. Importantly, Figure 12E shows that casualties in the last 120 days are uncorrelated
with the execution rate in the last 120 days. This pattern is similar to with what was
found in Tables 1 and 2. Moreover, Figure 12F indicates that absences in the last 120
days are uncorrelated with execution rates. Taken together, these figures suggest that
even if the military command (more specifically, the panel of officers of field rank major,
lieutenant colonel, or colonel) took into account point-in-time danger in sentencing sol-
diers to death, the Commander-in-Chief did not make the execution decision depend on
point-in-time danger or discipline within a unit.
I next turn to a random strings test. This approach is analogous to a Fisher exact
test, except I: 1) propose a statistic that can be computed from a sequence of 1s and 0s
(executions and commutations) within a unit i. 2) compute the statistic for the actual
sequence, s∗. 3) compute the statistic for each of 1,000 bootstrap samples from the actual
sequence (i.e., sˆ1, sˆ2, sˆ3 . . . sˆn). Since there were peaks and troughs in the execution rate,
I treat the bootstrap samples as a vector of realized Bernoulli random variables, with the
probability of a success (i.e., execution) equal to the global execution rate within fifty days
of that trial time, not including the unit under consideration. 4) compute the empirical
p-value, pi by determining where s∗ fits into sˆ1, sˆ2, sˆ3 . . . sˆn. 5) repeat steps 1-4 for each i.
The statistics I use are: 1. Autocorrelation) I see if the decision made in the jth cases
depends on the outcome in the j − 1th case. This statistic can detect whether executions
are “clustered,” meaning a higher than expected number of back-to-back executions. This
test tells me whether commanders executed soldiers in pairs, for example, in the cases
of two friends deserting together (they do, and the historiographical record confirms this
(Putkowski and Sykes 2007, p. 64), so in these assessments of randomization, I treat mul-
tiple observations of executions (commutations) of death sentences whose trials occurred
on the same day and for the same division as 1 observation). The autocorrelation test also
the number of absences recorded for that unit. The colors correspond to army type.
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tells me if commanders targeted divisions for poor discipline, or if lower level brigades or
battalions generated a disproportionate share of desertions and death sentences and were
targeted for discipline. 2. Mean-Reversion) I test whether there is any form of mean re-
version in the sequence, meaning that the execution in the jth case is correlated with the
deviation of the actual execution rate in previous j− 1 cases from the expected execution
rate. This test tells me whether the Commander-in-Chief was attempting to equilibrate his
decisions, considering whether a unit was “due” for an execution or whether they became
more lenient after an execution.116 3. Longest-Run) I test whether there are abnormally
long “runs” without any executions or long runs without commutations. This test tells
me whether certain units may have been favored with commutations during certain time
periods, for example, if a unit’s commanding officer always recommended commuting a
death sentence, and the Commander-in-Chief was influenced by the lower level officer’s
recommendation, or if lower-level groups of bad apples were being targeted for executions.
I use a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) Test to test whether the empirical distribution of
p-values approaches the CDF of a uniform distribution using the one-sided critical value
with n = 46.117 Figure 13 plots the empirical distribution for my three test statistics and
the corresponding table in that figure confirms the visual intuition that the p-values are
uniformly distributed for all tests. Appendix Figures 7A and 7B display power tests.
Showing that residuals behave like a random string does not address the possibility
that individual-level characteristics (randomly distributed over time) are correlated with
executions. But only examining orthogonality between executions and individual-level
characteristics could miss correlated temporal patterns in executions and desertions.
5.3 Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption Even if treatment assignment is
ignorable, valid causal inference is not necessarily possible: I have to be certain that the
outcome in one unit is not affected by the treatment assignment in another unit, i.e., that
SUTVA is satisfied. My within-unit design helps with ignorability but creates a SUTVA
problem because each unit is essentially serving as its own control.
For the problem of past events affecting the effect of future events, one possibility is to
include only those events between which there is sufficient elapsed time. Unfortunately,
requiring a greater amount of time between events helps SUTVA but hurts the ignorability
of treatment since treatment assignment is most likely to be ignorable when comparing
capital cases that appeared before the commander at roughly similar times. The approach
I use is to make a strong assumption, which is that past events are irrelevant. I then weaken
116Results are similar when examining whether execution in the jth case is correlated with the deviation
of the actual cumulative sum of executions in previous j − 1 cases from the expected sum.
117Imagine generating summary statistics for 1000 random strings. The 1001th random string should have
a summary statistic that is equally likely to be anywhere from 1 to 1000.
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this assumption by assuming a parametric model for deterrence and condition out the past
effects of previous events. With this approach, the effect of past treatment assignments
on future outcomes is modeled explicitly rather than assumed to be zero.
6 Empirical Strategy
6.1 Duration Analysis My first modeling approach is to assume that the elapsed
time from the most recent deterrence event to the next absence in a particular unit is a
random variable drawn from some distribution parameterized by unit and time charac-
teristics (i.e., y is drawn from a distribution with a pdf f). For exposition’s sake I will use
an exponential distribution, though other parametric distributions are possible. I assume
that the likelihood of observing an elapsed time of y from a given deterrence event to the
next absence is given by f(y) = λ exp (−λy).
The hazard rate, λ, depends upon the characteristics of that particular deterrence event.
λ = β0 + βexexij + βexdexij · desij + βdes · desij + γCcasit + γUj + γTyear(j)=T . Military units
are indexed by i, observations by j. ex is an indicator for an execution, des is an indicator
that the trial was for desertion, cas is the casualty rate and γU and γT are unit and
year fixed-effects, respectively. Collectively, I refer to these parameters as a vector θ. The
specification can also be interpreted within the theoretical model: cas controls for the cost
of staying and ex creates exogenous variation in perceptions of costs.
It is possible, however, that an execution or commutation occurs at the end of the data
frame, in which case the elapsed time y is no longer a realization of the time until an
absence, but rather a censored value. I assume that, but for the intervention, I would
have eventually observed an absence. In these censored cases, which I indicate with d = 0,
the likelihood is not f(y|θ), but rather 1− F (y|θ). The log-likelihood function consistent
with this censoring is given by: L(θ) =
∑N
j=1 dj log (f(yj|λ(θ)) + (1− dj) (1− F (yj|λ(θ)).
When analyzing the impact of the most recent event, the calculations treat desertions
and capital sentences that occurred in pairs or groups as one observation since the decisions
to execute or commute these soldiers were not independent: almost without exception,
they were determined simultaneously and with identical outcome. If executions and com-
mutations occurred on the same day, the time until next absence is calculated beginning
on the following day. Absences that occurred on the day of an event are considered as
occurring the previous night, so they do not count as the first absence after an event.
Multiple absences or events on the same day from different ethnicities are considered as
British as they constitute the modal soldier.118
118A date with an Irish execution (absence) means that only Irish were executed (absent).
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The Weak-SUTVA Approach
I assume that past events matter, but that they fade out exponentially, according
to some parameter k. I test values of k such that k = − log 12
∆t
where ∆t takes values
of 7, 14, 30, 60 and 90, corresponding to deterrence-effect half-lives of one week, two
weeks, one month, two months, and three months. In the weak-SUTVA approach, I
define two sets: Eex(t∗) ≡ times of all executions in the unit prior to t∗ and Ecm(t∗) ≡
times of all commutions in the unit prior to t∗.
These two terms measure the cumulative effects of past events, one for executions and
one for commutations. They also measure idiosyncratic variation in execution rates over
time within divisions, since the sequence is also exogenous. Differences in the effects of
these two terms characterize the effect of exogenous variation in the application of the
death penalty. Neither term by itself has a causal interpretation because the number of
death sentences could be endogenous. To be consistent with the strong SUTVA parameter,
multiple events on the same day and division are still treated as one event. Dex(k) =∑
t∈Eex(t∗) e
−k(t∗−t) and Dcm(k) =
∑
t∈Ecm(t∗) e
−k(t∗−t). The hazard is the original hazard
plus two terms for past executions and commutations: λ′(k) = λ+ αexDex + αcmDcm.
Results of the hazard model are presented in the main tables with standard errors clus-
tered at the division level119 since the weak-SUTVA parameters are serially correlated
within division. The appendix tables present two checks—one set of results without clus-
tering (to see if the statistical significance is similar), and another set of results where time
is run backwards and I calculate the time until the previous absence before a treatment
event (to see if there is a null result). In the specification check with time run backwards,
to minimize leakage, where the absence event that led to the death sentence is included
by chance as an outcome, the clock begins 90 days into the past.120
6.2 Day-by-Day Probability, Maximum Likelihood Approach One difficulty
of treating each death sentence as an observation, with an indicator for executions as the
primary independent variable and absences as an outcome (either a count of absences or
duration until the next absence) is that each unit experiences a whole sequence of execu-
tions and commutations. These past deterrent effects presumably affect the probability of
future absences within that unit, and hence it is hard to see why they can be ignored. My
response is to use a structural framework, where the effects of past events are explicitly
modeled. I assume that each unit had some probability of experiencing absence on any
particular day, and that this probability depends upon military unit and year fixed ef-
fects, all past death sentences, including the nature of the crime and outcomes, and their
119I have 47 divisions (Figure 11).
120I cannot match capital sentences by name to the absentee data to remove them.
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distance in time from the present day and the instantaneous casualty rate.
Military Units: i = 1 . . . I
Time: t = 1 . . . T Measured from 0-day, July 28th, 1914.
Absences: ai(t) is an indicator for whether there was an absence in unit i on day t.
Preceding Events: Ki(t) is the set of past deterrence event dates in a unit i (executions
or commutations) before time t; |Ki(t)| is the number of events in the set.
Day: tk is the day on which the kth element of K occurred.
Execution or Commutation: xk is an indicator for execution or commutation.
Crime Type: dk is an indicator for desertion or some other crime.
I use the logit as my link function, so the probability of an absence in unit i on day t is:
pi(t) =
1





+ X(t)γ, D(k) =
β ·E(k) =
(








, and X(t)γ = γ0 + γCcasit + γUi + γTyear(t).
βexd ≡ effect of executing a deserter, βexo ≡ effect of executing for any crime, βsd ≡ effect
of a desertion death sentence, and βso ≡ effect of a death sentence for any crime.
I define a vector of parameters: θ =
(
λ, βexd, βexo, βcd, βco; γ
0, γC , γU, γT
)
. X(t) is a
collection of covariates, such as the instantaneous, unit-specific danger rate (computed
from casualties) and a unit fixed-effect. The effects of past events fade as time pro-
gresses. There is one λ for both executions and commutations — i.e., events are “for-
gotten” at the same rate since commutations serve as control for executions. (An attempt
to infer λ from the data did not converge, so I present estimates using different val-





t=1 ai(t) log pi(t) + [1− ai(t)] log(1 − pi(t)). βexd and βexo have causal inter-
pretation. I also introduce terms for Irish executions and Irish death sentences. Results
are presented only with standard errors clustered at the division level since the treatment
variable is serially correlated within division. The appendix tables present a specification
check for null results where time is run backwards.
All analyses with the War Diaries data as outcome restrict the sample from day 670
to day 1085 (the 0-day is the start of World War I on July 28, 1914) when the vast
majority of absence data is recorded (Figure 1). Appendix Figure 8A visually summarizes
the duration model and Appendix Figure 8B visualizes the day-by-day approach.
7 Results
I begin by presenting the results graphically without controls. Figures 14A-14C present
for each of the three datasets a univariate analysis of the duration model—Kaplan-Meier
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survival rates (assuming an exponential hazard). The first of each pair of figures presents
the effect of Irish executions and the second of each pair presents the effect of British
executions. What is immediately apparent is the dispersion between the pairs of hazards
in each figure, especially in the War Diaries data (Figure 14A).121 The results suggest
that Irish executions spurred absences and British executions deterred.
7.1 Duration Framework–Strong SUTVA I use three different hazard models:
exponential distribution, Weibull, and Cox; I make three different imputations of commu-
tation dates; I employ three different datasets. Across tables, I gradually add controls.122
A negative coefficient implies a positive effect on time until next absence—i.e., a negative
coefficient suggests deterrence, while a positive coefficient suggests spurring.123
Table 5 cannot detect a deterrence effect, nor can it rule out such an effect. Consistent
across specifications is a “spurring” due to casualties (whether or not this has a causal
interpretation is not my purpose). In most specifications, the increase in casualties (both
contemporaneous4Log casualties and4Log casualties 30 days ago) is strongly correlated
with a spurring effect on time until next absence, significant at the 5% or 1% level.
While Table 5 finds limited evidence that executing deserters deters absence, Table 6
finds that Irish executions spur absence relative to British executions, as visualized in
Figure 14. I add several interaction terms—whether the death sentence was for desertion,
whether the deserter was executed, whether the death sentence was for an Irish soldier, and
whether the Irish soldier was executed. The hazard interpretation—presented in Appendix
Table 11 column 1 (7 and 13), which corresponds to Table 6 column 1 Panel A (B and
C)—is that an Irish execution triples the hazard for the War Diaries (and increases by 50%
or 100% for the Police Gazettes and trial registries respectively).124 In some specifications,
executing deserters significantly deterred absences relative to execution of non-deserters
(Table 6 Panel A Columns 7-9).
The significant negative coefficients on Irish death sentence suggests that Irish death
sentences occur when desertions are less frequent. The negative correlation could bias
effects of Irish executions to be one of deterrence, so true spurring effects may be larger.
7.2 Duration Framework–Weak SUTVA Table 7 includes aggregate past effects
in two separate terms, one for prior executions and one for prior commutations. It presents
121The hazard rate of absences after executions—displayed in the red—is generally pulled inwards to the
origin, relative to the hazard rate of absences after commutations—displayed in blue.
122Many models are presented with recognition of model uncertainty (Leamer 1978; Sala-i Martin, Dop-
pelhofer and Miller 2004; Hansen 2007; Cohen-Cole, Durlauf, Fagan and Nagin 2009).
123In the exponential distribution, the mean duration is 1λ , and the marginal effect of a coefficient βˆ is
− β
λˆ2
, where λˆ is the average duration.
124This means that relative to the median time-to-next absence, which is about two weeks, an Irish
execution cuts the time by about 66% in the War Diaries (less in the other two datasets).
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across separate columns the results from assuming five different half-lives for an effect (7
days, 14 days, 30 days, 60 days, 90 days).125
Due to execution’s randomness, the effect of the most recent event is invariant to inclu-
sion of previous events. The effect of executing Irish on spurring absences is robust.
The difference between the execution and commutation measure of previous events
represents the effect of the execution rate. The execution rate has a deterrence effect,
and it is observed in models that assume a longer half-life. In terms of magnitudes, an
execution instead of a commutation—evaluated on the day of the event—leads to a 10-15%
decrease in hazard rate in the time to next absence (Appendix Table 11).
7.3 Ethnic Identity of the Subsequent Deserter I analyze the ethnic identity
of the deserter subsequent to Irish and British executions and commutations. Examining
the commutations separately assesses whether commutations slipped into the night.
I find that Irish executions double the likelihood that the next absentee is Irish. Us-
ing numbers reflecting the 466 Irish and 1,942 non-Irish death sentences in the analysis
sample, the doubling of Irish proportion yields a Fisher’s exact test that is statistically
significant at the 5% level.126 After Irish and British commutations, the immediately fol-
lowing absences are unaffected, consistent with unnoticed commutations.127 Appendix E
discuss results under different commutation imputations and datasets.128
7.4 Robustness Checks Appendix E reports further checks. I explore whether re-
sults may be spuriously significant by using specifications run backwards in time. I report
analyses without clustering of standard errors. These analyses temper a strong inference
that execution rates deter. I also include more controls (officers, location, etc.).
I explore whether the effects of execution differ depending on the current casualty rate,
distance to coast or Berlin, officer status of the executed soldier, age of the executed solder,
days since the war began, and army type. Only one analysis is statistically significant in
each of the three absentee datasets: executions appear to deter desertions in the New
Army. Since the New Army saw less battle than the Regular Army, the effectively lower c
implies a greater deterrence effect of executions.129 I conclude that the soldiers’ response to
executing Irish soldiers is special, since the other interactions are not robustly significant.
I pool all three absentee datasets, but treat a death sentence that occurs before another
absence as censoring rather than as absence. Executing Irish still spurs absences.
125I focus on commutation imputation of 14 days and an exponential distribution.
126To be sure, the time frame of the War Diaries dataset makes necessary an analysis of a subset, whose
sample size does not allow strong conclusions. This question is revisited with the day-by-day framework.
127After Irish and British commutations, 13% of immediately following absences are Irish. This is consis-
tent with commutations serving as an adequate control for executions unnoticed by soldiers.
128Using the trial date introduces noise, so I use the 14-day imputation in the day-by-day framework.
129However, the prediction that higher casualties generally reduce the deterrence effect is not born out.
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7.5 Day-by-Day Framework I now combine the effect of the salience of the most
recent event with the delayed effects of all previous events using a day-by-day approach.
Based on the previous robustness checks, I use the execution date and impute the commu-
tation date of 14 days after the trial date. Table 9 uses as outcome variable an indicator
for whether any absence occurred.130 When aggregating Irish and non-Irish absences to-
gether, I usually cannot detect a deterrent or spurring effect.131 Table 10 shows robust
patterns of Irish (but not British) executions spurring rather than deterring Irish deser-
tions.132 Note that unlike the duration model, positive coefficients indicate spurring and
negative coefficients deterring. The effect is observed across all half-life specifications in
the War Diaries and Police Gazettes. In terms of magnitudes, an execution of an Irish
soldier (relative to execution of a British soldier) on the day of an execution would cause
an increase of around 2 percentage points in the probability of an Irish absence relative
to a British absence. Appendix E explores whether results may be spuriously significant.
7.6 Death Sentences Following Executions as Potential Source of Bias In my
final analysis, I examine what happened after an execution and whether military justice
changed. It is entirely possible that judicial panels comprising of lower-level officers sought
lesser sentences than capital punishment following an execution since they had already
“made their point”, consistent with models of residual deterrence.133 With the FGCM
data, we can assess how malleable the sentence charged at court martial could be, since
the chances of being convicted of desertion was almost 100%, but the chances of being
sentenced to death roughly 1 in 5.134 Appendix Table 13 finds that British (but not Irish)
desertion cases received temporary amnesty, particularly after Irish executions.135
This provides quantitative evidence that the Irish may have been differentially mis-
treated in their exclusion from what appears to be temporary amnesty that other soldiers
in desertion trials received. Using death sentences as a measure of absence would bias
towards finding deterrence, since after an execution, the likelihood of the next desertion
trial resulting in a death sentence was lower. This mechanical bias towards finding de-
terrence would be greatest for Irish executions. Finally, if soldiers knew about temporary
amnesty and acted on this knowledge, then this would bias towards finding a spurring
130Group desertions are not independent events, and it may be easier to desert in pairs or groups.
131In Panel B reporting on the Police Gazettes, some of the coefficients suggest a deterrence.
132The dependent variable in Table 10 takes the value of 1 if only Irish absences occurred on that day
in that division, -1 if only British absences occurred, and 0 if neither or both occurred. An event that
may spur the desertion of Irish soldiers may not affect British, or even deter British desertions.
133Endogenous justice could only appear at sentencing. Not reporting absences was abetting desertion.
134Executions could also affect lawyers’ behavior.
135After a division executed an Irish, 14% of the next desertion trials resulted in a death sentence, whereas
after a commutation, the figure was 22%. However, death sentencing rates of Irish desertion trials were
20% regardless of the previous execution event. Appendix E provides discussion.
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effect among British soldiers; instead, I find a spurring effect among Irish.
8 Discussion
8.1 Death penalty This study offers some insights potentially capable of greater
generalization. First, the granularity and richness of the data begets questions that are
sometimes ignored in the standard time-series crime rate studies. The British experience
presents a setting with exogenous shifts in risk perceptions (Apel and Nagin 2011; Lochner
2007; Sah 1991), and identifying its effects has been deemed a priority by critical sum-
maries of the death penalty literature (Nagin and Pepper, eds 2012; Donohue and Wolfers
2005; Cohen-Cole et al. 2009; Manski and Pepper 2011). Thus one focus of Section 2 is sol-
diers’ risk perceptions of capital punishment and how the military heightened these risk
perceptions for potential law-breakers: Commutations were not promulgated and trials
were not public, so soldiers had no way to know that executions were random.
8.2 Counterdeterrent effects Second, I contribute to a literature on counterdeter-
rent effects. Higher rates of incarceration among minorities have been attributed to the
perceived illegitimacy of authority (Tyler and Huo 2002; Bowers and Pierce 1980; Bailey
2006), but the correlation between minority incarceration and mistrust of institutions is
difficult to interpret.136 An important limitation has been that legitimacy perceptions were
not directly manipulated, which has “crucial implications not only for causal inference but
public policy” (Nagin and Telep 2016). For example, punishment may be unequal across
groups, which leads to higher rates of incarceration and perceived illegitimacy of the law-
giver. In addition, crime rates may be higher for other reasons that are unobserved, so
attributing causality from perceptions of authority to crime rates faces the econometric
challenge of controlling for omitted factors. The quasi-random application of the death
penalty across British and Irish soldiers addresses both issues.
8.3 Residual deterrence Third, I contribute to a dynamic games literature on resid-
ual deterrence. Residual deterrence involves enforcement officials temporarily reducing
their enforcement having ‘made their point’. The related work is primarily qualitative,
observational, or experimental with laboratory games (Sherman 1990; Nagin 1998; Dai et
al. 2016; Banerjee et al. 2014). There are some formal dynamic models in the enforcement
136Legitimacy is said to drive expressive powers of law, tax compliance, and non-compliance to laws
(McAdams 2000; Acemoglu and Jackson 2014; Bénabou and Tirole 2011; Kaplow and Shavell 2006;
Hurd 1999; Chen et al. 2014; 2004). Much of the causal link (cf. Barkworth and Murphy 2015; Bottoms
and Tankebe 2012; Tyler and Jackson 2014) rests on associations between perceptions of legitimacy
and self-reported offending (Fagan and Tyler 2005; Fagan and Piquero 2007; Reisig et al. 2007, 2014;
Papachristos et al. 2012; Tyler and Jackson 2014; Jackson et al. 2012), e.g., a two-wave panel survey
(Tyler 2006) or cross-sectional survey (Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler and Huo 2002). Experiments
also suggest the relevance of legitimacy (Bohnet et al. 2001; Bohnet and Cooter 2003; Vertova and
Galbiati 2010; Feld and Tyran 2002; McAdams and Nadler 2005, 2008; Chen et al. 2013; 2015; 2015a).
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literature, with recent formal theories relating information about enforcement policies to
the level of deterrence (Lazear 2006; Eeckhout et al. 2010; Dilmé and Garrett 2015), e.g.,
potential law-breakers presume that enforcement is still active when in fact it has actually
declined. I find that trial judges (but not the Commander-in-Chief) appear to follow the
predictions of what sanctioners do in these models, except when it came to Irish defen-
dants—British (but not Irish) desertion trials received temporary ‘amnesty’ (being less
likely to receive the death sentence) after the execution of another soldier.137
8.4 General deterrence Fourth, I build on a literature to estimate general deter-
rence. Drago et al. (2009) and Kuziemko (2012) use one-time mass commutations to
estimate deterrence effects for prisoners who have already committed a crime and whose
sentences were commuted. Donohue and Levitt (2001) uses the staggered introduction of
abortion laws (repeated mass commutations) to estimate the impact of unwanted children
(whose birth sentences were commuted). I use repeated, random commutations, to estimate
general deterrence for individuals who (typically) have not yet committed a crime.
8.5 Legitimacy Fifth, I build on a large literature on legitimacy. Social scientists and
philosophers have long speculated on the role of perceived legitimacy in judicial institu-
tions, organizations, and nation-states (Lipset 1959; Suchman 1995; Gibson et al. 1998).
Legitimacy is defined as an individual’s perceptions of the “evaluation of the fairness of de-
cision making (neutrality, transparency, factuality, allowing opportunities for input) and
of interpersonal treatment (treatment with respect or dignity, respect for rights)” (Tyler
2010, p. 73), building on theoretical arguments on the study of justice in social rela-
tionships.138 Legitimacy and procedural justice are foundational in the recent President’s
Task Force on 21st Century Policing’s (2015) recommendations. I build a formal model of
legitimacy, which increases rule compliance (Ostrom 1990). Would-be deserters weigh the
benefits of military desertion, such as being reunited with family or avoiding the trenches,
against economic costs, such as loss of freedom, money,139 and physical well-being (exe-
cution), psychological costs, such as the pain from violating one’s moral principles, and
137This contributes to a literature on variation in justice (Sunstein et al. 2006; Danziger et al. 2011; Shayo
and Zussman 2011; Barry et al. 2016; Berdejo and Chen 2016; Chen and Eagel 2016; Chen et al. 2014b;
2016a; 2016b; Eren and Mocan 2016; Ash et al. 2016; Chen et al. 2011; 2014b; 2015a; 2016a).
138Motivations such as perceived fairness have entered economic models (Rabin 1993), so that people care
about more than just material interests (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). Values have been cited as a rejection
of markets and policies (Roth 2007; Mankiw and Weinzierl 2010). Legitimacy is conceptually closest
to reference points in social preferences (Leventhal 1980; Thibaut and Walker 1975; Chen 2016c).
139Pay was deducted for every day “of absence either on desertion or without leave, or as a
prisoner of war [if a Court of Inquiry finds that the soldier purposely allowed himself to
be taken prisoner], and for every day of imprisonment awarded by a civil court or court-
martial” (Graham-Harrison, ed 1907, pp. 385-6 (Army Act SS 136 & 138). Retrieved from
http://archive.org/stream/manualofmilitary00greauoft#page/384/mode/1up, with free login.)
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social costs, such as shame and loss of reputation (Beckett and Simpson, eds 1985).140
9 Conclusion
The prevailing strategy for addressing non-compliance is the imposition of harsh sanc-
tions, and for most of the world’s population this includes the death penalty, despite a
lack of empirical evidence regarding the effects of the death penalty. This paper provides
evidence of another mechanism for legal compliance beyond deterrence that has received
less attention in the formal literature, namely that state-imposed sanctions can undermine
state legitimacy. Moral issues aside, analysis of whether British executions during World
War I deterred military desertions provides a test for the death penalty. With over two
death sentences per day, historians believe that the decision to execute or commute was
basically random, which I statistically corroborate. Using this result and archival data on
desertions, I find that executing Irish soldiers spurred absences, especially Irish absences.
I find limited evidence that executing deserters deterred British absences. Deterrence is
observed primarily for execution rates and in the (less professional) New Army.
There are several aspects of the data I could not explore in this paper: 1) Simulate
the battalion enlistment and investigate group attachment depending on ethnic compo-
sition of one’s battalion. 2) Generate loyalty surname map by calculating frequency of
appearance in Police Gazettes relative to the casualties database. 3) Generate an Irish
surname map by calculating frequency of appearance with Irish relative to British birth-
place.141 4) Uncover historical data on Catholic and Protestant birth parishes to check
Irish Protestant loyalty. 5) Characterize eyewitness vs. rumor effects by exploiting bat-
talion movement across divisions. 6) Estimate spatial effects by exploiting the distance
between divisions. 7) Analyze other levels of unit aggregation subject to minimum of 1
execution, 1 commutation, and 1 absence. 8) Estimate effect of executions on other crimes
using FGCM trial registries.142 9) Analyze the judicial response to different types of exe-
cutions. 10) Explore socioeconomic differences by merging with surnames dictionaries by
class. 11) Analyze physical descriptions of soldiers (youth, complexion, looks, occupation),
especially outcome heterogeneity, e.g., do young soldiers respond more to executions? 12)
Structurally estimate half-life of events or decision-making of optimizing Commanders-in-
Chief. 13) Construct time from previous battle. 14) Construct physical topography. 15)
Uncover trench maps detailing exact location of divisions. 16) Use diaries, letters, and
memoirs to characterize pluralistic ignorance to number of deserters or perceived loyalty
of comrades and their reactions to non-responses during roll call.
140In WW1, American deserters were required to wear a big waistband that had “deserter” on it.
141Subject to certain assumptions, both maps would create a continuous measure of loyalty or Irishness.
142However, other crimes’ trials may be more discretionary and confound soldier and sanctioner behavior.
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A.1 Court Martial Death Sentences and Commutation Data My death sentence data in-
cludes all 3,342 sentences, complete with name, unit, offense, sentencing date, rank, and outcome (execu-
tion with date or commutation),reference number in national archives, age (if soldier was executed), and
theatre of war, from August 1914 to September 1923 (Oram 2003). Original data sources include War
Office (WO) records of the trials of soldiers who were executed (WO 71), registers of field general court
martial (FGCM) trials (WO 213/2-26), and general court martial (GCM) trials (WO 90).
In my data, the date refers to date of death sentence, which is usually the trial date. It invariably differs
from date of execution, which is listed separately.143 The categories of offenses with the highest number of
sentences are: desertion (2,005), sleeping at post (449), cowardice (213), disobedience (120), and murder
(118). The other offenses are: Irish rebellion, quitting post (leaving guard duty), striking senior officer,
mutiny (which could involve absence but was more related to collective act or conspiracy), offense against
inhabitant (i.e., rape), espionage, treason, hostile act, violence, insubordination, absence, sedition, aiding
the enemy, casting away arms, possessing firearms, armed robbery, plundering, drunkenness, threatening
senior officer, offense against martial law, conspiracy, robbery, theft, attempted assassination, attempted
murder, attempted desertion, housebreaking, losing army property, pillaging, aiding enemy while POW,
and unspecified/other. In total there are over 30 types of offenses.
Final sentences in the dataset are those punishments (if any) ultimately confirmed by the Commander-
in-Chief. Of the 3,342 sentences, 2,724 are from the B.E.F., the remainder coming from other countries
like Canada, New Zealand, etc. If the soldier’s original death sentence was not confirmed, then the soldier
was either given a reduced sentence (hard labor, penal servitude, imprisonment, tied to a fixed object, or
reduced in rank) or the sentence was sometimes “quashed” (i.e., vacated). Figure 8A plots the distribution
of crimes for those sentenced to death and Figure 8B plots the distribution of crimes for commuted and
confirmed death sentences.
A.2 War Diaries Data Absentee lists are partially preserved in monthly war diaries of the Assistant
Provost Marshal (APM) for the four-year period from 1914 to 1918. They come from the National Archive
Files: a) WO 154 Series — WO 154/112: Monthly War Diary APM, September 1915 - May 1917; b) WO
154/114: Monthly War Diary APM, August 1914 - November 1916; c) WO 154/8: Monthly War Diary
APM 9th Army Corps, December 1916 - May 1918.
Lists and descriptions of absentees were printed and circulated with ID Number, Rank, Name, Unit
(Battalion Number, Battalion, and Regiment), Date of Absence, Reported by, and Description (usually
including age and height, and sometimes also hair color, build, lips, complexion, eyes, teeth, facial hair,
and accent; see Appendix Figure 3 for a sample image). The War Diaries span four years, but the bulk
of what was preserved in absentee lists is from July 1916-June 1917.
The absentee list was generated in the following manner:144 The APM was responsible for the military
police and the oversight of general military discipline and order. They maintained war dairies and sent
reports to the Provost-Marshall at General Headquarters in France. Among his duties for the area of his
particular jurisdiction, the APM noted the number of absentees from regiments broadly on a weekly basis.
Military units took roll call and attendance every morning (or more frequently). Those not present had
to be categorized: killed in action, wounded, missing (prisoner-of-war or wounded), sick or straggler (lost
or awaiting return from a “stragglers post” or “battle stop,” where they had been gathered up by either
143I remove 1 death sentence whose execution precedes the trial date.
144Conversations with Putkowski and the British National Archives.
49
regimental or Military Police). After a month, the names of those who were still absent and not accounted
for were forwarded to the Provost Marshall at headquarters where the information was collated with other
APM reports. The Provost Marshall would aggregate the material and circulate a printed updated list
of the names of men absent for a month by unit for the armies at the front. The APM could then match
names/descriptions to any soldier arrested. On occasion, three-month lists seemed to have appeared.
These lists revised known absentees making earlier lists redundant.
A.3 Police Gazettes Data A separate absentee list is preserved in the Deserters and Absentees
(D&A) supplement to the (weekly) Police Gazette from 1914 to 1918. This data includes: Office Number,
Name, Rank, Regiment Number, Corps (Battalion Number, Battalion, and Regiment), Age, Height,
Complexion, Hair, Eye Color, Trade (civilian occupation), Enlistment Date, Enlistment Place, Birth
Place (Parish and County), Desertion Date, Desertion Place, Marks and Remarks (see Appendix Figure
4). Additional biographical characteristics were merged in from soldiers’ attestation papers completed
upon joining the Army.
Compared to the War Diaries, the D&A supplement records are much more complete. However, they
include absentees both at Home (where it was much easier to desert) and Abroad (in the notes, e.g.,
“from B.E.F.”; for an example, see the “Marks and Remarks” column in Appendix Figure 4).
To provide a sense of data quality, Figure 9A shows the plot of all 126,818 absences at Home or Abroad.
The sharp spike in 1914 is the day after the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, which suggests that quite
a few soldiers were reluctant to go to war. In 1916 and 1917, spikes are observed around Christmas, when
soldiers are likely reminded of family. Another spike is observed at the end of the war in November 1918,
consistent with exhaustion or a belief that there was no death penalty for desertion during peacetime.
Although this paper digitizes the entire database, absences at Home are not subject to the death
penalty, so I gleaned 3,009 B.E.F. desertions from this data source by searching for the terms “en route”
or “from B.E.F.” in the notes field. Figure 9B shows that these B.E.F. desertions occur throughout the
war. The majority of these absentees were likely en route from B.E.F. to the UK.145
A.4 Trial Records A third source of absentees is preserved in handwritten FGCM registers (WO
213/2-26), dating from January 1914 to November 1919, recording roughly 144,609 trials. The data
includes: Date the Record was received, Rank, Name, Battalion Number, Regiment, Place of Trial, Date
of Trial, Nature of Charge, Nature (and length) of Sentence, Acquittal (or Not Guilty), Remittance (i.e.,
commutation to a different sentence or sentence length), and Remarks (e.g., Suspended to serve after the
war).
The charges include: Offense to Inhabitants, Mutiny, Cowardice, Absence (including absence from pa-
rade or Breaking out from barracks or camp), Striking or violence to a superior officer (and during superior
officer’s execution of office), Insubordinate or threatening language to a superior officer, Disobeying law-
ful command of superior officer, Leaving post (sentry or picquet) or asleep on sentry, Drunkenness (and
while on duty), Injury and receiving (stolen) property, Losing equipment (and clothing, necessaries, etc.),
Stealing and theft, Indecency, Resisting or escaping escort, Escaping confinement, and Other offenses.
The range of sentences includes: Death, Penal servitude, Imprisonment, Detention, Field punishment,
Ignominy, Reduction in Rank and Seniority, Fine, Reduction (of pay), and Stoppages (of leave or other
privileges).
Sometimes another field, Appeal from Summary Award of C.O., is present. In trials unrelated to
desertion, the commanding officer could immediately dispose of the case, but the disposal was subject to
145Email from Putkowski on November 4, 2012.
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the right of the accused, in certain cases, to demand trial. In the data, only 0.5% of desertion trials and
3% of absence trials come from an appeal. I do not make a different calculation of dates of absence for
trials that come from an appeal since both the initial judgment and the soldier’s exercise of his right to
demand a trial instead of summary judgment were likely to have been immediate.
There are 28,754 trials for absence and 13,309 trials for desertion. The number of death sentences across
all crimes was 2,858; the number of death sentences for accused deserters was 1,730. 449 of the accused
deserters were not guilty, but the remaining received some kind of sentence. Some of the difference from
the official statistics may be attributed to data entry errors as handwriting is notoriously difficult to
transcribe. For all crime variables, I interpret any mark in the column in the affirmative. Note that these
data are registers (see Appendix Figure 5) and not the trial proceedings themselves, most of which no
longer exist. The trial proceedings that survive are primarily of those where the accused was executed,
and these have already been previously analyzed by historians.
All three absentee records represent different samplings of the true desertion rate. When I compare
post-execution outcomes to post-commutation outcomes within a particular unit, I minimize the potential
bias that results from error in measuring outcomes. For example, if desertion and absentee lists are under-
inclusive because of poor preservation or if they are over-inclusive because they include those who were
killed, were prisoner of war by accident, or were stragglers, these measurement errors would affect both
treatment and control groups equally. Or, since only the trial date is recorded, the time delay between
desertion and apprehension should be similar in both treatment and control. I merge the FGCM data
into the Order of Battle assuming that the absence occurred one month earlier and analyze the data
accordingly.
A.5 Casualties Data I utilize the Soldiers Died In the Great War database containing 658,555
casualties to proxy for point-in-time danger by unit and by date. Casualties predict desertion (Costa and
Kahn 2003). This data includes: regiment, battalion, surname, first (and middle) name, birthplace town
and county, enlistment town and county, regimental number, rank, killed in action, died of wounds, died,
theatre of war of death, date of death and supplementary notes. Thus, I can match this data to desertion
dates by military unit to control for high frequency changes in perceived danger.
An interactive version of this data can be viewed at http://tinyurl.com/hwx2ctf.146 B.E.F. casual-
ties over the course of the war are displayed in the top panel and France-Flanders casualties in the
bottom panel. The estimated casualties (in thousands) are expressed as number pairs in the format
(German/Allies) in red and blue. Red indicates casualties from battles initiated by Germany.
Another interactive version allows comparing casualties with the execution rate and is available at
http://tinyurl.com/j7wqt3n.147 France-Flanders casualties are displayed in the top panel and death sen-
tences in the format (execution/sentences) in the bottom panels. Figure 6 presents a screenshot. Casualties
and casualty rates are positively related since officers tried to fill in the divisions in a manner such that
the divisions were roughly constant in size.
146https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/8089659/DPdeterrence/AnimatedCharts/Casualties.FranceBEF.html.
Safari or Internet Explorer works best for viewing, and loading of scripts may need to be manually
toggled.
147https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/8089659/DPdeterrence/AnimatedCharts/FranceBEF.html. Sa-
fari or Internet Explorer works best for viewing, and loading of scripts may need to be manually
toggled.
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A.6 Irish Surnames A list of 426 Irish surnames identifies soldiers of probable Irish ethnicity.148
The use of this data is subject to the caveats of potential measurement error. Differences between Irish
and British soldiers would be underestimated to the extent soldiers are sometimes mis-categorized.
A.7 Service and Pension Records The Service and Pension Records were obtained from Ances-
try.com, which digitized the original records held at the British National Archives (WO 363 and WO
364). The Service and Pension Records generally include name, age of enlistment, birth parish, birth
county, residence address, regimental number, and date of attestation.
The Service Records (WO 363) comprise roughly 2 million non-unique records. Of the original 6.5
million Service Records, only 40% survive from destruction during a German bombing raid on London
during World War II. These records are also known as the “Burnt Documents” or “Burnt Records” due
to charring and water damage in the records that survived. These records are for soldiers who were
discharged, demobilized at the end of the war, who died between 1914 and 1920 and who were not eligible
for an Army pension. Some soldiers who were in the regular army before the outbreak of war in August
1914 may, however, be included in this class of records. The Service Records do not include soldiers who
continued to serve in the military after 1920. Their records are not available for public access.
In addition to the 2 million or so “Burnt Documents”, there are the Pension Records (WO 364), com-
prising roughly 1 million non-unique records, which contain information on soldiers who were discharged
from the army and claimed disability pensions, so some records also include date and place of injury.
These records are for soldiers who were discharged for medical reasons (illness or wounds) during the
First World War. These records also include soldiers who were in the British Army before August 1914
and who were eligible for an Army pension because their term of service came to an end in or before
1920. This group of records are known as the “Unburnt Documents”. These records are unlikely to contain
information on three non-exclusive groups of individuals: (1) those who did not claim a pension, (2) those
who were discharged from demobilization at the end of the war (since they were generally not eligible for
pension), (3) those who were killed in action and had no dependents (as there would have been no one
to claim a pension).
I match the Service and Pension Records by name, where possible, to the death sentences dataset. This
provides additional covariates for checks of random assignment. Together, they provide 2.7 million unique
records identified by name, regiment, and residence. Even though the data is incomplete, age is useful to
merge in because age is only recorded in the capital sentences data for soldiers who were executed, but
age is recorded in the Service and Pension Records for non-executed soldiers. Therefore, the combined
data can serve to check for correlation between the execution decision and soldier’s age. In this kind
of analysis, missing data is dummied out and an indicator for whether age is missing is included. The
Service and Pension Records are also useful to examine the Irish surname database.
A.8 Unit of Analysis It is necessary to choose a unit of analysis for the study. Military organizations
are obviously hierarchical and there is a great deal of discretion in choice of unit-size. The casualty data
and absence data are at the battalion level, so I could in principle choose any unit from this level up to
the Corps. While there are exceptions, in general, the sequence of military units listed from lowest to
highest was: Battalion→ Regiment→ Brigade→ Division→ Corps→ Army→ Army Group. Each higher
level of organization contains three or four subordinate units plus headquarters and higher-level assets. A
battalion consisted of 1,000 men, with 3 to 4 battalions per brigade and 3 to 4 brigades per division. With
148Surnames of Irish Origin. (2009) Last Name Meanings Dictionary. Retrieved from http://www.last-
names.net/origincat.asp?origincat=Irish.
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the addition of support, a division consisted of between 18,000 and 19,000 men and would occupy up to 15
miles of road while moving (Corns and Hughes-Wilson 2007, p. 108). According to historical accounts, the
division commander was the highest-level commander whose commutation recommendation was ignored
(Oram 2003, p.129; Babington 1983, pp. 78-79, 103). I do not know anything about ignored execution
recommendations, because the records of the commuted cases were destroyed. If higher-level commanders
did target based on discipline or show discretion, then the division is the highest level appropriate for
analysis.
The thinness of the outcome data also compels a fairly high level of organization, even though the
salience of an execution and hence its deterrence effect (if any) would be strongest at lower levels of
organization. To be included in the analysis, units must contain at least 1 execution, 1 commutation, and
1 absence. From the War Diaries data, I identify 676 usable matches preserved mostly from July 1916 to
June 1917–roughly one-third of the war. The upper panel of Figure 1 plots the distribution of matches
from 700 to 1100 days after the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand on June 28, 1914. World War I
officially began one month later on July 28. The median time between trial and next recorded desertion
at the division level is about two weeks. From the Police Gazettes, I identify 3,009 B.E.F. deserters for
all four years of the War; 1,319 of these are merge-able with the Order of Battle. From the trial data, I
identify 45,824 usable matches for all four years; 4,365 of these matches are desertion trials.
A.9 Order of Battle and Merging To conduct the analysis, each event (death sentence, desertion,
or casualty) must be assigned a particular division. But most of the sources list the battalion of a soldier,
not his division. To determine the division, I developed a table of division assignments for each battalion.
Complicating this effort was the fact that battalions changed divisions throughout the war—in response
to particular strategic goals or needs of the divisions. The Order of Battle dataset provides the means to
determine, for a given battalion on a given date, which division was commanding. To develop this dataset,
I relied primarily on the Long, Long Trail (LLT) website. The website, available at http://www.1914-
1918.net, is based on James (1978). A sample appears in Appendix Figure 13. This website gives, in mostly
paragraph form, a time history of each battle unit and, in particular, the movement among divisions and
brigades. Appendix C documents how the Order of Battle was entered.
The website gives this data in two main forms. The first form focuses on the battalion (or other unit),
and describes in chronological order the movements of that unit. The second form focuses on the division,
and describes the movement of units into and out of the division. Combining these two data sources and
focusing on the mergeable units (some units like Army Service Corps are impossible to merge) yields
over 7,800 associations between battalion to brigade to division. Appendix B describes the process of
merging and additional challenges, such as different spellings or abbreviations. I also track higher-level
unit transfers (e.g., transfers from divisions to corps to army), constituting an additional 770 associations
between the divisions to corps to army. The two data sources are LLT and Edmonds (1922).
With the exception of Service and Pension Records, I do not merge by soldier name across datasets. All
datasets were scanned digitally and then checked, with the remaining non-scannable entries entered, by
hand. The trial registers were written in cursive handwriting. The lack of computerized records from this
time period makes prohibitively difficult the linking of absentees by name to their trial and to their death
sentence date, if any. Absentee lists are only a sample of the universe of absentees. So any conclusion
about the deserters being invariably caught (thus potentially appearing in the trial registers) rests on
historians’ statements and on the inferences rendered from the aggregate data. The inability to merge by
name also precludes extensive balancing checks based on demographic data stored in datasets other than
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the lists of executions and commutations.
A.10 Medal Rolls The inability to match by name precluded the use of the Medal Rolls Index
(WO 372), which I obtained in digital form from the British National Archives. Virtually all soldiers who
served received at least the British War Medal for “entering a theatre of war or rendering approved service
overseas” and there are 5,424,254 unique soldiers and a total of 7.8 million records (some soldiers received
multiple medals). This data provides the name, rank, regiment, regimental number, medal entitlement,
first theater of war and date of entry, information on soldiers who forfeited their medal entitlement
because of disciplinary infringement, and additional remarks (e.g., date of death or discharge). Merging
by Medal Rolls Index would regularize the spelling of the military unit for ease of merging into the Order
of Battle, but merging the absentee, casualty, and trial data directly into the Order of Battle proved more
effective. Instead, I use this data to make assessments about the Irish surname dictionary by comparing
against the official statistics regarding Irish enlistment, which I am able to do since the Medal Rolls Index
contains roughly the universe of all enlisted soldiers.
A.11 Officers I digitize a dataset of the 2,992 commanding officers and general staff officers for
division, corps, army, and general headquarters and the dates of their assignments and reassignments
throughout the war (Becke 1935-1944). Officer data enables additional checks of whether the decision to
execute or commute was correlated to officer identity and ethnicity and whether the soldier’s decision
to desert is correlated with his officer’s identity and his officer’s ethnicity inferred using the surname
dictionary. These data are merged into the Order of Battle.
A.12 Geographic Location The Order of Battle also contains major battles and the divisions
associated with each battle. In the great majority, battles are named after the town or city in which,
or near which, they took place. The towns can be entered into Google Maps, which provides geographic
coordinates. I make the albeit simple assumption that divisions travel linearly and incrementally from one
battle to the next to interpolate the rough location of each division on any date. Finally, these coordinates
yield calculations of distances between divisions, distance to the English Channel, and distance to Berlin,
which serve as additional controls. This data allows estimating the approximate location of each soldier
on the day of his absence. I also use Google Maps to geolocate the enlistment towns, birthplaces, and
residences of soldiers when this data is available and I analyze this data in Appendix D.
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B Appendix: Description of Merging Process
To recapitulate, the data is the outcome of the following data generating process: absentees, which led
to –> trials, which led to –> convictions, which led to –> death sentences, which led to –> executions
or commutations, which led to a potential causal effect on subsequent absentees. Absentees are measured
in the War Diaries, Police Gazette (B.E.F. subset), and Trials (absentee and deserters subset).








is merged into the Order of Battle. Each dataset has a different set of keys, the most important of which
is date, because the lower level military units moved between different higher level units throughout the
war. Each of the six datasets is also merged into the Irish surname dictionary. The Order of Battle is
itself merged into a list of battle locations to yield geocodes. The Service and Pension Records is merged
by name into each of the six datasets to obtain a handful of its covariates like age and birthplace. No
attempt is made to merge any other datasets by soldier name because of the difficulty in the merge due
to spelling and non-unique names.
The original sources are typed, with the exception of the trial registers, which are hand written. This
paper digitizes absentees, trials, officers, battle locations, and the Order of Battle. Casualties, capital
sentences, Irish surnames, Medal Rolls Index, and Services and Pensions Records were previously dig-
itized. Unit names were not the same in different data sources because of data quality and different
ways of spelling or abbreviation. As a first step in the data cleaning, names of military units were dis-
abbreviated with the help of historical sources and historians. For instance, the short form (ASC, RFA,
DAC, KRRC, MGC, RAMC, RAOC, RE, RGA, RHA) is changed to the respective long form (e.g. Army
Service Corps, Royal Field Artillery, etc.). More examples of abbreviations are at: http://www.1914-
1918.net/abbrev.htm. The Order of Battle also is entered with some difficulty. Battalions are recorded
both on regimental pages and divisional pages. Regiment pages appear to be more complete and reliable
and are given priority in data entry. Additional information on the Order of Battle digitization is provided
in Appendix C.
Linking the datasets to the Order of Battle is based on up to three variable keys: 1) Battalion name
(sometimes company or platoon name) and/or battalion number, 2) Regiment name, and 3) Date (ab-
sence, casualty, or trial date). A regiment name typically refers to a geographic location in the UK. Each
regiment has many numbered battalions. The battalions usually travelled in different divisions. All three
variable keys are necessary for an exact match. In addition, matching on only battalion number and
regiment string is possible because battalions within a regiment typically had unique battalion numbers.
The data linkages are generated through two steps: exact matching and algorithms. For exact matching,
all datasets employed a manual look-up table to serve as an exact translation of a unit to a combination
of regiment and battalion in the Order of Battle. Cross-checking with historical sources and historians
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yielded a manual look-up table linking the battalion/regiment string in each of the six datasets to the
equivalent battalion/regiment in the Order of Battle.
The exact lookup is composed of two steps: the actual exact lookup of the unit followed by a date
matching in the Order of Battle. If both conditions yield a match, then the first round is deemed successful.
Most matches were derived from this exact lookup. In a few instances, battalions are formed from existing
battalions that do not have an official separate entry in Order of Battle or are renamed into new battalions
that also do not have a separate entry, resulting in the soldier being listed as deserting or dying on a date
when the battalion does not exist in the Order of Battle. In these instances, the nearest date on which
the brigade and division is affiliated with the named battalion is used. Where a precise date is identified,
it usually refers to only the headquarters arrival or departure.149 The nearest-date assumption allows
time for a unit to reorganize during relocation. If the battalion is not listed affirmatively as not having
a brigade/division in some date range (for instance, headquarters may be moving from one location to
another), the battalion will be assigned to the nearest brigade/division by date. If the battalion is listed
affirmatively as not having a brigade/division in some date range (for instance, the battalion is in another
part of the world when the war began) but the soldier’s date falls in that range, he will be un-assigned.
For example, if a battalion is stated as being part of a brigade/division and does not mention a date,
it will be associated for the entire war. If a battalion is stated as being part of a brigade/division and
forming on December 1914, the Order of Battle will not have an entry for this battalion before December
1914 and the soldier will also have that association for dates prior to December 1914. On the other hand,
if the battalion is stated as forming in August 1914 and then arrives in December 1914 as part of a
brigade/division, then the Order of Battle will have an entry of “null” for this battalion before December
1914 and it will not be associated with anything before December 1914. Further, if it is first mentioned
on December 1914 as being affiliated with that brigade/division but the Order of Battle does not state a
date of formation, then the battalion will have an entry of “null” in the Order of Battle prior to December
1914 and will not be associated with anything before December 1914. Previous analyses making different
assumptions about the dates of battalion associations do not seem to be material to the final inference.
In addition, the first date of the war and the last date of the war are assumed when the first date at the
beginning of the war and last date at the end of the war for a battalion’s association with a brigade and
division are not explicitly stated.
In some instances, the military unit could not be identified easily by hand for an exact lookup. An
algorithm is then used, which involves approximate string distance matching and the prioritization of
variable keys to allow for minor typos in the original record or data entry. For example, the Order of
Battle occasionally lists battalions together as a single record. In some datasets, battalion and regiment are
not separated into separate variables in the original raw data. The raw data would leave the information
in such an abbreviated form that the entire string was used to match against the battalion and regiment
keys. This algorithmic step extracts the battalion number and separates it from the regiment, because in
most cases, battalions can be uniquely identified simply by its number within a regiment. Some inference
can also be made if the best possible matches all locate the battalion in the same division. In the
algorithmic step, the nearest date is not used to facilitate the merge; an exact match for the date is
required. Matching the regiment string also involved de-abbreviations, or if no de-abbreviation, a manual
look-up. A Jaro-Winkler string distance score was calculated comparing the closest OOB regiment match
with the extracted regiment. When multiple matches were available within a string distance of 0.20, it was
149Email from Putkowski on September 14, 2015.
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checked whether all potential matches yielded the same division and brigade. If only a single match was
available, then any match with string distance worse than 0.05 was discarded. Records without absence
dates or battalion numbers were discarded.
Finally, after merging the records into the Order of Battle brigade and division, the brigades and
divisions are assigned unique identifiers because the Order of Battle occasionally uses different names
to refer to the same division or same brigade. One form of measurement error is unavoidable: when the
Order of Battle does not record the exact day of month when a battalion moves to another division, I
assume the transition occurs on the first day of the month. Other measurement errors in the merging
process are assumed to be orthogonal to the execution or commutation decision.
Duplicates are also removed during the data cleaning process. Any soldier with the same first name,
last name, regiment number, and record date are made unique in the following datasets. Any soldier’s
record without a date is also dropped.
B.1 Capital Sentences merge to Order of Battle The capital sentences dataset already provides
a numerical code for brigade and division, so linking to the Order of Battle merely required decoding.
However, brigade data was often not included in the original data, so these were looked up and entered
manually by searching for the regiment and battalion, checking that the original division data is correct
for the record’s date, and entering the brigade that is correspondingly listed in the Order of Battle.
B.2 Absentees-War Diaries merge to Order of Battle The War Diaries dataset is merged using
the Unit (which contains battalion name, battalion number, and regiment name) to the Order of Battle.
The units are first matched manually as best as possible, using historical consultations, de-abbreviations,
and a look-up table. Units where there is no possible way to uniquely identify the match are dropped (e.g.,
a unit listed as, 1st Engineers, would be impossible to disambiguate). The second round of matching uses
the Jaro string distance between the combination of battalion number, battalion name, and regiment
name with its equivalent in the Order of Battle. The algorithm makes pairwise comparisons between
every possible match in the Order of Battle and takes the best match if the distance is below a threshold.
Battalion and regiment string distances are given equal weight in priority. However, the battalion number
is required to be an exact match.
B.3 Absentees-Police Gazettes merge to Order of Battle The Police Gazettes dataset is
merged using Corps (which contains battalion name, battalion number, and regiment name) to the Order
of Battle. The units are first matched manually as best as possible, using historical consultations, de-
abbreviations, and a look-up table. The second round of matching uses the Jaro string distance between
the combination of battalion number, battalion name, and regiment name with its equivalent in the Order
of Battle. The algorithm makes pairwise comparisons between every possible match in the Order of Battle
and takes the best match if the distance is below a threshold. Battalion and regiment string distances
are given equal weight in priority. However, the battalion number is required to be an exact match.
Dates in the Police Gazettes did not include calendar year. Calendar year is inferred from the publication
date of the newspaper gazette. For example, December absence recorded in a January gazette would have
the year be set as the year prior to the publication date.
B.4 Trials merge to Order of Battle The FGCM dataset contains only Regiment name and
Battalion Number. The regiment name is first matched manually as best as possible, using historical
consultations, de-abbreviations, and a look-up table, to the regiment in the Order of Battle. Then,
additional records with spellings that are close to the matchable FGCM regiment strings are replaced
with the matchable spellings via algorithm to address minor errors in the handwriting transcription. Next,
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the battalion number and regiment string are used to find its equivalent in the Order of Battle. The second
round of matching uses string distance between the combination of battalion number and regiment name
to find its equivalent in the Order of Battle. The algorithm makes pairwise comparisons between every
possible match in the Order of Battle and takes the best match if the distance is below a threshold. Because
these strings are noisier than in the other datasets, both the Jaro string distance and the Levenshtein
string distance are employed. The battalion number is sometimes missing in FGCM. In this scenario, all
possible matches are examined and checked to see if they all yield the same brigade/division, if so, then
that brigade/division is assigned. Note that because the exact date of absence is not recorded, I assume
that the absence occurred one month before the trial date and deduct this month accordingly before
merging with the Order of Battle. This ensures that the news a potential deserter responds to is merged
in from the correct division in case the battalion has moved divisions in the meantime. However, the true
trial date is kept for all analyses.
B.5 Casualties merge to Order of Battle The casualties dataset contains battalion, regiment,
and battalion number. This dataset was previously digitized, so linking to the Order of Battle merely
required decoding. However, some records are lost in linking to Order of Battle because the Order of
Battle did not provide information on the brigade and division for some battalions. These casualties are
dropped.
B.6 Officer List merge to Order of Battle The officers are already organized by each of the
higher level units (Brigade, Division, Corp, Army, and General Headquarters).
B.7 Merging to Service and Pension Records Linking to the Service and Pension Records
requires the soldier name. The first name is often abbreviated. If so, only the first letter of the first name
is used in the merge. Sometimes the raw data includes first and middle initials in capital letters without
punctuation separating the two initials. The two initials would be separated before merging by name.
The matching algorithm involves a mix of exact-match requirements and minimum distance calcula-
tions. Battalion number and first letter of the first name are required to match exactly. Matching based
on unit names and the remainder of a soldier name is based on approximate string distance: Levenshtein
distance is used for soldier names and the Jaro distance is used for unit name. The reason for using
Jaro when matching military units is that the number of strings describing the military unit often differs
across datasets. These extra strings do not impose as much of a penalty when using the Jaro distance.
The Levenshtein distance counts the number of deletions (d), insertions (i) and substitutions (s)
necessary to turn two strings, A and B, in the other. All characters, including spaces and punctuations,
count. This distance is bounded, for instance if A contain nA characters and B contains nB characters,
the lower bound is nA − nB and the upper bound is nA (if nA > nB) or nB (if nB > nA). This distance
metric is more appropriate for a single string, like a surname.
The Jaro distance is a heuristic measure. Let nAB be the number matching characters between A and
B and nt the number of transpositions of the nAB matching characters. Two characters cA and cB are
said to be matching in A and B if and only if cA = cB and the index (position) of cA in A is less or equal
to b0.5 ·max (nA, nB)− 1c. Then, the Jaro distance is:













This distance is bounded between 0 (exact match) and 1 (complete dissimilarity). It is also defined as 1
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when there are no characters in common between A and B.
Given two vector of strings A and B, each element of A is compared with each element of B. Let A1,
B1, and B2 be strings. A1 matches B1 better than B2 if and only if dA1,B1 < dA1,B2 . In declaring a string
match of one element Aj of A with one element Bk of B, two conditions must be satisfied:
1. Aj matches better toBk than how it matches to any other element ofB: dAj ,Bk = min
{
dAj ,Bs , s = 1, . . . ,mB
}
,
where mB is the number of elements in B.
2. dAj ,Bk < τ , where τ is a deterministic threshold
A higher threshold is allowed for merging Service and Pension Records than for merging Order of Battle
because the data is recorded with poor quality. Data that was hand-entered as “[?]” could have been
treated as a wildcard for the purposes of matching, which would have greatly increased computation
time. Wildcards are dropped instead since dropping them does not affect the string distance functions
much.
B.8 Irish Indicator Each of the six datasets is also merged into the Irish surname dictionary. This
is based on an exact name match. A second Irish indicator is imputed using the merge with Service and
Pension Records. The place of birth is matched to Ireland. The second indicator is used in robustness
checks but is not the main indicator because the Service and Pension Records merge is not strong, but it
is used to conduct validity checks on the surname dictionary.
B.9 Merging with Higher Order Units (Corps, Army, and General Headquarters) Linking
the division to the higher order units is more straightforward because it does not involve data external to
the Order of Battle. However, sometimes the Order of Battle does not report for some dates the association
of a division to a particular corps or army. In this case, a match is made to the chronologically closest
corps or army that the division is part of. This is because the official dates of association typically refer
to the headquarters’ relocation, but given the size of the unit, the soldiers themselves could take quite
awhile to relocate. If the previous hierarchy is unknown for matching divisions to corps, a match is made
by looking forward in time and for the next corps that the division is associated with. If the previous
hierarchy is unknown for matching corps to army, a match is made by looking forward in time and for
the next army that the corps is associated with, with exceptions noted below. In a handful of cases, the
Order of Battle reports that the division is associated with more than one corps/army. In those cases, a
match is made to the corps/army that has the longest association with the division.
Corps outside of France and Flanders are linked directly to a general headquarter. The four other
general headquarters whose officers are recorded are located in Salonika, Egypt (Palestine), Gallilopi
(Mediterranean), and Italy. Some corps fought first in Italy and then in France. Only corps in Italy have
an associated army unit. Units associated with these corps are assigned to the appropriate army while
they are fighting outside France. Army units are associated to general headquarters on exact dates.
B.10 Geolocation Linking to the battle is straightforward because it does not involve data external
to the Order of Battle. A battalion is not assigned a geolocation before its first battle or after its last
battle and is assumed to travel incrementally from one battle to the next. The air distance is calculated
to the English Channel and to Berlin.
B.11 Final Dataset The final dataset contains 14,466 unique records of soldiers who were absent
or sentenced to death. Observable individual, unit, and environmental characteristics are merged from
all other datasets. The variables are summarized below:
Environmental characteristics are derived as follows:
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• Battle environment: Number casualties in each division and brigade at each point in time. One
number for British and one for Irish.
• Morale: Number of absentees in each division and brigade at each point in time. One number
comes from each of War Diaries, Police Gazettes, and FGCM. These numbers are further broken
down by British and Irish.
• Disciplinary environment: Number of death sentences and number of trials in each division
and brigade at each point in time. The death sentences number comes from the capital sentences
dataset and the number of trials comes from the trial dataset. These numbers are further broken
down by British and Irish.
• Executions environment: Number of executions in each division and brigade at each point in
time. This number comes from the capital sentences dataset. These numbers are further broken
down by British and Irish.
The environmental factors are calculated in and around a time window of 30, 60, and 90 days before,
after, or before and after the current day, never including the current day (so a 30 day window is really
a 29 day window before and after the current day).
The final list of variables are:
• Name - Name of the soldier
• Unit - Unit of the soldier, typically battalion
• Rank - Rank of the soldier, typically private but in some cases also specific officer rank
• Date - Absence date (War Diaries and Police Gazette), sentence date (Capital Sentences), or trial
date minus 30 (FGCM dataset)
• CaseType - Crime such as desertion, absence, or quitting (FGCM dataset)
• Sentence - Commutation or execution
• Location - The city name (FGCM dataset) or a general indication such as B.E.F. (War Diaries
and Police Gazette) or F&F
• OtherType - Other crimes the soldier was tried for or miscellaneous info about the sentence
• Brigade, Division, Regiment, Battalion - Name of each unit the soldier was part of on that date
• Dataset - Name of the dataset where the record comes from
• LastName, FirstName, FirstLetterLastName - Soldier’s name
• DeathSent - Indicator for whether the soldier is sentenced to death (FGCM dataset)
• CorpName, ArmyName, GHQName - Name of additional units the soldier was part of on that
date
• BrigOfficerName, BrigOfficerRank - Name and rank of the 1st officer in command of the soldier’s
brigade
• DivGOCName, DivGOCRank, DivGSO1Name, DivGSO1Rank - Name and rank of the Division
General Officer Commanding (GOC) and Division 1st grade staff officer (SO)
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• CorpGOCName, CorpGOCRank, CorpBGGSName, CorpBGGSRank - Name and rank of the
Corps GOC and Corps staff officer
• ArmGOCName, ArmGOCRank, ArmMGGSName, ArmMGGSRank - Name and rank of the Army
GOC and Army staff officer
• GHQChiefName, GHQChiefRank, GHQCGSName, GHQCGSRank - Name and rank of the C-in-C
and the staff officer of the B.E.F.
• LastName_SP, BirthParish, BirthCounty, Residence, Age, DocYear_SP, regiment_SP, FirstName_SP
- Information from the Service and Pension Records
• Irish - Indicator of whether the soldier’s surname is Irish
• DistCoast, DistBerlin - The air distance of the division of the soldier record to the English Channel
and to Berlin, obtained from linking with the Geo Location dataset
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C Order of Battle
This section describes some of the assumptions and procedures used when entering the entire Order
of Battle from The Long, Long Trail (http://www.1914-1918.net/). Battalions are recorded both on
regimental pages and divisional pages. Regiment pages appear to be more complete and reliable and are
given priority in data entry.
Battalions, brigades, and divisions also had multiple spellings, e.g., Highland Division and 51st Highland
Division and 51st Division. Priority was given to the longest spelling and, in general, to make all identifiers
unique even when the original data did not provide a unique string for a single military unit. The division
pages sometimes have a lot more specific information than the regiment page on the exact name of
the brigade or division. The division page would be relied upon for the more complete information.
Geography or unit number often uniquely identify the military unit. However, some data records needed
to be dropped because there was either contradictory geography and unit number identifiers (e.g., 55th
2nd West Lancashire Division would be dropped because there was a 57th 2nd West Lancashire Division)
or the information was not specific enough to identify the unit (e.g., Welsh Division).
Interpreting the Order of Battle also required several assumptions. The regimental pages are organized
by battalion. For each battalion, each of its association to a particular brigade and division would come
with the identity of the brigade and division and the beginning and end date of the association. If the
start or end date of a battalion is not listed and the association is chronologically the first or last for
the battalion, then the first and last date of World War I is assumed. When only month and year are
provided, the 1st of the month is assumed.
Sometimes, a battalion is amalgamated with or absorbed or formed into another battalion. In this
case, the division and brigade of the new battalion is entered for the old absorbed battalion from the
date of absorption all the way to its end date to ensure that data was not lost in merging. The other
datasets would sometimes record a soldier as being part of the absorbed battalion after the battalion was
absorbed. For example, 11th service battalion pioneers of the King’s Liverpool Regiment was absorbed
by the 15th Battalion of the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment on 17 June 1918. The details for the 11th
service battalion June 17 onwards would be entered from information for the 15th battalion, because now
the 11th service battalion is part of the 15th battalion.
If a battalion is formed on a certain date, say 1 Aug 1914, but is assigned a division and brigade at
a later date, say 1 September 1914, the first entry for this battalion would be 1 Aug 1914-1 September
1914, and the division and brigade would be null. If a battalion was disbanded on a particular date, the
date of disbandment would be the end date. In practice, this means any soldier attached to the battalion
before it got assigned to a division and brigade or after the battalion was disbanded would not merge
into the other datasets. This is because if a soldier deserted or was sentenced on a particular date in this
unit, we affirmatively know that the soldier should not be part of a division or brigade. In contrast, if
the Order of Battle simply has no information for a battalion, the soldier is attached to the division or
brigade nearest in date (see Appendix B), because we do not know affirmatively that the soldier should
not be part of a division or brigade.
Continuous connections to brigade or division are assumed unless the original data said explicitly that
the battalion left the division or brigade and there is no information on another division or brigade
assigned. For example, if the battalion was assigned to another division without any information on
brigade, the previous brigade information was assumed. Similarly, previous division information was
assumed if the battalion was assigned to a new brigade without any new information being provided on
62
division. In all instances, the divisional page would be cross-checked for more information. Sometimes, a
battalion may move to another division as “divisional troops”, in which case no brigade would be recorded
in the data entry.
As long as there is information available on the original battalion, this information would be tracked
in data entry. For instance, if a battalion is reduced to cadre strength, and personnel are transferred
to another battalion (hence, usually to another division) and the cadre is reported to be in a different
division, information on the cadre is entered for the battalion, i.e., entries reflect the division and brigade
information of the cadre.
Sometimes, the Order of Battle would report the battalion assignments to be “same as” or “similar to”
another battalion. Sometimes battalions would be listed together with identical battalion assignments.
These information would be, as best as possible, carefully separated out to facilitate merges. Sometimes
the location assignments were not detailed enough for data entry, e.g., data on cyclist units. Occasionally,
absentees would be recorded as part of training reserve battalions, which were in the UK, so these
absentees were also dropped during the merge. Cavalry divisions were also ambiguous so if a battalion
was listed as being associated with a numbered cavalry division and then an unnumbered cavalry division,
the numbered cavalry division was assumed. Finally, sometimes the battalion has different names but are
identical as far as one can tell from the Order of Battle (e.g., 483rd field company and 1 ea anglian field
company); they are listed in the Order of Battle under each name in case the raw data lists soldiers as
being part of one battalion or the other.
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D Assessing Irish Ethnicity
There are three ways to assess Irish ethnicity: surname dictionary, regiment, and birthplace. Each
source of data on absentees, death sentences, and casualties has name and regiment, but only three
databases–Service and Pension Records, Casualties, and Police Gazettes–have birthplace and enlistment
location. For reasons described below, I use surname instead of regiment to infer Irish ethnicity. Linking
by name to access these location data is presently infeasible because of slight differences in spelling,
typographical errors in the originals or in transcriptions, large number of people with shared names, and
the fact that the Service and Pension Records are incomplete samples of the universe of soldiers who
served.
However, the availability of these datasets with surname and birthplace allows five inquiries:
1. Assess how closely Irish surname and Irish birthplace align
2. Assess the relative loyalty of Irish and non-Irish by birthplace (I can do this because the birthplace
data is available in conceptually distinct datasets)
3. Assess differences between being born in Ireland or Britain vs. being enlisted in Ireland or Britain
vs. having Irish vs. non-Irish surname
4. Assess quality of geolocation
5. Assess population representativeness of casualties
Differences in distance-in-time to Irish roots can be related to differences between having male Irish
ancestry vs. having Irish birthplace. Those born and raised in Britain with Irish male ancestry may be
more loyal than those born and raised in Ireland, but those having male Irish ancestry may be less loyal
than those without male Irish ancestry even among soldiers born and raised in Britain.
D.1 Irish Regiment Some previous researchers have relied on regiment to infer Irish ethnicity and
use regiments to base their analysis of how the World War I experience differed for Irish and non-Irish
soldiers. The casualties database has both regiment and birthplace, so, assuming that those who died are
a representative sample, it can be used to assess the validity of using regiment to infer Irish ethnicity—or
more precisely, birthplace, which I will take to be the best measure of Irish ethnicity. I proceed in two
steps to identify the geographic location of every birthplace and enlistment location. The first step uses
a list of counties. I first construct a single address string if both parish and county are available. I then
look for exact string matches with the list of counties. For example, “down” and “derry”, which are Irish
counties, would have to appear as a separate string. Occasionally the address would have multiple strings
that match the county list. To address this, if the data has “co” or “co.”, the string that appears right
after would be prioritized in the matching, or if the string comes after a comma, it would be prioritized.
The second step uses Google Map’s API to locate the remaining locations.
Previous analysis (Perry 1994, p. 67) and my own analysis of the casualties database indicate that some
regiments are disproportionately composed of soldiers whose birthplaces were in Ireland. Northern Irish
regiments were: Royal Irish Rifles, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, and Royal Irish Fusiliers. Southern Irish
regiments were: Irish Guards, Royal Irish Regiment, Connaught Rangers, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, Leinster
Regiment, and Royal Munster Fusiliers. Among soldiers whose birthplaces could be appropriately located
by the API (82% of the 660,585 casualties had birthplaces that could be located in the UK using the two-
step algorithm), the Northern Irish regiment that had the fewest soldiers born in Northern Ireland had
38% of its casualties born in Northern Ireland and the one with the largest proportion was 62%. Between
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67-74% of casualties in Southern Irish regiments were born in Southern Ireland. Before proceeding, it is
important to note that all percentages discussed in this section are reported as a percent of the soldiers
whose birthplaces could be located in the UK. 19,241 casualties were marked as being born in Southern
Ireland and 10,189 were marked as being born in Northern Ireland.
About 30% of those whose birthplaces were in Ireland were assigned to non-Irish regiments. While many
soldiers were allocated to their regiments according to their birthplace, the military command changed
its policy during the war. It began allocating soldiers according to need instead of by geography, which
avoided the decimation of entire youth cohorts of villages. Using regiments to base the analysis of how
the World War I experience differed for Irish and non-Irish soldiers may be confounded with changes in
military policy.
An analysis using surnames to infer ethnicity (99,433 soldiers have Irish surnames) would be unaffected
by policy changes in allocation of soldiers to regiment. Moreover, disparate treatment of–and response
by–minorities need not be limited to soldiers being born in Ireland. Disparate treatment can affect soldiers
who had Irish male ancestry. British-born soldiers without Irish ancestry but assigned to Irish regiments
are unlikely to have experienced disparate treatment of the kind that soldiers with male Irish ancestry
would have experienced. If they experienced advantaged treatment, then using regiment would render a
greater violation of monotonicity (if we analogize the use of Irish regiment as an instrumental variable
for Irish identity).
Thus, my analysis relies on Irish surnames rather than Irish regiment since counting British-born
soldiers without Irish ancestry as “Irish” for statistical analysis can lead to a qualitatively different kind
of measurement error. Finally, a more practical concern that precludes the use of regiments is simply that
they are not always cleanly available in different datasets due to idiosyncratic abbreviations, spelling
error in the originals, or typographical errors in data entry.
D.2 Medal Rolls Using the Medal Rolls Index, which contains the near universe of all soldiers who
enlisted in World War I, I compare the identification of soldiers with male Irish ancestry as a percentage
of overall enlistment with the official government statistics reported on Irish enlistment by place of birth
(which is 3.9%). The Medal Rolls Index does not contain county of origin, but contains last name, first
name (and, if available, middle name or initials), rank, regiment, and regiment number. There is no
battalion number, battalion string, or date. Merging the Irish surname dictionary with the Medal Rolls
yields an estimate of 14.1% having male Irish ancestry out of 5.4 million soldiers. The figure, 14.1%, is
250% higher than the 3.9% of the UK soldiers in France and Flanders as reported in government statistics
as being born in Ireland, as extensive migration from Ireland spread Irish surnames across Great Britain
in the 19th century.
D.3 Casualties Using the casualties database, I compare the identification of soldiers with male
Irish ancestry with the identification of soldiers born in Ireland. Roughly 15.1% or 99,433 of the 658,616
casualties are identified as having male Irish ancestry according to the surname dictionary. A similar 15%
of the 549,884 listed as dying in France and Flanders are also identified as Irish according to surname.
This 15% ratio is similar to the 14.1% of the Medal Rolls identified as having male Irish ancestry. Those
with Irish surnames appear to have been dying at the same rate at which they were enlisted, which
suggests that soldiers with Irish male ancestry were not sent to more dangerous areas or that they were
better fighters if they were. Three-month aggregates of Irish and non-Irish casualty rates are correlated
at 0.9 in my data, so I use overall casualties as proxy for battle environment.
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Turning to an analysis of birthplace, according to the Irish National War Memorial150, only 49,000
of the casualties were Irish and most estimates range from 30,000 to 50,000. In a separate analysis of
birthplace, 29,739 men in the casualties database were born in Ireland (Jeffery 2000, p. 150). Another
source, analyzing the Irish census, reports 27,405 Irish deaths, a rate of 14% out of the enlisted Irish
and “the same proportion as for the British army overall” (Fitzpatrick 1996, p. 392), which was 12%.
My geolocation algorithm yields 29,430 Irish deaths. The 27,405 Irish census deaths account for 4.1% of
the casualties database, which is close to the 3.9% reported in government statistics of the percent of all
enlistees being born in Ireland.
On the basis of the analysis of casualties according to surname or casualties according to birthplace, one
may assume—as other historical researchers like Perry (1994) and Oram (1998) have assumed—that the
casualties reflect a representative sample of the overall enrollment. Moreover, three analyses of birthplace
and surnames—government statistics and the Medal Rolls Index surnames, Irish census (Fitzpatrick 1996)
and casualties surnames, and geolocation and casualties surnames—suggest that the surname dictionary
results in a similar 240-250% more soldiers being identified with male Irish ancestry compared to soldiers
who were born in Ireland, so the “measurement error”–if we think of surname as measuring birthplace
with error–when using Irish surname is at least similar across enlistment and casualties statistics. Next
we examine desertions.
D.4 Police Gazettes Using the entire Police Gazettes database on 152,699 deserters and absentees
(including those who deserted in the UK), I compare the identification of Irish soldiers using the surname
dictionary with the Irish identification based on county of origin in a large sample. Among the Police
Gazettes’ deserters, 21.7% have Irish surnames. Among the B.E.F. sub-sample of deserters, 22.7% have
Irish surnames. In the sample of deserters recorded in the War Diaries, 21% have Irish surnames.
The higher percentage of soldiers counted as Irish in these desertion samples is consistent with the Irish
having a lower morale and deserting at a higher rate than the British. Using birthplace data, 13.4% of
B.E.F. deserters were born in Southern Ireland and 4.4% were born in Northern Ireland. (All percentages
are reported as a fraction of geolocateable soldiers.) In this dataset, 62% of soldiers could be geolocated.
The higher rates of desertion from Southern Ireland would be consistent with priors.
The increase in the share of soldiers with Irish birthplace in this database (13.4 + 4.4 = 17.8% of
geolocateable birthplaces) as opposed to the casualties database (5.4% of geolocateable birthplaces151) is
notable as it indicates that the Irish-born were more inclined to desert in the field. Dividing 17.8 by 5.4
indicates that the Irish-born were deserting at roughly 3.3 times the rate at which they enlisted (using
the reasonable assumption that the casualty statistics are representative of enlistment statistics).
Those with Irish surnames were deserting at 1.5 times the rate at which they enlisted. The ratio of
22.7% to 17.8% indicates that, among deserters, Irish surnames are only 28% more frequent than Irish
birthplace, not 240-250% as found in the analysis of enlistment and casualties. The dramatic decrease in
the ratio of the number of soldiers with Irish surname to the number of soldiers with Irish birthplace is
notable because it suggests that length of time from Irish roots is predictive of morale. We next examine
this further.
150http://imr.inflandersfields.be/index.html
151Note that the figure 5.4% differs from 4.1% in the previous sub-section because only 82% of casualties
are geolocateable and I geolocated about 2,000 additional casualties as being born in Ireland than the
27,405 reported in the Irish census.
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D.5 Irish Loyalty and Length of Time from Irish Roots Analysis of birthplace data across
these datasets provides additional evidence that the Irish were probably less loyal than the British. The
casualties database has 1.9% of its soldiers being born in Northern Ireland and 3.6% of its soldiers being
born in Southern Ireland. The Police Gazettes has 4.5% of its soldiers being born in Northern Ireland
and 9.8% of its soldiers being born in Southern Ireland. In the sub-sample of B.E.F. deserters, 4.4% were
born in Northern Ireland and 13.4% were born in Southern Ireland. Since B.E.F. deserters are those
who deserted in the field, whereas Police Gazette desertion can be interpreted as desertion that occurred
during training, the higher share of Southern Irish-born in the B.E.F. sub-sample suggests that lower
morale among Irish soldiers was more relevant for Southern Irish when choosing to desert in the field of
battle than when choosing to desert in the UK.
Comparing desertion statistics with enlistment statistics suggests that lower duty to fight is also ob-
served among the enlisted Irish-born soldiers compared to enlisted British-born soldiers. As a share of
enlistment, Irish-born soldiers were 170% (dividing 4.5% + 9.8% by 1.9% + 3.6%) more likely to desert
during training in the UK, but Southern Irish-born were 270% times more likely to desert in France and
Flanders (dividing 13.4% by 3.6%) while Northern Irish-born were 130% more likely to desert in the field
(dividing 4.4% by 1.9%). This finding suggests that, despite Northern Ireland remaining part of Britain
after World War I, the Northern Irish-born were over twice as likely to desert as British-born enlistees.
Next, I analyze enlistment location data. Analysis of enlistment location suggests that the gradient
in the duty to fight is similar according to enlistment location than according to birthplace: 1.8% of
casualties, 4.1% of Police Gazette, and 3.8% of Police Gazette B.E.F. deserters were enlisted in Northern
Ireland while 2.2% of casualties, 7.2% of Police Gazette, and 8.1% of Police Gazette B.E.F. deserters
were enlisted in Southern Ireland. As a share of enlistment, soldiers who enlisted in Ireland were 180%
(dividing 4.1% + 7.2% by 1.8% + 2.2%) more likely to desert during training in the UK, but Southern
Irish-enlistees were 270% times more likely to desert in France and Flanders (dividing 8.1% by 2.2%) while
Northern Irish-enlistees were 110% more likely to desert in the field (dividing 7.2% by 1.8%). In sum,
desertion in the field was also higher for soldiers who enlisted in Ireland relative to those who enlisted
elsewhere. These results suggest that birthplace is a stronger predictor of loyalty, but enlistment location
and surname are also strong predictors.
Together, the fact that both the Northern Irish-born and the Northern Irish-enlistees were over twice
as likely to desert assuages the concern that the use of the Irish surname does not distinguish between
Southern and Northern Irish. Therefore, not distinguishing between the two groups in the main analyses
is unlikely to be problematized by the potential for the Northern Irish to have equal or heightened loyalty
compared to the British. At present, I do not have historical information on Catholic or Protestant
birth parishes to ascertain whether Protestant Irish had heightened loyalty, but there is little in the
discriminatory statements made by British officers indicating that they made a distinction on the basis
of religion. The use of surnames is still likely superior to the use of regiment to mark “Irish” because 27%
of soldiers in Irish regiments were born in Britain. The mix of Protestant and Catholic Irish would also
still exist in the regiments.
Finally, even though British-born soldiers were far more loyal, British-born soldiers with Irish surnames,
were disproportionately, slightly disloyal. This further supports the use of Irish male ancestry as a proxy
for “Irishness”. In the data, soldiers with Irish surnames and Irish birthplaces comprise 2.0% of casualties
and–with the assumption of population representative death rate–2.0% of enlistment, but 6.5% of the
Police Gazette (225% more likely to desert). Soldiers with Irish surnames and British birthplaces comprise
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13.2% of casualties and 15.6% of the Police Gazette (20% more likely to desert). Soldiers without Irish
surnames and with Irish birthplaces comprise 3.4% of casualties and 8.2% of the Police Gazette (140%
more likely to desert). Soldiers without Irish surnames and with British birthplaces comprise 81.4% of
casualties and 69.7% of the Police Gazette (15% less likely to desert).
D.6 FGCM Notably, the proportion of soldiers with Irish surnames is 20% in the desertion and
absence trials, 23% in the B.E.F. Police Gazette sample of deserters, 21% in the War Diaries sample of
deserters, and 19% of the death sentences (and 17% of executions). Assuming that the Police Gazette and
War Diaries sample represent the true desertion rate, the consistency in the share with Irish surnames
suggests that the military command did not disproportionately target or disfavor Irish soldiers in the
apprehension and trial stage nor in the sentencing and execution stage.
D.7 Irish Surname vs. Irish Regiment The consistency in the proportion of soldiers deemed
Irish is not present when I use Irish regiment. In the B.E.F. Police Gazette sample of deserters, 17.5% are
from Irish regiments. This is close to the 16.5% with Irish birthplaces. However, in the War Diaries sample
of deserters, only 10.5% come from Irish regiments. The reason is partly due to the fact that names are
recorded better than regiments, which often appear inside an idiosyncratic spelling or abbreviation of the
military unit, which can be merged to brigade and division but not always cleanly to regiment. Further
corroborating the difficulty of using regiments to identify Irish ethnicity: In the capital sentences data,
8.1% come from Irish regiments. The lower percentage could mean that those from Irish regiments were
treated very favorably by the military justice system conditional on deserting, but no historical evidence
suggests that this is the case. Alternatively, the quality of the spelling of regiments could be lowest in
the capital sentences data, which used very short abbreviations, relative to the War Diaries and Police
Gazette data sources. Thus, for the many reasons described in this section, I use surname instead of
regiment to identify Irish soldiers.
Notably, despite the potentially poor transcription of regiment, within the capital sentences dataset,
7.1% of executed soldiers, 7.1% of deserters with capital sentences, and 7.4% of executed deserters come
from Irish regiments. The consistency of proportion of soldiers deemed Irish within-dataset—regardless
of how Irishness is measured—is consistent with the hypothesis that the decision to execute or commute
any soldier was quasi-random and unrelated to, for example, the soldier’s Irish identity.
D.8 Service and Pension Records Finally, I investigate the Service and Pension Records, a large
sample based on pension eligibility, which also contains data on birthplace. The quality of location data
here is particularly low. Only 815,000 soldiers or 29% could be geolocated, unlike the 82% geolocation rate
for the casualties data. This low rate is largely due to the fact that 1.9 million soldiers did not have birth
location data. All soldiers have surnames, however. In this data, 15.3% of the 2.7 million soldiers have Irish
surnames, which is consistent with the percentage found for the Medal Rolls and Casualties databases.
On the basis of this consistency, one might infer that the data destruction during WW2 bombings was
effectively random.
Interestingly, 9.1% of geolocateable soldiers are identified as born in Ireland. This would seem to suggest
a larger proportion of Irish-born soldiers who joined after 1914 but left before 1920 (and thus not eligible
for pension) in the Service Records (a.k.a. “Burnt Documents”) or a larger proportion of Irish-born soldiers
who were discharged for medical reasons during the war, or who were killed and whose dependents claim
a pension in the Pension Records (a.k.a. “Unburnt Documents”). I have no good reason to think that
Irish-born would been more likely to suffer illness or wounds leading to medical discharge, since the
Irish-born constitute a fraction of the casualties database representative of their enrollment. I have no
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strong reason to think they would be more likely to have dependents. One possible reason for the higher
proportion of Irish-born, then, is they were more likely to demobilize at the end of the war. This would
be consistent with their falling enlistment rates throughout the war, and the fact that the Irish war for
independence commenced in 1919.
Besides the birth location, another possibility to geolocate the soldiers is the residence data, though
this variable is also missing for 1.3 million records. Of the geolocateable soldiers, 2.4% are identified as
residing in Ireland. However, many Irish soldiers who served in the British army chose not to or could not
live in Ireland after Ireland declared independence. In fact, this analysis provides quantitative evidence
suggesting that only 26% of soldiers born in Ireland returned after the war, which would be consistent
with their original country no longer welcoming them or viewing their service in the war as particularly
legitimate. To be sure, they may have simply found better economic opportunities elsewhere.
Irish surname is still predictive of being born in Ireland and is also predictive of residing in Ireland. Pair-
wise regressions yield coefficients of 0.21 for residence and 0.23 for birthplace (and pairwise regressions in
Police Gazettes and casualties yield 0.25 and 0.24 respectively). Irish surname is more strongly correlated
with Southern Irish locales. In casualties, 0.3 and 0.29 for Southern Irish enlistment and birthplace and
0.14 for Northern Irish enlistment and birthplace. In Police Gazettes, 0.28 and 0.29 for Southern Irish
enlistment and birthplace and 0.12 for Northern Irish enlistment and birthplace. In Service and Pension
Records, 0.28 and 0.25 for Southern Irish birthplace and residence and 0.12 and 0.15 for Northern Irish




E.1 Power of random strings test In Appendix Figure 7A, m1 represents the assumed autocor-
relation between successive execution decisions (if p is the correct marginal probability of an execution,
the transition probability from one execution to the next is m1p). For autocorrelation as low as 1.5, the
distribution of p-values in one simulation is significantly different from the uniform CDF at the 10% level.
In order to estimate the type-II error rate, thousands of strings are simulated. For each individual real-
ization, the Null H0 : no autocorrelation is rejected if the p-value from the KS test is less than α = 0.05.
The fraction of incorrect decisions (failures to reject H0) serves as an estimate for the type-II error.
Appendix Figure 7B displays the distribution of the KS p-values for 4 different values of m1, which for
convenience have already been translated into the corresponding values of the autocorrelation coefficient.
For values of autocorrelation between 0.13 and 0.17, the estimated power lies between 0.74 and 0.9. For
example, for autocorrelation, I show the degree of autocorrelation that would show statistically significant
KS-tests of deviation from a uniform distribution. I then show the distribution of KS-test statistics for
many simulations of autocorrelated strings.
E.2 Commutation date Assuming that commutation dates occur on the upper end of the time
range, 14 days after the trial date, would tend to magnify the estimated deterrent effect, since time between
commutation and subsequent absence is minimized. Assuming that only the original trial date is relevant
could reduce the chance to detect either deterrence or spurring effects, since an intervening absence after
the trial (but before the execution or commutation) can occur. This interpretation is somewhat consistent
with the patterns in the data. Table 5 Panel A displays a slight spurring effect of executions (as we can see
from the positively-signed coefficients) in Columns 7 and 8 and Panel C displays a slight deterring effect
in Columns 1-3. These coefficients are significant at the 10% level; more generally, 4 of 27 specifications
display a significant impact of executions at the 10% level (and 1 of 27 at the 5% level), but they do so
in opposite ways, which cautions against strong conclusions in either direction.
E.3 Execution rates When the half-life is assumed to be short (7 days), the two coefficients in
Table 7 tend to be of the same sign and not statistically significantly distinguishable from each other.
However, as the half-life is extended, the coefficient on the cumulative measure of executions becomes
significantly more negative relative to the coefficient on commutations. The significant difference can be
inferred from fact that the coefficient for commutations is positive and significant at the 5% level while the
coefficient for executions is negative and not significantly different from 0. This means that the execution
rate has a deterrence effect and it is observed in models that assume a longer half-life. This pattern is
observed for the Police Gazette and FGCM data, while the pattern is less statistically significant in the
War Diaries data, though the coefficient on the execution term is always more negative relative to the
commutation term.
The reader can interpret any of the specifications in Appendix Table 11, but to take just one, for
illustrative purposes, in the specification assuming a half-life of one month, the difference between the
cumulative execution measure (-0.027) and commutation measure (0.105) is 0.12–or 12%–decrease in
hazard rate for executions relative to commutations. Another way to interpret the coefficient magnitudes
would involve the counterfactual of no death penalty—the difference between all death sentences leading
to execution vs. all death sentences leading to commutations. Such an extrapolation involves re-calculating
the cumulative half-life measure (sum of the execution and commutation measures), and multiply this sum
by 0.12. Taking the product, then averaging for all divisions and all days, would yield the counterfactual
effect of having the death penalty on time to next absence.
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E.4 Ethnic identity of the subsequent deserter Beginning with Panel A of Table 8 Column 1,
which uses the +14 imputation date for a commutation trial, we see that after the execution of an Irish
soldier, 19% of the War Diaries absences that immediately follow are Irish, but after executing a non-Irish
soldier, 11% of the immediately following War Diaries absences are Irish. That is, Irish executions double
the likelihood the following absentee is Irish. A similar pattern is observed for desertion death sentences
(9.5% increasing to 20.0%).
Focusing still on War Diaries absentees and moving to the another imputation assumption in Panel B,
a difference is also visible for Irish vs. British executions—and no difference observed for Irish vs. British
commutations—when using the nearest-neighbor imputation. The doubling reported in the execution
rows should be unaffected since the execution date is not being changed moving from Panel A to B.
Commutation statistics change slightly and are consistent with their still being invisible.
Turning to the other datasets, we see similar–but muted–patterns in FGCM in Column 3, where a
difference is also visible for Irish vs. British executions (e.g., 15.3% increasing to 21.6%) and no difference
observed for Irish vs. British commutations, at least for Panels A and B. However, in Column 2 we no
longer see that Irish—more than British—executions spurred absences of the Irish—more than British. I
have no theoretical reason for this to be the case, but an explanation for the weaker Police Gazette result
is its density of absences is far lower than the other datasets, which would result in more measurement
error. From the War Diaries data, I identify 676 usable matches for one-third of the war. From the
Police Gazettes, 1,319 of these are merge-able for the entire war. Indeed, one might interpret the greater
differences in ethnic composition subsequent Irish vs. British commutations to be consistent with greater
measurement error.
In Panel C, the execution and commutation dates are both set to the trial date. The increase in Irish
absences subsequent Irish execution is muted though still sizable. Interestingly, the percentage of next
absences that are Irish become more dissimilar after Irish and non-Irish commutations when the trial
date is used (e.g., 9.1% vs. 14.0%). This suggests that the third imputation method may be the worst one
in introducing noise to the control (whereas 2 weeks after a trial is a good metric for the time between
sentence and confirmation/commutation decision; alternatively if military events for some reason made it
possible to hold the the trial—but delayed the confirmation/commutation decision—the nearest-neighbor
assumption is also a good one). In addition, using the trial date instead of execution date introduces noise
to the treatment variable. On this basis, we might rely less on estimates using this imputation.
E.5 Robustness checks Appendix Tables 1-2 report falsification checks where the analysis is run
backwards in time. I start the clock 90 days before the treatment event to ensure the subject of the death
sentence does not affect the outcome variable. A handful of significant coefficients appear, in particular, 13
of 81 coefficients that would have a causal interpretation (executions or their interactions) are significant
at the 10% level in Appendix Table 1. Appendix Table 2 is mirror to Table 7 (which may arguably be
the preferred specification–assuming a 14-day commutation imputation and using exponential hazard–and
including weak SUTVA coefficients). None of the execution salience coefficients are statistically significant.
Several of the execution rate coefficients–by coefficient, I mean the difference between the prior executions
coefficient and the prior commutations coefficient–are statistically significant, in the FGCM data. Notably
the casualties coefficient is still positive, as we would expect with associations between casualties and
temporally local rates of absence, in War Diaries. However it becomes negative in FGCM. This would
be consistent with FGCM being a poorer measure of absences, since in order for the field trials to be
conducted, there should not be pitched battle. In Tables 5 and 7, the associations between casualties and
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FGCM absences were also not as large as the associations observed for War Diaries.
To see if some of the significant placebo results are due to inappropriate clustering of standard errors,
Appendix Tables 3-5 report results without clustering of standard errors, where similar inferences are
obtained as in the main tables. Appendix Table 3 indicates no robust deterrent effect of execution salience.
Consistent spurring effects of Irish executions are found in Appendix Tables 4 and 5. Deterrent effects
of execution rates are found in Appendix Table 5 for Police Gazettes and FGCM under longer half-life
assumptions.
Appendix Tables 6-7 report the backwards analysis without clustering. What is worth noting is that
6 of 81 coefficients that would have a causal interpretation are significant at the 10% level in Appendix
Table 6. In Appendix Table 7, only the execution salience coefficients would be worth interpreting and
here there are no significant coefficients. To be sure, any interpretation of weak-SUTVA coefficients
without accounting for clustering warrants strong caution. These are cumulative measures so are, by
definition, positively serially correlated. Thus not accounting for the correlation could render results that
are artificially significant. The fact that this does not seem to be materially relevant (comparing Appendix
Table 7 with Appendix Table 2)–and the fact that placebo deterrence is observed for FGCM trials, which
constitute half of the evidence in favor of deterrence of execution rates in Table 7–warrants further caution
on strong inferences regarding the deterrence of execution rates.
Appendix Table 10 shows that the results of Table 7 are robust to including the following variables:
Irish indicators for each officer in the chain-of-command, whether the executed soldier was an officer,
the executed soldier’s age, distance to coast, distance to Berlin, fixed effects for the identities of the
Division Commanding Officer and Division 1st General Staff Officer (Officers that appear with less than
10 frequency are categorized in an Other category), and lag measures of absences and of death sentences
(the log of absences and the log of death sentences in the time window 30-59 Days Ago and 60-89 Days
Ago). As before, when officer or age data is missing, it is dummied out (i.e., set to a constant and another
variable indicating whether it is missing is included). To speed calculations, the exponential models do
not include officer identity fixed effects, but the Weibull and Cox models do. The results of this table
would support the earlier inferences.
In Appendix Table 12, as always, missing data is dummied out (i.e., set to a constant and another vari-
able indicating whether it is missing is included), and for interaction analysis, that means that interactions
with the dummy are included.
Appendix Table 14 reports these robustness to pooling the data. There are relatively few absences
that follow a death sentence event when each absentee dataset is used individually as can be seen in the
visual univariate analyses of Appendix Figures 9A-9C. However, the graphical intuition of Irish executions
spurring rather than deterring is still present in these figures as in Figures 14A-14C.
E.6 Day-by-day framework The size of the effects are largest with the smaller half-life assump-
tions. They are larger in the War Diaries dataset, but more statistically significant in the Police Gazettes
dataset. One might interpret the sum of the level term (on execution) and interaction term (with Irish)
as still suggesting a net spurring effect, despite any potential deterrent effect of British executions as
articulated in the theory section. The FGCM data suggest some spurring of Irish desertion relative to
non-Irish desertion but only when it comes to the execution of deserters. Again, the size of the effects are
largest with the smaller half-life assumptions.
Another way to interpret the magnitudes, the average value of the outcome is -0.002 in the Police
Gazettes, and the average value of the Irish execution variable is 0.003. So multiplying the coefficient
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0.012 by 0.003 yields roughly 2% of the average outcome. The standard deviation of the Irish execution
variable is 0.045 and the standard deviation of the outcome is 0.057, so multiplying by the coefficient
would yield roughly 1% of the standard deviation of the outcome.
Finally, to assuage concerns that these treatment variables are measured in a cumulative fashion–thus
strong positive serial correlation may affect inference, in Appendix Tables 8 and 9, I run the clock
backwards and examine the effect of future events on previous absences. I again shift the absence data
by 90 days earlier to ensure the subject of the death sentence are excluded from the outcome variable.
For example, consider March 1, 1916. I do not correlate the absence on March 1 with executions and
commutations beginning on March 1, 1916. This is because an absence on March 1 could appear in
the treatment data–up to three months, say–and would be on both the left- and right-hand side of
the specification. Instead, I correlate the absence on December 1, 1915 with forward-treatment (future
executions and commutations) beginning on March 1, 1916 in the placebo check for null results. What
emerges is that 5 out of 90 coefficients on an execution term are significant at the 10% level, which is
consistent with the low rate of significant coefficients in prior randomization and placebo checks.
E.7 Death Sentences Following Executions as Potential Source of Bias Appendix Table
13 reports that after an execution, the percentage of next desertion trials resulting in a death sentence
was lower, and it was particularly likely to be lower after an Irish execution. After a division executed
an Irish soldier, roughly 14% of the next desertion trials resulted in a death sentence, whereas after
a commutation, roughly 22% of the next desertion trials resulted in a death sentence. This pattern of
temporary ‘amnesty’–lower rates of death-sentencing after a recent execution–emerges across different
imputation assumptions for the commutation dates in Panels B and C. In this analysis, the numbers
differ slightly across Panels for the execution rows because if the next event was a capital sentence, a “1”
was coded. The capital sentence data is treated as data that should be a subset of the FGCM. However,
temporary amnesty did not seem to exist for Irish desertion trials, whose death sentencing rates were
roughly the same (around 20%) regardless of the previous death sentence being executed or commuted.
This is certainly observed in the 14-day imputation assumption of Panel A. In Panels B and C, the average
death-sentencing subsequent Irish and British executions vs. average death-sentencing subsequent Irish
and British commutations would also render muted any temporary amnesty.
It is important to emphasize that endogenous justice or temporary amnesty could not have been known
to soldiers (and affect C(p) in the opposite direction of what was intended). Informing the offender and
no one else of the charge, finding, sentence, and confirmation was sufficient promulgation to satisfy the
military laws. It was unlikely that the 130,936 FGCM convictions were circulated to the entire army (90
per day would likely reduce their impact). Public knowledge of lesser sentences for deserters would be
inconsistent with repeated admonishments that “it should be remembered that on active service the usual
penalty is death” for leaving post, cowardice, sleeping on post, etc. And, neither soldiers at the time nor
British military historians of World War I analyzing qualitative records knew about the low rate of death
sentences for convicted deserters.
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Figure 1: Death Sentences and Outcomes for BEF Units














































First Marne Second Ypres Verdun Somme Third Ypres Second Marne
Note: This figure shows the distribution of death sentences during the course of the war.
The dotted vertical lines indicate the start of major British o↵ensives. The sequence of tick
marks along the bottom axis represent each death sentence, with upward-pointing ticks
indicating a commutation and downward-pointing ticks indicating an execution.
Figure 2: British Army Divisions























































Note: This figure summarizes death sentences, executions and absences by British Army division. The x-axis the
number of death sentences passed in a division, while the y-axis is the count of executions. Each division is labeled
with its actual divisional number. The diameter of the circle around each division is proportional to the number of
absences recorded for that unit, though the exact size of the circle is not directly interpretable in terms of the axes.
Regular army divisions are indicated with red circles, new army divisions (Kirchner’s Army) are indicated with navy
circles and territorial divisions by tan circles. The upward sloping dashed line indicates an execution rate of 12%. For
each division, there is a tick above the division name indicating the estimated fraction of absences and death sentences
of Irish soldiers in that division. The tick full tick represents 50% of the division, with the green portion indicating
the proportion of that 1/2 that was Irish e.g., a solid green tick would indicate that 50% of the death sentences and
absences were passed on / committed by Irish soldiers.
Figure 2B (Absences from Police Gazettes) 
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Figure 14A: Non-Parametric Survival Distributions (War Diaries) 
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Figure 14B: Non-Parametric Survival Distributions (Police Gazettes) 
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Figure 14C: Non-Parametric Survival Distributions (FGCM) 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Irish -0.00133 -0.00162 0.00750 -0.00261 -1.93e-14 -0.000283 -0.000398 -0.00313 -0.0147 -0.00467 0.0131





1915 -0.138 -0.135 -0.210+ -0.0495
(0.0951) (0.107) (0.110) (0.115)
1916 -0.148 -0.150 -0.246* -0.00752
(0.0934) (0.105) (0.109) (0.114)
1917 -0.205* -0.205* -0.288** -0.0376
(0.0930) (0.104) (0.109) (0.114)
1918 -0.222* -0.219* -0.320** -0.0678
(0.0939) (0.105) (0.110) (0.114)
Irish x 1915 -0.0152
(0.237)
Irish x 1916 0.00798
(0.234)
Irish x 1917 0.00133
(0.233)






∆Log Casualties -0.00134 -0.00493
(0.00742) (0.00565)
∆Log Casualties 30 Days Ago 0.00327 -0.00292
(0.00718) (0.00540)
Distance to Coast -0.000474+
(0.000268)
Distance to Berlin 0.000240
(0.000467)
Year Fixed Effects N N N Y Y N N N N Y Y
Month Fixed Effects N N N N N Y N N N N N
Day of Week Fixed Effects N N N N N N Y N N N N
Division Fixed Effects N N N N N N N Y N Y Y
Joint Test of Fixed Effects 0.000883 0.00575 0.750 0.258 0.0272 0.590
Joint Test of Irish x Year FE 0.995
Joint Test of Casualties 0.839
Joint Test of Distance 0.209
Constant 0.151** 0.206** 0.984** 0.334** 0.333** 0.144** 0.178** 0.188* 0.162** 0.493** 0.757*
(0.00959) (0.0436) (0.0801) (0.0921) (0.103) (0.0306) (0.0275) (0.0889) (0.0154) (0.140) (0.379)
N 1741 1741 1741 1741 1741 1741 1741 1741 1418 1741 1190
R-sq 0.000 0.001 0.554 0.011 0.011 0.004 0.004 0.055 0.001 0.066 0.609
Notes: All regressions use ordinary least squares on death sentences occurring in France & Flanders before the end of World War I. Death sentences recorded 
without Divisions or from the Labour Corps were removed. Log Casualties is calculated as log(1+Casualties). ∆Log Casualties is defined as the difference in 
Log Casualties 1 to 29 Days Ago vs. 30 to 59 Days Ago. ∆Log Casualties 30 Days Ago is defined as the difference in Log Casualties 30 to 59 Days Ago vs. 
60 to 89 Days Ago. Distances are set to missing before the first battle and after the last battle. Territorial/New/Regular Army status is not assigned for 
Indian, Australian, Canadian, or New Zealand Divisions. Regressions including age also dummy out age when it is missing (i.e., assign a constant and 
include an indicator for age being missing). Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Results are similar with Logit or Probit.
Table 1: Are Observable Characteristics Correlated with Execution Decisions? (Deserters)




Brigade Commanding Officer 0.872
Division Commanding Officer 0.0211
Division 1st General Staff Officer 0.109
Corp Commanding Officer 0.527
Corp 1st General Staff Officer 0.529
Army Commanding Officer 0.214
Army 1st General Staff Officer 0.182
GHQ Commanding Officer 0.129
GHQ 1st General Staff Officer 0.277
Irish Soldier x Irish Officer FE 0.659
Military Indiscipline 30-59 & 60-89 days ago 0.482
Death Sentences 30-59 & 60-89 days ago 0.139
Execution Rate 30-59 & 60-89 days ago 0.415
Panel B:













Table 2: Are Observable Characteristics Correlated with Execution Decisions? (Deserters)
Notes: Data is restricted to death sentences occurring in France & Flanders before the end of World War I. Death sentences recorded without 
Divisions or from the Labour Corps were removed. In Panel A, each row reports a separate ordinary least squares regression and tests of joint 
significance of the fixed effects or measures of the recent battle environment. Military indiscipline and death sentences are calculated as 
log(1+number). Military indiscipline is the average of absentees and trials measured from the War Diaries, Police Gazettes, and FGCM trial 
registries. Lag execution rates is a set of controls comprising the numbers of executions and commutations within each time window. Units or 
officers that appeared with less than 10 frequency were categorized in a separate "other" category. All regression models include year, division, and 
Irish fixed effects. In Panel B, each row reports a separate ordinary least squares stacked autocorrelation regression. The strings of events within 
each unit were stacked and the first event within each unit was excluded as a dependent variable. If more than one event occurred on a day within 
a unit, the average outcome was calculated for that day. All regression models include year fixed effects and the leave-one-out mean execution rate 
of the unit. Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Results are similar with Logit or Probit.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Irish 0.00998 0.00969 0.0136 0.0101 0.0619 0.0106 0.0114 0.0106 0.00105 -0.000867 0.0697 0.0117
(0.0171) (0.0170) (0.0110) (0.0171) (0.0961) (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0173) (0.0188) (0.0169) (0.0951) (0.0141)








Desert 0.0970 0.0994 0.0603
(0.0673) (0.0674) (0.0626)
Coward -0.00968 -0.0128 -0.00141
(0.0713) (0.0714) (0.0652)
Disobedience -0.0366 -0.0367 -0.000702
(0.0827) (0.0828) (0.0781)
Murder 0.872** 0.861** 0.377**
(0.115) (0.115) (0.0948)
Mutiny 0.186+ 0.189+ 0.0383
(0.108) (0.108) (0.0953)
Quit -0.0290 -0.0315 -0.00165
(0.0781) (0.0782) (0.0705)
Sleep -0.0820 -0.0758 -0.00236
(0.0696) (0.0698) (0.0645)
Striking 0.0466 0.0491 0.113
(0.0898) (0.0899) (0.0822)
Rape -0.0467 -0.0473 0.0253
(0.104) (0.104) (0.107)
∆Log Casualties 0.000332 -0.00213
(0.00553) (0.00437)
∆Log Casualties 0.00487 -0.00140
  30 Days Ago (0.00512) (0.00410)
Distance to Coast -0.000409+
(0.000211)
Distance to Berlin 0.000262
(0.000383)
Year Fixed Effects N N N Y Y N N N N Y Y Y
Month Fixed Effects N N N N N Y N N N N N N
Day Fixed Effects N N N N N N Y N N N N N
Division Fixed Effects N N N N N N N Y N Y Y Y
Joint Test of Fixed Effects 0.0790 0.252 0.486 0.111 0.0554 0.770
Joint Test of Irish x Year FE 0.864
Joint Test of Casualties 0.615
Joint Test of Distance 0.152
Constant 0.123** 0.204** 0.956** 0.0824* 0.0714 0.116** 0.157** -2.90e-13 0.138** 0.113 0.160 0.665*
(0.00751) (0.0321) (0.0668) (0.0394) (0.0442) (0.0250) (0.0217) (0.329) (0.0119) (0.330) (0.332) (0.338)
N 2408 2408 2408 2408 2408 2408 2408 2408 2044 2408 2408 1612
R-sq 0.000 0.003 0.583 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.040 0.000 0.099 0.102 0.637
Table 3: Are Observable Characteristics Correlated with Execution Decisions? (All Death Sentences)
Notes: All regressions use ordinary least squares on death sentences occurring in France & Flanders before the end of World War I. Death sentences recorded 
without Divisions or from the Labour Corps were removed. Log Casualties is calculated as log(1+Casualties). ∆Log Casualties is defined as the difference in 
Log Casualties 1 to 29 Days Ago vs. 30 to 59 Days Ago. ∆Log Casualties 30 Days Ago is defined as the difference in Log Casualties 30 to 59 Days Ago vs. 
60 to 89 Days Ago. Distances are calculated based on the soldier's unit's participation in battles and are interpolated between battles. Distances are set to 
missing before the first battle and after the last battle. Territorial/New/Regular Army status is not assigned for Indian, Australian, Canadian, or New 
Zealand Divisions. Regressions including age also dummy out age when it is missing (i.e., assign a constant and include an indicator for age being missing). 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Results are similar with Logit or Probit.           




Brigade Commanding Officer 0.670
Division Commanding Officer 0.185
Division 1st General Staff Officer 0.517
Corp Commanding Officer 0.366
Corp 1st General Staff Officer 0.0900
Army Commanding Officer 0.0688
Army 1st General Staff Officer 0.308
GHQ Commanding Officer 0.369
GHQ 1st General Staff Officer 0.455
Irish Soldier x Irish Officer FE 0.452
Military Indiscipline 30-59 & 60-89 days ago 0.325
Death Sentences 30-59 & 60-89 days ago 0.109
Execution Rate 30-59 & 60-89 days ago 0.324
Panel B:













Table 4: Are Observable Characteristics Correlated with Execution Decisions? (All Death Sentences)
Notes: Data is restricted to death sentences occurring in France & Flanders before the end of World War I. Death sentences recorded without 
Divisions or from the Labour Corps were removed. In Panel A, each row reports a separate ordinary least squares regression and tests of joint 
significance of the fixed effects or measures of the recent battle environment. Military indiscipline and death sentences are calculated as 
log(1+number). Military indiscipline is the average of absentees and trials measured from the War Diaries, Police Gazettes, and FGCM trial 
registries. Lag execution rates is a set of controls comprising the numbers of executions and commutations within each time window. Units or 
officers that appeared with less than 10 frequency were categorized in a separate "other" category. All regression models include year, division, and 
Irish fixed effects. In Panel B, each row reports a separate ordinary least squares stacked autocorrelation regression. The strings of events within 
each unit were stacked and the first event within each unit was excluded as a dependent variable. If more than one event occurred on a day within 
a unit, the average outcome was calculated for that day. All regression models include year fixed effects and the leave-one-out mean execution rate 
of the unit. Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Results are similar with Logit or Probit.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: War Diaries Exp/+14 Wb/+14 Cox/+14 Exp/NN Wb/NN Cox/NN Exp/C=T Wb/C=T Cox/C=T
Execution -0.177 -0.144 -0.158 0.183 0.167 0.129 0.280+ 0.250+ 0.209
(0.174) (0.152) (0.155) (0.202) (0.171) (0.167) (0.147) (0.132) (0.129)
∆Log Casualties 0.0928 0.0802 0.0648 0.0494 0.0372 0.0159 0.124* 0.110* 0.0992*
(0.0671) (0.0579) (0.0516) (0.0833) (0.0715) (0.0638) (0.0629) (0.0562) (0.0505)
∆Log Casualties 0.151* 0.139** 0.108* 0.140* 0.132* 0.107* 0.208** 0.190** 0.159**
  30 Days Ago (0.0601) (0.0506) (0.0444) (0.0692) (0.0573) (0.0515) (0.0600) (0.0519) (0.0454)
N 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536
Panel B: Police Gazette
Execution -0.0770 -0.0715 -0.0662 0.0503 0.0535 0.0567 -0.0179 -0.0133 -0.0114
(0.0974) (0.0912) (0.0838) (0.0885) (0.0825) (0.0764) (0.102) (0.0956) (0.0883)
∆Log Casualties 0.0569+ 0.0546+ 0.0517+ 0.0518+ 0.0502+ 0.0495+ 0.0584+ 0.0571+ 0.0558+
(0.0303) (0.0290) (0.0271) (0.0292) (0.0277) (0.0264) (0.0341) (0.0327) (0.0310)
∆Log Casualties 0.0620* 0.0601* 0.0584* 0.0685* 0.0664* 0.0646* 0.0719* 0.0706* 0.0695*
  30 Days Ago (0.0289) (0.0276) (0.0256) (0.0296) (0.0280) (0.0265) (0.0301) (0.0288) (0.0272)
N 1640 1640 1640 1638 1638 1638 1640 1640 1640
Panel C: FGCM Trial Registries (Time Until Next Desertion Trial)
Execution -0.206+ -0.198+ -0.191* 0.135 0.121 0.114 0.0282 0.0283 0.0235
(0.119) (0.106) (0.0948) (0.112) (0.100) (0.0888) (0.0926) (0.0879) (0.0796)
∆Log Casualties 0.0476 0.0387 0.0298 0.0563 0.0472 0.0386 0.0369 0.0339 0.0296
(0.0420) (0.0386) (0.0349) (0.0409) (0.0373) (0.0339) (0.0444) (0.0430) (0.0405)
∆Log Casualties 0.0796* 0.0740* 0.0684* 0.0840* 0.0796* 0.0757* 0.0272 0.0248 0.0227
  30 Days Ago (0.0377) (0.0361) (0.0342) (0.0378) (0.0359) (0.0343) (0.0387) (0.0380) (0.0361)
N 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654
Table 5: Effects of Executions vs. Commutations on Elapsed Time Until Next Absence
Notes: Outcome is elapsed time from death sentence resolution (execution or commutation) until next absence. "Exp", "Wb" and "Cox" use the exponential, 
Weibull and Cox models respectively to parameterize the baseline hazard. In columns sub-titled "+14", the announcement of the commutation is assumed 
to occur 14 days after trial. In columns subtitled "NN" the nearest-neighbor method is used, which means the imputed announcement of the commutation 
is same as the most nearby execution announcement, while in columns labeled "C=T", the trial date is used as the announcement date of the execution 
and commutation. Log Casualties is calculated as log(1+Casualties). ∆Log Casualties is defined as the difference in Log Casualties 1 to 29 Days Ago vs. 30 
to 59 Days Ago. ∆Log Casualties 30 Days Ago is defined as the difference in Log Casualties 30 to 59 Days Ago vs. 60 to 89 Days Ago. All specifications 
include division and year fixed-effects. War Diaries analysis restricts to July 1916-June 1917, which is the time window for the surviving data. Standard 
errors clustered at the division level in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: War Diaries Exp/+14 Wb/+14 Cox/+14 Exp/NN Wb/NN Cox/NN Exp/C=T Wb/C=T Cox/C=T
Execution -0.417 -0.394 -0.308 0.219 0.182 0.239 0.723* 0.627* 0.689*
(0.736) (0.687) (0.670) (0.359) (0.324) (0.313) (0.338) (0.304) (0.273)
Desert -0.0429 -0.0218 -0.00996 0.0470 0.0531 0.0511 0.138 0.146 0.133
(0.305) (0.274) (0.240) (0.302) (0.265) (0.234) (0.311) (0.283) (0.246)
Ex-Desert -0.00330 0.0467 -0.0154 -0.241 -0.161 -0.218 -0.650+ -0.555+ -0.627*
(0.746) (0.700) (0.671) (0.406) (0.360) (0.336) (0.374) (0.337) (0.291)
Irish -0.727** -0.629** -0.464** -0.646** -0.541** -0.391* -0.475+ -0.407+ -0.263
(0.179) (0.176) (0.147) (0.207) (0.194) (0.173) (0.252) (0.237) (0.208)
Ex-Irish 1.179** 1.003** 0.805** 0.768** 0.579** 0.399* 0.619** 0.537** 0.355+
(0.285) (0.256) (0.248) (0.222) (0.195) (0.190) (0.202) (0.201) (0.195)
N 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536
Panel B: Police Gazette
Execution -0.372 -0.355 -0.340 0.0857 0.0890 0.0811 0.206 0.197 0.163
(0.387) (0.365) (0.333) (0.277) (0.259) (0.246) (0.286) (0.266) (0.249)
Desert -0.0459 -0.0409 -0.0341 -0.0245 -0.0228 -0.0212 -0.0510 -0.0488 -0.0454
(0.0938) (0.0888) (0.0820) (0.0887) (0.0828) (0.0772) (0.0890) (0.0849) (0.0797)
Ex-Desert 0.251 0.241 0.235 -0.0773 -0.0747 -0.0611 -0.327 -0.309 -0.267
(0.422) (0.399) (0.365) (0.316) (0.295) (0.279) (0.318) (0.298) (0.280)
Irish -0.179 -0.172+ -0.164+ -0.187+ -0.175+ -0.169+ -0.119 -0.116 -0.114
(0.109) (0.103) (0.0950) (0.106) (0.0990) (0.0925) (0.103) (0.0983) (0.0937)
Ex-Irish 0.431* 0.410* 0.387* 0.219 0.203 0.196 0.408* 0.392* 0.382*
(0.196) (0.181) (0.161) (0.199) (0.185) (0.169) (0.207) (0.193) (0.177)
N 1640 1640 1640 1638 1638 1638 1640 1640 1640
Panel C: FGCM Trial Registries (Time Until Next Desertion Trial)
Execution -0.709 -0.648 -0.588 0.0476 0.0296 0.0233 0.0772 0.0703 0.0526
(0.522) (0.473) (0.420) (0.308) (0.276) (0.252) (0.252) (0.240) (0.222)
Desert 0.0535 0.0411 0.0235 0.110 0.0816 0.0482 -0.0590 -0.0656 -0.0855
(0.136) (0.121) (0.108) (0.135) (0.121) (0.111) (0.133) (0.127) (0.118)
Ex-Desert 0.442 0.397 0.351 -0.0496 -0.0232 -0.00214 -0.164 -0.148 -0.116
(0.555) (0.506) (0.451) (0.343) (0.311) (0.286) (0.267) (0.256) (0.238)
Irish -0.353* -0.326* -0.297* -0.221 -0.196 -0.172 -0.252+ -0.243+ -0.218+
(0.141) (0.129) (0.117) (0.142) (0.130) (0.118) (0.132) (0.127) (0.118)
Ex-Irish 0.718** 0.639** 0.560** 0.651** 0.566** 0.480** 0.556* 0.525* 0.465*
(0.243) (0.224) (0.206) (0.206) (0.191) (0.178) (0.234) (0.226) (0.215)
N 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654
Table 6: Effects of Executions vs. Commutations on Elapsed Time Until Next Absence Differing by whether Case 
was a Desertion Trial and whether Soldier was Irish
Notes: Outcome is elapsed time from death sentence resolution (execution or commutation) until next absence. "Exp", "Wb" and "Cox" use the exponential, 
Weibull and Cox models respectively to parameterize the baseline hazard. In columns sub-titled "+14", the announcement of the commutation is assumed 
to occur 14 days after trial. In columns subtitled "NN" the nearest-neighbor method is used, which means the imputed announcement of the commutation 
is same as the most nearby execution announcement, while in columns labeled "C=T", the trial date is used as the announcement date of the execution 
and commutation. All specifications include division and year fixed-effects and ∆Log Casualties and ∆Log Casualties 30 Days Ago. War Diaries analysis 
restricts to July 1916-June 1917, which is the time window for the surviving data. Standard errors clustered at the division level in parentheses; + p < 
0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Execution -0.417 -0.390 -0.378 -0.368 -0.374 -0.389 -0.372 -0.544 -0.513 -0.475 -0.432 -0.411 -0.709 -0.919 -0.895 -0.856 -0.791 -0.752
(0.736) (0.798) (0.781) (0.742) (0.701) (0.679) (0.387) (0.527) (0.497) (0.447) (0.407) (0.393) (0.522) (0.699) (0.675) (0.622) (0.566) (0.541)
Desert -0.0429 -0.0203 -0.0188 -0.0253 -0.0517 -0.0763 -0.0459 -0.0711 -0.0804 -0.0656 -0.0458 -0.0412 0.0535 0.0272 0.0179 0.0317 0.0559 0.0630
(0.305) (0.300) (0.302) (0.300) (0.298) (0.297) (0.0938) (0.0879) (0.0859) (0.0851) (0.0882) (0.0912) (0.136) (0.127) (0.123) (0.122) (0.127) (0.132)
Ex-Desert -0.00330 -0.0249 -0.0306 -0.0251 0.000868 0.0202 0.251 0.312 0.284 0.258 0.234 0.228 0.442 0.518 0.504 0.474 0.430 0.411
(0.746) (0.782) (0.762) (0.728) (0.697) (0.683) (0.422) (0.562) (0.529) (0.480) (0.441) (0.426) (0.555) (0.741) (0.716) (0.663) (0.607) (0.580)
Irish -0.727** -0.769** -0.784** -0.822** -0.850** -0.836** -0.179 -0.158 -0.172 -0.186+ -0.189+ -0.185+ -0.353* -0.351* -0.365* -0.373** -0.366* -0.358*
(0.179) (0.181) (0.190) (0.212) (0.226) (0.220) (0.109) (0.110) (0.109) (0.107) (0.108) (0.108) (0.141) (0.143) (0.144) (0.145) (0.144) (0.143)
Ex-Irish 1.179** 1.258** 1.262** 1.310** 1.359** 1.347** 0.431* 0.432* 0.440* 0.437* 0.424* 0.420* 0.718** 0.726** 0.750** 0.778** 0.775** 0.761**
(0.285) (0.323) (0.308) (0.282) (0.270) (0.268) (0.196) (0.210) (0.202) (0.196) (0.196) (0.196) (0.243) (0.260) (0.255) (0.253) (0.251) (0.249)
∆Log Casualties 0.0870 0.0812 0.0781 0.0721 0.0626 0.0574 0.0537+ 0.0738** 0.0774** 0.0748* 0.0682* 0.0629* 0.0422 0.0597 0.0658+ 0.0662+ 0.0605 0.0543
(0.0602) (0.0602) (0.0599) (0.0595) (0.0597) (0.0603) (0.0301) (0.0269) (0.0281) (0.0292) (0.0294) (0.0293) (0.0413) (0.0371) (0.0380) (0.0389) (0.0394) (0.0398)
∆Log Casualties 0.170** 0.173** 0.170** 0.163** 0.153* 0.148* 0.0652* 0.0619* 0.0681* 0.0719** 0.0709** 0.0689* 0.0856* 0.0826* 0.0924** 0.100** 0.0987** 0.0944**
  30 Days Ago (0.0569) (0.0596) (0.0599) (0.0613) (0.0634) (0.0641) (0.0286) (0.0276) (0.0272) (0.0275) (0.0275) (0.0274) (0.0370) (0.0358) (0.0350) (0.0344) (0.0342) (0.0343)
Ex's - 7d -0.194 0.214* 0.356**
(0.214) (0.0939) (0.116)
Cm's - 7d -0.0304 0.214** 0.183**
(0.158) (0.0562) (0.0453)
Ex's - 14d -0.146 0.0840 0.172+
(0.155) (0.0788) (0.0901)
Cm's - 14d -0.0439 0.156** 0.140**
(0.108) (0.0383) (0.0328)
Ex's - 30d -0.147 -0.0270 0.0216
(0.130) (0.0703) (0.0738)
Cm's - 30d -0.0653 0.105** 0.0990**
(0.0722) (0.0267) (0.0255)
Ex's - 60d -0.193 -0.0734 -0.0390
(0.132) (0.0643) (0.0667)
Cm's - 60d -0.0856 0.0651** 0.0623**
(0.0546) (0.0211) (0.0206)
Ex's - 90d -0.222+ -0.0857 -0.0569
(0.132) (0.0624) (0.0650)
Cm's - 90d -0.0887+ 0.0455* 0.0425*
(0.0480) (0.0190) (0.0181)
N 536 536 536 536 536 536 1640 1640 1640 1640 1640 1640 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654
War Diaries FGCM Trial Registries (Desertion Trials)
Notes: All specifications use the "+14" commutation date imputation method and all specifications use exponential models to parameterize baseline hazard rates. All specifications include division and year fixed-effects. 
Log Casualties is calculated as log(1+Casualties). ∆Log Casualties is defined as the difference in Log Casualties 1 to 29 Days Ago vs. 30 to 59 Days Ago. ∆Log Casualties 30 Days Ago is defined as the difference in Log 
Casualties 30 to 59 Days Ago vs. 60 to 89 Days Ago. The regressors labeled ex's-Yd or cm's-Yd measure the cumulative effects of previous deterrence events in the unit. Y is the half-life of the effect. War Diaries analysis 
restricts to July 1916-June 1917, which is the time window for the surviving data. Standard errors clustered at the division level in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Table 7: Effects of Execution vs. Commutation on Elapsed Time Until Next Absence, Full Sample, Weak SUTVA
Police Gazettes
Panel A: +14 Imputation War Diaries Police Gazettes FGCM (Desertion Trials)
All Death Sentences
Irish Execution 19.2% 9.8% 21.6%
Non-Irish Execution 11.1% 9.0% 15.3%
Irish Commutation 13.3% 16.4% 12.0%
Non-Irish Commutation 13.1% 14.4% 13.3%
Desertion Death Sentences
Irish Execution 20.0% 9.3% 23.3%
Non-Irish Execution 9.5% 9.1% 15.5%
Irish Commutation 14.0% 17.8% 13.2%
Non-Irish Commutation 12.8% 15.8% 14.4%
Panel B: NN Imputation
All Death Sentences
Irish Execution 19.2% 9.8% 21.6%
Non-Irish Execution 11.1% 9.0% 15.3%
Irish Commutation 12.5% 16.4% 12.4%
Non-Irish Commutation 12.6% 13.7% 13.5%
Desertion Death Sentences
Irish Execution 20.0% 9.3% 23.3%
Non-Irish Execution 9.5% 9.1% 15.5%
Irish Commutation 10.4% 17.4% 13.2%
Non-Irish Commutation 12.1% 15.8% 14.2%
Panel C: C=T Imputation
All Death Sentences
Irish Execution 15.4% 7.8% 15.7%
Non-Irish Execution 10.4% 10.0% 16.2%
Irish Commutation 9.1% 17.6% 11.0%
Non-Irish Commutation 14.0% 13.8% 12.1%
Desertion Death Sentences
Irish Execution 15.0% 7.0% 16.3%
Non-Irish Execution 7.4% 10.2% 16.5%
Irish Commutation 9.6% 20.6% 10.8%
Non-Irish Commutation 13.8% 15.6% 13.1%
Table 8: Effects of Execution vs. Commutation on Ethnicity of Next Absence
% of Next Absences that are Irish
Notes: In panels sub-titled "+14", the announcement of the commutation is assumed to occur 14 days after trial. In panels subtitled 
"NN" the nearest-neighbor method is used, which means the imputed announcement of the commutation is same as the most nearby 
execution announcement, while in panels labeled "C=T", the trial date is used as the announcement date of the execution and 
commutation. War Diaries analysis restricts to July 1916-June 1917, which is the time window for the surviving data. 
Panel A: War Diaries (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
  Half-life 1 week 2 weeks 1 month 2 months 3 months
Execution 0.00894 0.00760 0.00804 0.00920 0.00957
(0.0110) (0.00925) (0.00902) (0.00832) (0.00742)
Death Sentence 0.00170 0.000383 -0.000446 -0.000740 -0.000807
(0.00202) (0.00108) (0.000769) (0.000766) (0.000768)
Ex-Irish -0.0124 -0.00516 -0.00106 -0.00260 -0.00453
(0.0119) (0.0108) (0.00944) (0.00767) (0.00688)
Irish 0.00608 0.00486 0.00191 0.000680 0.000635
(0.00877) (0.00669) (0.00490) (0.00353) (0.00316)
Ex-Desert -0.0177 -0.0135 -0.0114 -0.0111 -0.0112
(0.0112) (0.00890) (0.00841) (0.00799) (0.00736)
Desert 0.000511 0.000805 0.00127 0.00207 0.00271+
(0.00280) (0.00169) (0.00125) (0.00131) (0.00146)
N 20750 20750 20750 20750 20750
Panel B: Police Gazettes
Execution -0.0188** -0.0174* -0.0133 -0.00861 -0.00639
(0.00601) (0.00752) (0.00794) (0.00683) (0.00578)
Death Sentence 0.00340 0.00348 0.00329 0.00274 0.00238+
(0.00211) (0.00242) (0.00230) (0.00166) (0.00127)
Ex-Irish -0.00932 -0.00846 -0.00875 -0.0115* -0.0128*
(0.00618) (0.00557) (0.00529) (0.00539) (0.00527)
Irish 0.00316 0.00327 0.00363 0.00399 0.00396
(0.00486) (0.00508) (0.00452) (0.00345) (0.00270)
Ex-Desert 0.0115 0.0118 0.0102 0.00751 0.00626
(0.00791) (0.00860) (0.00882) (0.00723) (0.00600)
Desert -0.00385 -0.00438 -0.00419+ -0.00331+ -0.00278*
(0.00289) (0.00279) (0.00247) (0.00165) (0.00115)
N 54605 54605 54605 54605 54605
Panel C: FGCM Desertion Trial Registries
Execution 0.0122 0.0146 0.00819 0.000144 -0.00264
(0.0223) (0.0205) (0.0158) (0.0116) (0.00992)
Death Sentence 0.0106* 0.00628* 0.00356 0.00210 0.00145
(0.00403) (0.00311) (0.00219) (0.00155) (0.00134)
Ex-Irish -0.00844 -0.0143 -0.0111 -0.00676 -0.00469
(0.0194) (0.0144) (0.0102) (0.00814) (0.00763)
Irish -0.000543 0.00317 0.00454 0.00489 0.00484
(0.00855) (0.00661) (0.00468) (0.00344) (0.00304)
Ex-Desert -0.0125 -0.0156 -0.0121 -0.00601 -0.00362
(0.0193) (0.0179) (0.0147) (0.0116) (0.0102)
Desert 0.00236 0.00320 0.00256 0.00159 0.00108
(0.00388) (0.00357) (0.00277) (0.00204) (0.00175)
N 59355 59355 59355 59355 59355
Table 9: Day-by-Day Framework, All Absences
Notes: Outcome is whether there was any absence on that day and division. All specifcations use the "+14" commutation date imputation method and include 
division and year fixed-effects, ∆Log Casualties, and ∆Log Casualties 30 Days Ago. The half-life row indicates the assumed exponential half-life of the effect of 
past events. War Diaries analysis restricts to July 1916-June 1917, which is the time window for the surviving data. War Diaries analysis restricts to July 1916-
June 1917, which is the time window for the surviving data. Standard errors clustered at the division level in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Panel A: War Diaries (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
  Half-life 1 week 2 weeks 1 month 2 months 3 months
Execution -0.0207 -0.0129 -0.00711 -0.00546 -0.00531
(0.0143) (0.0124) (0.00923) (0.00664) (0.00554)
Death Sentence -0.00106 -0.000889 -0.000577 -0.000368 -0.000286
(0.00162) (0.00137) (0.00113) (0.000938) (0.000830)
Ex-Irish 0.0255* 0.0219* 0.0156+ 0.0126+ 0.0119+
(0.0127) (0.0105) (0.00839) (0.00686) (0.00611)
Irish 0.0000700 -0.000649 -0.000233 0.000565 0.00105
(0.00781) (0.00643) (0.00491) (0.00356) (0.00296)
Ex-Desert 0.0268+ 0.0174 0.00913 0.00542 0.00468
(0.0153) (0.0131) (0.00926) (0.00665) (0.00569)
Desert -0.00595+ -0.00439+ -0.00241 -0.00159 -0.00158
(0.00331) (0.00244) (0.00178) (0.00149) (0.00140)
N 20750 20750 20750 20750 20750
Panel B: Police Gazettes
Execution 0.00661+ 0.00495 0.000708 -0.00208 -0.00266
(0.00388) (0.00448) (0.00454) (0.00403) (0.00363)
Death Sentence -0.000576 -0.00118 -0.00120 -0.00108 -0.00100+
(0.00143) (0.00142) (0.00116) (0.000747) (0.000544)
Ex-Irish 0.0121* 0.00937* 0.00784** 0.00760** 0.00736**
(0.00545) (0.00412) (0.00289) (0.00239) (0.00233)
Irish -0.00474 -0.00312 -0.00200 -0.00120 -0.000779
(0.00314) (0.00237) (0.00192) (0.00144) (0.00119)
Ex-Desert -0.00778 -0.00491 -0.000327 0.00160 0.00150
(0.00595) (0.00547) (0.00521) (0.00448) (0.00388)
Desert 0.000462 0.00136 0.00123 0.000937 0.000832
(0.00169) (0.00167) (0.00136) (0.000872) (0.000635)
N 54605 54605 54605 54605 54605
Panel C: FGCM Desertion Trial Registries
Execution -0.0240 -0.0183 -0.00784 0.00197 0.00559
(0.0162) (0.0131) (0.00972) (0.00716) (0.00620)
Death Sentence -0.00425 -0.00241 -0.00147 -0.00104 -0.000829
(0.00514) (0.00329) (0.00193) (0.00114) (0.000885)
Ex-Irish 0.00333 0.00267 -0.000828 -0.00408 -0.00540
(0.0160) (0.0120) (0.00782) (0.00576) (0.00510)
Irish 0.00498 0.00192 0.0000538 -0.000915 -0.00116
(0.00575) (0.00451) (0.00328) (0.00236) (0.00202)
Ex-Desert 0.0313+ 0.0258* 0.0162+ 0.00644 0.00249
(0.0157) (0.0120) (0.00883) (0.00679) (0.00618)
Desert -0.00724 -0.00605+ -0.00400+ -0.00230 -0.00153
(0.00517) (0.00350) (0.00222) (0.00146) (0.00120)
N 59355 59355 59355 59355 59355
Table 10: Day-by-Day Framework, Irish - non-Irish Absence
Notes: Outcome is whether there was any Irish absence on that day and division minus whether there was any non-Irish absence on that day and division. All 
specifcations use the "+14" commutation date imputation method and include division and year fixed-effects, ∆Log Casualties, and ∆Log Casualties 30 Days 
Ago. The half-life row indicates the assumed exponential half-life of the effect of past events. War Diaries analysis restricts to July 1916-June 1917, which is the 
time window for the surviving data. War Diaries analysis restricts to July 1916-June 1917, which is the time window for the surviving data. Standard errors 
clustered at the division level in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
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EXECUTION OF A BRITISH PRIVATE: SHOT AS A DESERTER FROM THE TRENCHES
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IRISH SOLDIERS TRAIN TO FIGHT IN GERMAN ARMY: Deserters Eager to Humble England--Regard Teutons a...
Wilson, Carolyn
Chicago Daily Tribune (1872-1922); Mar 20, 1916; 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers: Chicago Tribune (1849-1987)
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Appendix Figure 6A: Map of Trenches 
 
Appendix Figure 6B: Distance to Coast 
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Appendix Figure 9A: Non-Parametric Survival Distributions (War Diaries) 
 
(a) Irish Executions Only 
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Appendix Figure 9B: Non-Parametric Survival Distributions (Police Gazettes) 
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Appendix Figure 9C: Non-Parametric Survival Distributions (FGCM) 
 
(a) Irish Executions Only 
 
 
(b) Non-Irish Executions Only 
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Appendix Figure 10A: Impact of Easter Rising on Irish Desertion (War Diaries) 
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Appendix Figure 10C: Impact of Easter Rising on Irish Desertion (FGCM Trials) 
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Appendix Figure 10E: Impact of Easter Rising on Irish Executions 
 
 
Notes: April 29, 1916 is the end date of the Easter Rising. All graphs display kernel-
weighted local polynomial regressions. X-axis is days from January 1, 1960 and Y-axis is 
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Appendix Figure 11A: Impact of Conscription on Irish Desertion in the UK 
 
 
Appendix Figure 11B: Impact of Easter Rising on Irish Desertion in the UK 
 
Notes: March 2, 1916 is the date that the Military Service Act of 1916 came into force 
to conscript in Britain. April 29, 1916 is the end date of the Easter Rising. All graphs 
display kernel-weighted local polynomial regressions. X-axis is days from January 1, 
1960 and Y-axis is the Irish indicator. Data comes from the Police Gazettes. 
Appendix Figure 12A: Samples of General Routine Part 1 Orders 
 
Appendix Figure 12B: Sample of General Routine Part 2 Orders 
 
Appendix Figure 12C: General Routine Part 2 Orders Desertion vs. Absence Distinction  
 
Appendix Figure 12D: Sample of General Routine Part 2 Orders (Frequency of “Absence”) 
 
Appendix Figure 12E: Sample of General Routine Part 2 Orders (Frequency of “Desertion”) 
 
Appendix Figure 13: Order of Battle Sample 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: War Diaries Exp/+14 Wb/+14 Cox/+14 Exp/NN Wb/NN Cox/NN Exp/C=T Wb/C=T Cox/C=T
Execution 0.0983 -0.0543 -0.168 0.0404 0.334 0.567 0.329+ 0.425 0.556
(0.173) (0.251) (0.290) (0.257) (0.349) (0.439) (0.185) (0.281) (0.348)
Desert -0.0630 -0.103 -0.133 -0.0341 -0.0359 -0.0738 0.0629 0.0153 -0.0542
(0.0957) (0.125) (0.151) (0.0885) (0.138) (0.176) (0.105) (0.135) (0.168)
Ex-Desert -0.115 -0.0948 0.0129 -0.0608 -0.313 -0.543 -0.317+ -0.391 -0.555
(0.193) (0.307) (0.368) (0.270) (0.351) (0.448) (0.186) (0.274) (0.340)
Irish 0.00526 -0.0540 -0.0829 0.0267 -0.0417 -0.0852 0.165+ 0.137 0.135
(0.112) (0.132) (0.169) (0.110) (0.142) (0.164) (0.1000) (0.132) (0.159)
Ex-Irish 0.126 0.316 0.405 0.0677 0.0383 0.0520 0.0120 -0.0612 -0.0820
(0.210) (0.243) (0.302) (0.240) (0.353) (0.412) (0.196) (0.303) (0.372)
N 435 435 435 438 438 438 413 413 413
Panel B: Police Gazette
Execution 0.0293 0.135 0.104 0.244* 0.221 0.509* 0.166+ 0.0692 0.220
(0.109) (0.330) (0.232) (0.118) (0.330) (0.257) (0.0878) (0.456) (0.291)
Desert -0.0133 0.0375 0.0177 0.0505 0.0420 0.106 0.0266 0.110 0.0745
(0.0371) (0.0908) (0.0698) (0.0532) (0.162) (0.0951) (0.0288) (0.105) (0.0759)
Ex-Desert -0.0245 -0.291 -0.185 -0.247* -0.304 -0.521* -0.130 -0.221 -0.300
(0.116) (0.294) (0.221) (0.124) (0.324) (0.248) (0.0920) (0.424) (0.291)
Irish -0.0384 -0.230 -0.172 -0.0332 -0.0868 -0.0822 -0.00815 -0.188 -0.158
(0.0466) (0.162) (0.108) (0.0572) (0.141) (0.107) (0.0424) (0.161) (0.109)
Ex-Irish 0.0594 0.215 0.200 0.0306 0.278 0.135 0.0715 0.620** 0.460*
(0.0915) (0.315) (0.219) (0.119) (0.223) (0.188) (0.0870) (0.240) (0.190)
N 1481 1481 1481 1500 1500 1500 1479 1479 1479
Panel C: FGCM Trial Registries (Time Until Next Desertion Trial)
Execution -0.177 0.0193 -0.0555 0.335* 0.303 0.517* -0.133 0.118 0.00467
(0.262) (0.385) (0.351) (0.154) (0.331) (0.252) (0.242) (0.369) (0.349)
Desert -0.0196 0.0557 -0.0206 0.0171 0.0717 0.0787 0.0936 0.259 0.132
(0.0934) (0.173) (0.101) (0.0677) (0.106) (0.0844) (0.0810) (0.175) (0.108)
Ex-Desert 0.174 0.110 0.137 -0.463** -0.427 -0.580* 0.0957 -0.0744 0.00106
(0.261) (0.385) (0.352) (0.164) (0.331) (0.252) (0.256) (0.388) (0.377)
Irish -0.0586 -0.0378 -0.0570 0.0165 0.0232 -0.0468 -0.0146 -0.0319 -0.0504
(0.0910) (0.173) (0.121) (0.0811) (0.145) (0.123) (0.0907) (0.162) (0.125)
Ex-Irish -0.0397 -0.125 -0.119 -0.00562 0.0560 0.0490 0.0572 0.0739 0.142
(0.208) (0.308) (0.250) (0.222) (0.314) (0.209) (0.241) (0.355) (0.284)
N 1648 1648 1648 1526 1526 1526 1642 1642 1642
Appendix Table 1: Effects of Executions vs. Commutations on Elapsed Time Until Previous Absence Differing by 
whether Case was a Desertion Trial and whether Soldier was Irish
Notes: Outcome is elapsed time from death sentence resolution (execution or commutation) until previous absence at least 90 days before the death 
sentence. "Exp", "Wb" and "Cox" use the exponential, Weibull and Cox models respectively to parameterize the baseline hazard. In columns sub-titled 
"+14", the announcement of the commutation is assumed to occur 14 days after trial. In columns subtitled "NN" the nearest-neighbor method is used, 
which means the imputed announcement of the commutation is same as the most nearby execution announcement, while in columns labeled "C=T", the 
trial date is used as the announcement date of the execution and commutation. All specifications include division and year fixed-effects and ∆Log 
Casualties and ∆Log Casualties 30 Days Ago. War Diaries analysis restricts to July 1916-June 1917, which is the time window for the surviving data. 
Standard errors clustered at the division level in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Execution 0.0983 0.0960 0.0432 -0.0189 -0.0629 -0.0830 0.0293 0.0271 0.0327 0.0383 0.0396 0.0385 -0.177 -0.193 -0.205 -0.206 -0.200 -0.195
(0.173) (0.190) (0.198) (0.205) (0.211) (0.213) (0.109) (0.109) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.262) (0.260) (0.263) (0.265) (0.264) (0.263)
Desert -0.0630 -0.0575 -0.0495 -0.0481 -0.0553 -0.0606 -0.0133 -0.0146 -0.0144 -0.00981 -0.00266 0.00162 -0.0196 -0.0158 -0.0171 -0.0247 -0.0310 -0.0323
(0.0957) (0.0947) (0.0949) (0.0959) (0.0961) (0.0957) (0.0371) (0.0367) (0.0365) (0.0362) (0.0356) (0.0354) (0.0934) (0.0889) (0.0872) (0.0871) (0.0887) (0.0898)
Ex-Desert -0.115 -0.116 -0.0840 -0.0505 -0.0280 -0.0166 -0.0245 -0.0225 -0.0239 -0.0240 -0.0257 -0.0267 0.174 0.143 0.152 0.163 0.173 0.175
(0.193) (0.202) (0.212) (0.221) (0.225) (0.226) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.117) (0.117) (0.261) (0.259) (0.261) (0.263) (0.262) (0.261)
Irish 0.00526 0.00545 -0.00151 -0.00423 -0.00138 0.000996 -0.0384 -0.0379 -0.0383 -0.0377 -0.0359 -0.0354 -0.0586 -0.0632 -0.0587 -0.0537 -0.0532 -0.0535
(0.112) (0.111) (0.110) (0.110) (0.109) (0.109) (0.0466) (0.0465) (0.0471) (0.0472) (0.0457) (0.0446) (0.0910) (0.0867) (0.0865) (0.0869) (0.0881) (0.0889)
Ex-Irish 0.126 0.129 0.146 0.140 0.115 0.101 0.0594 0.0620 0.0607 0.0532 0.0499 0.0519 -0.0397 -0.0107 -0.0143 -0.0212 -0.0293 -0.0339
(0.210) (0.208) (0.207) (0.212) (0.218) (0.220) (0.0915) (0.0916) (0.0920) (0.0915) (0.0893) (0.0881) (0.208) (0.213) (0.211) (0.208) (0.207) (0.208)
∆Log Casualties 0.0552 0.0552 0.0527 0.0506 0.0497 0.0493 -0.0218 -0.0220 -0.0212 -0.0212 -0.0219 -0.0218 -0.0448+ -0.0485* -0.0498* -0.0499* -0.0479* -0.0466*
(0.0347) (0.0353) (0.0361) (0.0366) (0.0364) (0.0364) (0.0149) (0.0151) (0.0150) (0.0146) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0235) (0.0220) (0.0217) (0.0219) (0.0225) (0.0228)
∆Log Casualties 0.0783* 0.0795* 0.0749* 0.0697+ 0.0662+ 0.0647+ -0.00676 -0.00650 -0.00572 -0.00595 -0.00658 -0.00660 -0.0302 -0.0371+ -0.0382+ -0.0371+ -0.0337 -0.0318
  30 Days Ago (0.0321) (0.0339) (0.0349) (0.0358) (0.0360) (0.0361) (0.0151) (0.0149) (0.0150) (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0220) (0.0205) (0.0206) (0.0210) (0.0216) (0.0219)
Ex's - 7d -0.108 0.0398 -0.209*
(0.148) (0.0433) (0.0982)
Cm's - 7d 0.00111 -0.00178 0.126**
(0.0663) (0.0266) (0.0359)
Ex's - 14d -0.155 0.0197 -0.169*
(0.132) (0.0381) (0.0821)
Cm's - 14d 0.0453 -0.00956 0.0974**
(0.0541) (0.0197) (0.0266)
Ex's - 30d -0.146 -0.0124 -0.0909
(0.117) (0.0357) (0.0651)
Cm's - 30d 0.0847+ -0.0167 0.0616**
(0.0495) (0.0155) (0.0202)
Ex's - 60d -0.115 -0.0323 -0.0338
(0.107) (0.0339) (0.0514)
Cm's - 60d 0.107* -0.0193 0.0342*
(0.0461) (0.0127) (0.0167)
Ex's - 90d -0.0991 -0.0387 -0.0125
(0.104) (0.0316) (0.0456)
Cm's - 90d 0.113* -0.0195+ 0.0232
(0.0441) (0.0112) (0.0154)
N 435 435 435 435 435 435 1481 1481 1481 1481 1481 1481 1648 1648 1648 1648 1648 1648
Appendix Table 2: Effects of Execution vs. Commutation on Elapsed Time Until Previous Absence, Full Sample, Weak SUTVA
War Diaries Police Gazettes FGCM Trial Registries (Desertion Trials)
Notes: Outcome is elapsed time from death sentence resolution (execution or commutation) until previous absence at least 90 days before the death sentence. All specifcations use the "+14" commutation date imputation 
method and all specifications use exponential models to parameterize baseline hazard rates. All specifications include division and year fixed-effects and ∆Log Casualties and ∆Log Casualties 30 Days Ago. The regressors 
labeled ex's-Yd or cm's-Yd measure the cumulative effects of previous deterrence events in the unit. Y is the half-life of the effect. War Diaries analysis restricts to July 1916-June 1917, which is the time window for the 
surviving data. Standard errors clustered at the division level in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: War Diaries Exp/+14 Wb/+14 Cox/+14 Exp/NN Wb/NN Cox/NN Exp/C=T Wb/C=T Cox/C=T
Execution -0.177 -0.144 -0.158 0.183 0.167 0.129 0.280* 0.250+ 0.209
(0.141) (0.139) (0.140) (0.144) (0.141) (0.141) (0.139) (0.137) (0.137)
∆Log Casualties 0.0928* 0.0802+ 0.0648 0.0494 0.0372 0.0159 0.124** 0.110* 0.0992*
(0.0470) (0.0461) (0.0458) (0.0473) (0.0462) (0.0456) (0.0468) (0.0461) (0.0454)
∆Log Casualties 0.151** 0.139** 0.108* 0.140** 0.132** 0.107* 0.208** 0.190** 0.159**
  30 Days Ago (0.0457) (0.0449) (0.0447) (0.0457) (0.0444) (0.0441) (0.0456) (0.0451) (0.0447)
N 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536
Panel B: Police Gazette
Execution -0.0770 -0.0715 -0.0662 0.0503 0.0535 0.0567 -0.0179 -0.0133 -0.0114
(0.0783) (0.0781) (0.0779) (0.0761) (0.0759) (0.0758) (0.0782) (0.0780) (0.0780)
∆Log Casualties 0.0569* 0.0546* 0.0517* 0.0518* 0.0502* 0.0495* 0.0584* 0.0571* 0.0558*
(0.0228) (0.0227) (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0229) (0.0228) (0.0228)
∆Log Casualties 0.0620** 0.0601** 0.0584** 0.0685** 0.0664** 0.0646** 0.0719** 0.0706** 0.0695**
  30 Days Ago (0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0200) (0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203)
N 1640 1640 1640 1638 1638 1638 1640 1640 1640
Panel C: FGCM Trial Registries (Time Until Next Desertion Trial)
Execution -0.206+ -0.198+ -0.191+ 0.135 0.121 0.114 0.0282 0.0283 0.0235
(0.105) (0.104) (0.104) (0.0991) (0.0986) (0.0983) (0.107) (0.106) (0.106)
∆Log Casualties 0.0476 0.0387 0.0298 0.0563+ 0.0472+ 0.0386 0.0369 0.0339 0.0296
(0.0291) (0.0289) (0.0287) (0.0288) (0.0286) (0.0283) (0.0310) (0.0309) (0.0307)
∆Log Casualties 0.0796** 0.0740** 0.0684** 0.0840** 0.0796** 0.0757** 0.0272 0.0248 0.0227
  30 Days Ago (0.0261) (0.0260) (0.0259) (0.0259) (0.0258) (0.0258) (0.0278) (0.0277) (0.0277)
N 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654
Appendix Table 3: Effects of Executions vs. Commutations on Elapsed Time Until Next Absence
Notes: Outcome is elapsed time from death sentence resolution (execution or commutation) until next absence. "Exp", "Wb" and "Cox" use the exponential, 
Weibull and Cox models respectively to parameterize the baseline hazard. In columns sub-titled "+14", the announcement of the commutation is assumed 
to occur 14 days after trial. In columns subtitled "NN" the nearest-neighbor method is used, which means the imputed announcement of the commutation 
is same as the most nearby execution announcement, while in columns labeled "C=T", the trial date is used as the announcement date of the execution 
and commutation. Log Casualties is calculated as log(1+Casualties). ∆Log Casualties is defined as the difference in Log Casualties 1 to 29 Days Ago vs. 30 
to 59 Days Ago. ∆Log Casualties 30 Days Ago is defined as the difference in Log Casualties 30 to 59 Days Ago vs. 60 to 89 Days Ago. All specifications 
include division and year fixed-effects. War Diaries analysis restricts to July 1916-June 1917, which is the time window for the surviving data. Standard 
errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: War Diaries Exp/+14 Wb/+14 Cox/+14 Exp/NN Wb/NN Cox/NN Exp/C=T Wb/C=T Cox/C=T
Execution -0.417 -0.394 -0.308 0.219 0.182 0.239 0.723+ 0.627 0.689+
(0.446) (0.441) (0.439) (0.418) (0.414) (0.411) (0.397) (0.396) (0.393)
Desert -0.0429 -0.0218 -0.00996 0.0470 0.0531 0.0511 0.138 0.146 0.133
(0.176) (0.174) (0.172) (0.172) (0.169) (0.167) (0.178) (0.175) (0.172)
Ex-Desert -0.00330 0.0467 -0.0154 -0.241 -0.161 -0.218 -0.650 -0.555 -0.627
(0.468) (0.464) (0.461) (0.439) (0.435) (0.431) (0.417) (0.415) (0.412)
Irish -0.727** -0.629** -0.464** -0.646** -0.541** -0.391* -0.475* -0.407* -0.263
(0.181) (0.182) (0.180) (0.178) (0.178) (0.177) (0.186) (0.185) (0.182)
Ex-Irish 1.179** 1.003** 0.805* 0.768* 0.579 0.399 0.619+ 0.537 0.355
(0.356) (0.357) (0.355) (0.359) (0.358) (0.355) (0.340) (0.340) (0.341)
N 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536
Panel B: Police Gazette
Execution -0.372 -0.355 -0.340 0.0857 0.0890 0.0811 0.206 0.197 0.163
(0.232) (0.231) (0.230) (0.213) (0.213) (0.213) (0.219) (0.219) (0.219)
Desert -0.0459 -0.0409 -0.0341 -0.0245 -0.0228 -0.0212 -0.0510 -0.0488 -0.0454
(0.0795) (0.0794) (0.0792) (0.0783) (0.0781) (0.0781) (0.0780) (0.0779) (0.0778)
Ex-Desert 0.251 0.241 0.235 -0.0773 -0.0747 -0.0611 -0.327 -0.309 -0.267
(0.248) (0.247) (0.245) (0.231) (0.230) (0.229) (0.236) (0.236) (0.235)
Irish -0.179* -0.172+ -0.164+ -0.187* -0.175* -0.169+ -0.119 -0.116 -0.114
(0.0895) (0.0892) (0.0891) (0.0892) (0.0890) (0.0890) (0.0902) (0.0900) (0.0899)
Ex-Irish 0.431* 0.410* 0.387* 0.219 0.203 0.196 0.408* 0.392* 0.382+
(0.198) (0.197) (0.197) (0.198) (0.198) (0.197) (0.198) (0.198) (0.197)
N 1640 1640 1640 1638 1638 1638 1640 1640 1640
Panel C: FGCM Trial Registries (Time Until Next Desertion Trial)
Execution -0.709* -0.648* -0.588* 0.0476 0.0296 0.0233 0.0772 0.0703 0.0526
(0.286) (0.283) (0.281) (0.260) (0.259) (0.258) (0.254) (0.253) (0.253)
Desert 0.0535 0.0411 0.0235 0.110 0.0816 0.0482 -0.0590 -0.0656 -0.0855
(0.0990) (0.0982) (0.0977) (0.0981) (0.0976) (0.0972) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103)
Ex-Desert 0.442 0.397 0.351 -0.0496 -0.0232 -0.00214 -0.164 -0.148 -0.116
(0.306) (0.303) (0.301) (0.281) (0.280) (0.279) (0.281) (0.280) (0.279)
Irish -0.353** -0.326** -0.297* -0.221* -0.196+ -0.172 -0.252* -0.243+ -0.218+
(0.116) (0.116) (0.115) (0.113) (0.112) (0.112) (0.124) (0.124) (0.123)
Ex-Irish 0.718** 0.639* 0.560* 0.651** 0.566* 0.480+ 0.556* 0.525+ 0.465+
(0.271) (0.271) (0.270) (0.252) (0.251) (0.250) (0.269) (0.268) (0.268)
N 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654
Appendix Table 4: Effects of Executions vs. Commutations on Elapsed Time Until Next Absence Differing by 
whether Case was a Desertion Trial and whether Soldier was Irish
Notes: Outcome is elapsed time from death sentence resolution (execution or commutation) until next absence. "Exp", "Wb" and "Cox" use the exponential, 
Weibull and Cox models respectively to parameterize the baseline hazard. In columns sub-titled "+14", the announcement of the commutation is assumed 
to occur 14 days after trial. In columns subtitled "NN" the nearest-neighbor method is used, which means the imputed announcement of the commutation 
is same as the most nearby execution announcement, while in columns labeled "C=T", the trial date is used as the announcement date of the execution 
and commutation. All specifications include division and year fixed-effects and ∆Log Casualties and ∆Log Casualties 30 Days Ago. War Diaries analysis 
restricts to July 1916-June 1917, which is the time window for the surviving data. Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Execution -0.417 -0.386 -0.374 -0.363 -0.370 -0.384 -0.372 -0.542* -0.512* -0.475* -0.432+ -0.411+ -0.709* -0.919** -0.895** -0.856** -0.791** -0.752**
(0.446) (0.453) (0.452) (0.451) (0.450) (0.450) (0.232) (0.245) (0.242) (0.237) (0.234) (0.233) (0.286) (0.305) (0.301) (0.295) (0.290) (0.288)
Desert -0.0429 -0.0205 -0.0188 -0.0251 -0.0512 -0.0756 -0.0459 -0.0711 -0.0804 -0.0656 -0.0458 -0.0412 0.0535 0.0272 0.0179 0.0317 0.0559 0.0630
(0.176) (0.177) (0.177) (0.176) (0.175) (0.175) (0.0795) (0.0800) (0.0799) (0.0796) (0.0795) (0.0795) (0.0990) (0.0998) (0.0997) (0.0994) (0.0993) (0.0992)
Ex-Desert -0.00330 -0.0293 -0.0343 -0.0282 -0.00235 0.0168 0.251 0.310 0.283 0.258 0.235 0.229 0.442 0.518 0.504 0.474 0.430 0.411
(0.468) (0.472) (0.470) (0.467) (0.465) (0.464) (0.248) (0.260) (0.257) (0.253) (0.250) (0.249) (0.306) (0.323) (0.320) (0.315) (0.311) (0.309)
Irish -0.727** -0.766** -0.782** -0.821** -0.849** -0.836** -0.179* -0.158+ -0.172+ -0.186* -0.189* -0.185* -0.353** -0.351** -0.365** -0.373** -0.366** -0.358**
(0.181) (0.184) (0.185) (0.186) (0.185) (0.183) (0.0895) (0.0898) (0.0897) (0.0896) (0.0896) (0.0896) (0.116) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117)
Ex-Irish 1.179** 1.250** 1.256** 1.305** 1.355** 1.343** 0.431* 0.432* 0.440* 0.437* 0.424* 0.421* 0.718** 0.726** 0.750** 0.778** 0.775** 0.761**
(0.356) (0.361) (0.361) (0.361) (0.359) (0.358) (0.198) (0.199) (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.198) (0.271) (0.273) (0.273) (0.272) (0.272) (0.272)
∆Log Casualties 0.0870+ 0.0811+ 0.0781+ 0.0721 0.0624 0.0571 0.0537* 0.0744** 0.0776** 0.0747** 0.0681** 0.0628** 0.0422 0.0597* 0.0658* 0.0662* 0.0605* 0.0543+
(0.0465) (0.0466) (0.0468) (0.0470) (0.0474) (0.0477) (0.0229) (0.0233) (0.0234) (0.0233) (0.0231) (0.0230) (0.0291) (0.0296) (0.0298) (0.0298) (0.0296) (0.0295)
∆Log Casualties 0.170** 0.171** 0.168** 0.162** 0.151** 0.146** 0.0652** 0.0620** 0.0681** 0.0719** 0.0709** 0.0689** 0.0856** 0.0824** 0.0923** 0.100** 0.0987** 0.0944**
  30 Days Ago (0.0457) (0.0456) (0.0456) (0.0458) (0.0461) (0.0462) (0.0199) (0.0202) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0202) (0.0201) (0.0261) (0.0263) (0.0264) (0.0267) (0.0266) (0.0265)
Ex's - 7d -0.174 0.217** 0.355**
(0.170) (0.0841) (0.113)
Cm's - 7d -0.0348 0.214** 0.183**
(0.0909) (0.0328) (0.0408)
Ex's - 14d -0.133 0.0852 0.172*
(0.137) (0.0632) (0.0832)
Cm's - 14d -0.0468 0.156** 0.140**
(0.0670) (0.0236) (0.0299)
Ex's - 30d -0.138 -0.0264 0.0213
(0.114) (0.0475) (0.0615)
Cm's - 30d -0.0673 0.105** 0.0991**
(0.0502) (0.0168) (0.0219)
Ex's - 60d -0.186+ -0.0731+ -0.0392
(0.104) (0.0386) (0.0497)
Cm's - 60d -0.0872* 0.0651** 0.0623**
(0.0412) (0.0130) (0.0169)
Ex's - 90d -0.216* -0.0855* -0.0570
(0.100) (0.0354) (0.0455)
Cm's - 90d -0.0902* 0.0454** 0.0425**
(0.0375) (0.0116) (0.0149)
N 536 536 536 536 536 536 1640 1640 1640 1640 1640 1640 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654
Appendix Table 5: Effects of Execution vs. Commutation on Elapsed Time Until Next Absence, Full Sample, Weak SUTVA
War Diaries Police Gazettes FGCM Trial Registries (Desertion Trials)
Notes: All specifcations use the "+14" commutation date imputation method and all specifications use exponential models to parameterize baseline hazard rates. All specifications include division and year fixed-effects. Log 
Casualties is calculated as log(1+Casualties). ∆Log Casualties is defined as the difference in Log Casualties 1 to 29 Days Ago vs. 30 to 59 Days Ago. ∆Log Casualties 30 Days Ago is defined as the difference in Log 
Casualties 30 to 59 Days Ago vs. 60 to 89 Days Ago. The regressors labeled ex's-Yd or cm's-Yd measure the cumulative effects of previous deterrence events in the unit. Y is the half-life of the effect. War Diaries analysis 
restricts to July 1916-June 1917, which is the time window for the surviving data. Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: War Diaries Exp/+14 Wb/+14 Cox/+14 Exp/NN Wb/NN Cox/NN Exp/C=T Wb/C=T Cox/C=T
Execution 0.0983 -0.0543 -0.168 0.0404 0.334 0.567 0.329 0.425 0.556
(0.388) (0.394) (0.400) (0.436) (0.434) (0.438) (0.451) (0.453) (0.458)
Desert -0.0630 -0.103 -0.133 -0.0341 -0.0359 -0.0738 0.0629 0.0153 -0.0542
(0.170) (0.171) (0.173) (0.169) (0.175) (0.179) (0.193) (0.196) (0.200)
Ex-Desert -0.115 -0.0948 0.0129 -0.0608 -0.313 -0.543 -0.317 -0.391 -0.555
(0.413) (0.422) (0.427) (0.453) (0.457) (0.464) (0.468) (0.473) (0.478)
Irish 0.00526 -0.0540 -0.0829 0.0267 -0.0417 -0.0852 0.165 0.137 0.135
(0.185) (0.189) (0.195) (0.185) (0.191) (0.195) (0.199) (0.205) (0.208)
Ex-Irish 0.126 0.316 0.405 0.0677 0.0383 0.0520 0.0120 -0.0612 -0.0820
(0.386) (0.392) (0.403) (0.382) (0.390) (0.398) (0.392) (0.399) (0.406)
N 435 435 435 438 438 438 413 413 413
Panel B: Police Gazette
Execution 0.0293 0.135 0.104 0.244 0.221 0.509* 0.166 0.0692 0.220
(0.234) (0.239) (0.237) (0.215) (0.221) (0.221) (0.222) (0.231) (0.226)
Desert -0.0133 0.0375 0.0177 0.0505 0.0420 0.106 0.0266 0.110 0.0745
(0.0823) (0.0839) (0.0831) (0.0849) (0.0916) (0.0885) (0.0832) (0.0846) (0.0834)
Ex-Desert -0.0245 -0.291 -0.185 -0.247 -0.304 -0.521* -0.130 -0.221 -0.300
(0.248) (0.255) (0.253) (0.231) (0.239) (0.238) (0.236) (0.247) (0.242)
Irish -0.0384 -0.230* -0.172+ -0.0332 -0.0868 -0.0822 -0.00815 -0.188* -0.158+
(0.0901) (0.0939) (0.0912) (0.0905) (0.0936) (0.0917) (0.0899) (0.0941) (0.0911)
Ex-Irish 0.0594 0.215 0.200 0.0306 0.278 0.135 0.0715 0.620** 0.460*
(0.209) (0.216) (0.213) (0.215) (0.220) (0.218) (0.204) (0.212) (0.209)
N 1481 1481 1481 1500 1500 1500 1479 1479 1479
Panel C: FGCM Trial Registries (Time Until Next Desertion Trial)
Execution -0.177 0.0193 -0.0555 0.335 0.303 0.517* -0.133 0.118 0.00467
(0.285) (0.293) (0.290) (0.235) (0.242) (0.240) (0.307) (0.316) (0.313)
Desert -0.0196 0.0557 -0.0206 0.0171 0.0717 0.0787 0.0936 0.259* 0.132
(0.0930) (0.0997) (0.0945) (0.0980) (0.100) (0.0986) (0.0989) (0.108) (0.102)
Ex-Desert 0.174 0.110 0.137 -0.463+ -0.427 -0.580* 0.0957 -0.0744 0.00106
(0.303) (0.309) (0.308) (0.260) (0.270) (0.267) (0.326) (0.334) (0.333)
Irish -0.0586 -0.0378 -0.0570 0.0165 0.0232 -0.0468 -0.0146 -0.0319 -0.0504
(0.108) (0.113) (0.110) (0.107) (0.112) (0.110) (0.112) (0.117) (0.114)
Ex-Irish -0.0397 -0.125 -0.119 -0.00562 0.0560 0.0490 0.0572 0.0739 0.142
(0.260) (0.266) (0.263) (0.261) (0.271) (0.267) (0.266) (0.274) (0.270)
N 1648 1648 1648 1526 1526 1526 1642 1642 1642
Appendix Table 6: Effects of Executions vs. Commutations on Elapsed Time Until Previous Absence Differing by 
whether Case was a Desertion Trial and whether Soldier was Irish
Notes: Outcome is elapsed time from death sentence resolution (execution or commutation) until previous absence at least 90 days before the death 
sentence. "Exp", "Wb" and "Cox" use the exponential, Weibull and Cox models respectively to parameterize the baseline hazard. In columns sub-titled 
"+14", the announcement of the commutation is assumed to occur 14 days after trial. In columns subtitled "NN" the nearest-neighbor method is used, 
which means the imputed announcement of the commutation is same as the most nearby execution announcement, while in columns labeled "C=T", the 
trial date is used as the announcement date of the execution and commutation. All specifications include division and year fixed-effects and ∆Log 
Casualties and ∆Log Casualties 30 Days Ago. War Diaries analysis restricts to July 1916-June 1917, which is the time window for the surviving data. 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Execution 0.0983 0.0960 0.0432 -0.0189 -0.0629 -0.0830 0.0293 0.0271 0.0327 0.0383 0.0396 0.0385 -0.177 -0.193 -0.205 -0.206 -0.200 -0.195
(0.388) (0.393) (0.395) (0.397) (0.397) (0.396) (0.234) (0.235) (0.235) (0.235) (0.235) (0.235) (0.285) (0.285) (0.285) (0.285) (0.285) (0.285)
Desert -0.0630 -0.0575 -0.0495 -0.0481 -0.0553 -0.0606 -0.0133 -0.0146 -0.0144 -0.00981 -0.00266 0.00162 -0.0196 -0.0158 -0.0171 -0.0247 -0.0310 -0.0323
(0.170) (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) (0.170) (0.0823) (0.0824) (0.0824) (0.0826) (0.0827) (0.0828) (0.0930) (0.0931) (0.0931) (0.0930) (0.0931) (0.0931)
Ex-Desert -0.115 -0.116 -0.0840 -0.0505 -0.0280 -0.0166 -0.0245 -0.0225 -0.0239 -0.0240 -0.0257 -0.0267 0.174 0.143 0.152 0.163 0.173 0.175
(0.413) (0.415) (0.416) (0.417) (0.416) (0.415) (0.248) (0.248) (0.248) (0.248) (0.248) (0.248) (0.303) (0.303) (0.303) (0.303) (0.303) (0.303)
Irish 0.00526 0.00545 -0.00151 -0.00423 -0.00138 0.000996 -0.0384 -0.0379 -0.0383 -0.0377 -0.0359 -0.0354 -0.0586 -0.0632 -0.0587 -0.0537 -0.0532 -0.0535
(0.185) (0.186) (0.186) (0.185) (0.185) (0.185) (0.0901) (0.0901) (0.0901) (0.0901) (0.0901) (0.0901) (0.108) (0.109) (0.109) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108)
Ex-Irish 0.126 0.129 0.146 0.140 0.115 0.101 0.0594 0.0620 0.0607 0.0532 0.0499 0.0519 -0.0397 -0.0107 -0.0143 -0.0212 -0.0293 -0.0339
(0.386) (0.387) (0.386) (0.386) (0.386) (0.386) (0.209) (0.209) (0.210) (0.210) (0.210) (0.210) (0.260) (0.261) (0.261) (0.261) (0.260) (0.260)
∆Log Casualties 0.0552 0.0552 0.0527 0.0506 0.0497 0.0493 -0.0218 -0.0220 -0.0212 -0.0212 -0.0219 -0.0218 -0.0448 -0.0485+ -0.0498+ -0.0499+ -0.0479+ -0.0466+
(0.0498) (0.0500) (0.0502) (0.0505) (0.0509) (0.0511) (0.0250) (0.0251) (0.0251) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0275) (0.0277) (0.0277) (0.0278) (0.0278) (0.0278)
∆Log Casualties 0.0783+ 0.0795+ 0.0749 0.0697 0.0662 0.0647 -0.00676 -0.00650 -0.00572 -0.00595 -0.00658 -0.00660 -0.0302 -0.0371 -0.0382 -0.0371 -0.0337 -0.0318
  30 Days Ago (0.0465) (0.0479) (0.0477) (0.0473) (0.0469) (0.0467) (0.0228) (0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0249) (0.0252) (0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0252)
Ex's - 7d -0.108 0.0398 -0.209+
(0.221) (0.0976) (0.124)
Cm's - 7d 0.00111 -0.00178 0.126**
(0.0993) (0.0387) (0.0416)
Ex's - 14d -0.155 0.0197 -0.169+
(0.167) (0.0706) (0.0883)
Cm's - 14d 0.0453 -0.00956 0.0974**
(0.0783) (0.0276) (0.0305)
Ex's - 30d -0.146 -0.0124 -0.0909
(0.133) (0.0524) (0.0631)
Cm's - 30d 0.0847 -0.0167 0.0616**
(0.0618) (0.0196) (0.0226)
Ex's - 60d -0.115 -0.0323 -0.0338
(0.117) (0.0425) (0.0499)
Cm's - 60d 0.107* -0.0193 0.0342+
(0.0514) (0.0151) (0.0177)
Ex's - 90d -0.0991 -0.0387 -0.0125
(0.112) (0.0382) (0.0447)
Cm's - 90d 0.113* -0.0195 0.0232
(0.0471) (0.0133) (0.0155)
N 435 435 435 435 435 435 1481 1481 1481 1481 1481 1481 1648 1648 1648 1648 1648 1648
Appendix Table 7: Effects of Execution vs. Commutation on Elapsed Time Until Previous Absence, Full Sample, Weak SUTVA
War Diaries Police Gazettes FGCM Trial Registries (Desertion Trials)
Notes: Outcome is elapsed time from death sentence resolution (execution or commutation) until previous absence at least 90 days before the death sentence. All specifcations use the "+14" commutation date imputation 
method and all specifications use exponential models to parameterize baseline hazard rates. All specifications include division and year fixed-effects and ∆Log Casualties and ∆Log Casualties 30 Days Ago. The regressors 
labeled ex's-Yd or cm's-Yd measure the cumulative effects of previous deterrence events in the unit. Y is the half-life of the effect. War Diaries analysis restricts to July 1916-June 1917, which is the time window for the 
surviving data. Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Panel A: War Diaries (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
  Half-life 1 week 2 weeks 1 month 2 months 3 months
Execution 0.0171 0.0127 0.00897 0.00550 0.00318
(0.0218) (0.0156) (0.0118) (0.0102) (0.00921)
Death Sentence -0.0000876 -0.000565 -0.000739 -0.000570 -0.000497
(0.00143) (0.00127) (0.00111) (0.000977) (0.000942)
Ex-Irish 0.0127 0.0121 0.0124 0.0144 0.0158
(0.0137) (0.0102) (0.00928) (0.00953) (0.00958)
Irish -0.0137* -0.0123* -0.00919+ -0.00765 -0.00724
(0.00511) -0.0049 (0.00465) (0.00457) (0.00440)
Ex-Desert -0.0190 -0.0147 -0.0122 -0.0101 -0.00839
(0.0197) (0.0147) (0.0117) (0.0101) (0.00893)
Desert 0.00204 0.00298 0.00279 0.00250+ 0.00239+
(0.00196) (0.00196) (0.00181) (0.00144) (0.00130)
N 20750 20750 20750 20750 20750
Panel B: Police Gazettes
Execution 0.00273 -0.00634 -0.00989 -0.00994 -0.00857
(0.0214) (0.0182) (0.0139) (0.0106) (0.00915)
Death Sentence 0.00741 0.00596 0.00414 0.00250 0.00167
(0.00452) (0.00414) (0.00312) (0.00207) (0.00160)
Ex-Irish 0.0124 0.00621 -0.000201 -0.00325 -0.00353
(0.0161) (0.0125) (0.00906) (0.00699) (0.00599)
Irish -0.00154 0.00198 0.00371 0.00390 0.00352
(0.00586) (0.00506) (0.00443) (0.00382) (0.00333)
Ex-Desert -0.00454 0.00626 0.00954 0.00830 0.00629
(0.0206) (0.0169) (0.0128) (0.00949) (0.00818)
Desert -0.00729 -0.00703 -0.00569 -0.00364 -0.00237
(0.00454) (0.00419) (0.00341) (0.00256) (0.00215)
N 50465 50465 50465 50465 50465
Panel C: FGCM Desertion Trial Registries
Execution -0.0308* -0.0245+ -0.0133 -0.00607 -0.00400
(0.0141) (0.0122) (0.0110) (0.00890) (0.00705)
Death Sentence 0.00367 0.00350 0.00288+ 0.00196+ 0.00144+
(0.00313) (0.00233) (0.00167) (0.00111) (0.000793)
Ex-Irish -0.00701 -0.00497 -0.00283 -0.000694 0.000834
(0.0167) (0.0134) (0.00998) (0.00725) (0.00612)
Irish 0.0152* 0.0122** 0.00857* 0.00532* 0.00366+
(0.00611) (0.00456) (0.00345) (0.00249) (0.00199)
Ex-Desert 0.0231 0.0178 0.00644 0.000998 0.000752
(0.0143) (0.0124) (0.0118) (0.00979) (0.00785)
Desert 0.00102 0.000660 0.00261 0.00364* 0.00345*
(0.00468) (0.00322) (0.00227) (0.00168) (0.00136)
N 54855 54855 54855 54855 54855
Appendix Table 8: Day-by-Day Framework, Future Events and Previous Absences
Notes: Outcome is whether there was any absence on that day and division. All specifcations use the "+14" commutation date imputation method and 
include division and year fixed-effects, ∆Log Casualties, and ∆Log Casualties 30 Days Ago. The half-life row indicates the assumed exponential half-life of 
the effect of future events beginning 90 days in the future. War Diaries analysis restricts to July 1916-June 1917, which is the time window for the 
surviving data. War Diaries analysis restricts to July 1916-June 1917, which is the time window for the surviving data. Standard errors clustered at the 
division level in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Panel A: War Diaries (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
  Half-life 1 week 2 weeks 1 month 2 months 3 months
Execution -0.00885 -0.00633 -0.00499 -0.00447 -0.00374
(0.0110) (0.00899) (0.00544) (0.00531) (0.00562)
Death Sentence 0.000503 0.000822 0.000949 0.000954 0.000943
(0.00153) (0.00119) (0.000903) (0.000834) (0.000819)
Ex-Irish 0.00699 0.00319 0.00103 -0.00117 -0.00298
(0.0145) (0.00875) (0.00680) (0.00696) (0.00706)
Irish 0.00239 0.00102 -0.000630 -0.000713 -0.000241
(0.00447) (0.00279) (0.00254) (0.00278) (0.00273)
Ex-Desert 0.00150 0.00128 0.00256 0.00430 0.00474
(0.0130) (0.0105) (0.00544) (0.00435) (0.00468)
Desert 0.00167 0.000528 -0.000378 -0.00109 -0.00135
(0.00281) (0.00218) (0.00151) (0.00116) (0.00106)
N 20750 20750 20750 20750 20750
Panel B: Police Gazettes
Execution -0.0282 -0.0199 -0.0114 -0.00543 -0.00315
(0.0178) (0.0129) (0.00849) (0.00568) (0.00453)
Death Sentence 0.000329 0.000108 -0.000266 -0.000187 -0.00000606
(0.00221) (0.00164) (0.00122) (0.000866) (0.000701)
Ex-Irish 0.00120 0.00495 0.00567+ 0.00449+ 0.00339
(0.0103) (0.00605) (0.00330) (0.00249) (0.00232)
Irish -0.000198 -0.00167 -0.00158 -0.00139 -0.00133
(0.00532) (0.00397) (0.00297) (0.00214) (0.00172)
Ex-Desert 0.0269 0.0187 0.0113 0.00639 0.00450
(0.0179) (0.0130) (0.00874) (0.00599) (0.00487)
Desert -0.00338 -0.00169 -0.000409 -0.000265 -0.000454
(0.00262) (0.00175) (0.00133) (0.00103) (0.000886)
N 50465 50465 50465 50465 50465
Panel C: FGCM Desertion Trial Registries
Execution 0.0332** 0.0259* 0.0148 0.00739 0.00475
(0.0121) (0.0109) (0.00949) (0.00725) (0.00563)
Death Sentence -0.00265 -0.00240 -0.00207 -0.00157 -0.00121
(0.00266) (0.00191) (0.00133) (0.000948) (0.000748)
Ex-Irish -0.00942 -0.00784 -0.00677 -0.00461 -0.00361
(0.0122) (0.00976) (0.00774) (0.00620) (0.00553)
Irish -0.00851+ -0.00807* -0.00398 -0.000594 0.000457
(0.00441) (0.00338) (0.00263) (0.00218) (0.00192)
Ex-Desert -0.0248* -0.0174 -0.00559 -0.000398 0.0000879
(0.0123) (0.0108) (0.00925) (0.00727) (0.00597)
Desert -0.00206 -0.000792 -0.00226 -0.00319* -0.00308**
(0.00333) (0.00218) (0.00155) (0.00122) (0.00104)
N 54855 54855 54855 54855 54855
Appendix Table 9: Day-by-Day Framework, Future Events and Previous Irish - non-Irish Absence
Notes: Outcome is whether there was any Irish absence on that day and division minus whether there was any non-Irish absence on that day and division. All 
specifcations use the "+14" commutation date imputation method and include division and year fixed-effects, ∆Log Casualties, and ∆Log Casualties 30 Days 
Ago. The half-life row indicates the assumed exponential half-life of the effect of past events. War Diaries analysis restricts to July 1916-June 1917, which is the 
time window for the surviving data. War Diaries analysis restricts to July 1916-June 1917, which is the time window for the surviving data. Standard errors 
clustered at the division level in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Execution -0.368 -0.394 -0.359 -0.213 -0.278 -0.118 -0.475 -0.432 -0.457 -0.414 -0.434 -0.421 -0.855 -0.498 -0.779 -0.577 -0.688 -0.539
(0.742) (0.625) (0.694) (0.619) (0.682) (0.618) (0.447) (0.394) (0.427) (0.482) (0.387) (0.451) (0.622) (0.500) (0.559) (0.572) (0.483) (0.507)
Desert -0.0253 -0.0511 -0.0103 -0.283 -0.00336 -0.245 -0.0656 -0.0815 -0.0608 -0.0788 -0.0514 -0.0700 0.0317 0.0299 0.0246 -0.0607 0.0118 -0.0489
(0.300) (0.308) (0.269) (0.243) (0.235) (0.231) (0.0851) (0.0855) (0.0823) (0.0998) (0.0767) (0.0925) (0.122) (0.126) (0.113) (0.132) (0.103) (0.123)
Ex-Desert -0.0250 0.0408 0.0317 -0.0144 -0.0314 -0.0884 0.258 0.191 0.249 0.117 0.241 0.134 0.474 0.299 0.425 0.414 0.366 0.374
(0.728) (0.619) (0.688) (0.534) (0.663) (0.540) (0.480) (0.415) (0.459) (0.471) (0.417) (0.440) (0.663) (0.539) (0.600) (0.570) (0.520) (0.499)
Irish -0.822** -0.702** -0.717** -0.755** -0.549** -0.573** -0.186+ -0.140 -0.180+ -0.211+ -0.174+ -0.206+ -0.374** -0.349* -0.346** -0.420* -0.314** -0.391**
(0.212) (0.219) (0.204) (0.229) (0.173) (0.196) (0.107) (0.114) (0.102) (0.119) (0.0951) (0.112) (0.145) (0.146) (0.133) (0.166) (0.120) (0.146)
Ex-Irish 1.310** 1.118** 1.127** 1.058** 0.925** 0.863** 0.437* 0.445* 0.423* 0.554* 0.402* 0.536* 0.778** 0.712** 0.702** 0.608+ 0.612** 0.566+
(0.282) (0.334) (0.253) (0.333) (0.242) (0.291) (0.196) (0.203) (0.186) (0.233) (0.167) (0.217) (0.253) (0.270) (0.234) (0.328) (0.214) (0.292)
Ex's - 30d -0.147 -0.204+ -0.152 -0.299* -0.176+ -0.302* -0.0270 -0.0674 -0.0257 -0.158* -0.0247 -0.148* 0.0227 -0.0513 0.0197 -0.158 0.0203 -0.145
(0.130) (0.112) (0.115) (0.124) (0.102) (0.117) (0.0703) (0.0611) (0.0678) (0.0754) (0.0634) (0.0699) (0.0738) (0.0663) (0.0687) (0.105) (0.0626) (0.0972)
Cm's - 30d -0.0654 -0.121+ -0.0574 -0.184* -0.0532 -0.149+ 0.105** 0.0967** 0.101** -0.0177 0.0926** -0.0170 0.0988** 0.0877** 0.0898** -0.0850* 0.0775** -0.0780*
(0.0722) (0.0697) (0.0646) (0.0888) (0.0562) (0.0821) (0.0267) (0.0355) (0.0248) (0.0470) (0.0234) (0.0432) (0.0255) (0.0258) (0.0235) (0.0414) (0.0218) (0.0374)
∆Log Casualties 0.0721 0.0552 0.0618 0.0471 0.0448 0.0423 0.0748* 0.0829** 0.0726* 0.113** 0.0689* 0.108** 0.0663+ 0.0751* 0.0574 0.106** 0.0466 0.0901**
(0.0595) (0.0596) (0.0539) (0.0663) (0.0501) (0.0597) (0.0292) (0.0267) (0.0284) (0.0275) (0.0268) (0.0262) (0.0388) (0.0342) (0.0365) (0.0362) (0.0334) (0.0344)
∆Log Casualties 0.163** 0.148* 0.150** 0.175** 0.113* 0.142** 0.0719** 0.0739** 0.0704** 0.116** 0.0684** 0.114** 0.100** 0.108** 0.0934** 0.141** 0.0848** 0.128**
  30 Days Ago (0.0613) (0.0602) (0.0529) (0.0566) (0.0472) (0.0498) (0.0275) (0.0273) (0.0266) (0.0292) (0.0248) (0.0279) (0.0344) (0.0391) (0.0334) (0.0439) (0.0321) (0.0410)
Division and Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Additional Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
N 536 536 536 536 536 536 1640 1640 1640 1640 1640 1640 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654
Appendix Table 10: Effects of Execution vs. Commutation on Elapsed Time Until Next Absence, Full Sample, Weak SUTVA
War Diaries Police Gazettes FGCM Trial Registries (Desertion Trials)
Exp Weibull Cox Exp Weibull
Notes: All specifications use the "+14" commutation date imputation method. All specifications include division and year fixed-effects. Log Casualties is calculated as log(1+Casualties). ∆Log Casualties is defined as the 
difference in Log Casualties 1 to 29 Days Ago vs. 30 to 59 Days Ago. ∆Log Casualties 30 Days Ago is defined as the difference in Log Casualties 30 to 59 Days Ago vs. 60 to 89 Days Ago. Additional controls are Irish 
indicators for each officer in the chain-of-command, whether the executed soldier was an officer, the executed soldier's age, distance to coast, distance to Berlin, fixed effects for the identities of the Division Commanding 
Officer and Division 1st General Staff Officer, and lag measures of absences and of death sentences (the log of absences and the log of death sentences in the time window 30-59 Days Ago and 60-89 Days Ago). When 
officer or age data is missing, it is dummied out (i.e., set to a constant and another variable indicating whether it is missing is included). Officers that appear with less than 10 frequency are categorized in an Other 
category. Exponential models do not include officer identity fixed effects to speed calculations. The regressors labeled ex's-Yd or cm's-Yd measure the cumulative effects of previous deterrence events in the unit. Y is the 
half-life of the effect. War Diaries analysis restricts to July 1916-June 1917, which is the time window for the surviving data. Standard errors clustered at the division level in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 
0.01
Exp Weibull Cox Cox
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Execution 0.659 0.680 0.688 0.695 0.691 0.681 0.689 0.580 0.599 0.622 0.650 0.663 0.492 0.399 0.408 0.425 0.454 0.471
(0.485) (0.541) (0.536) (0.515) (0.484) (0.462) (0.267) (0.306) (0.297) (0.278) (0.264) (0.260) (0.257) (0.279) (0.276) (0.264) (0.257) (0.255)
Desert 0.958 0.980 0.981 0.975 0.950 0.927 0.955 0.931 0.923 0.937 0.955 0.960 1.055 1.027 1.018 1.032 1.058 1.065
(0.292) (0.294) (0.296) (0.293) (0.283) (0.275) (0.0896) (0.0818) (0.0792) (0.0797) (0.0842) (0.0875) (0.143) (0.130) (0.125) (0.126) (0.134) (0.141)
Ex-Desert 0.997 0.971 0.966 0.972 0.998 1.017 1.285 1.366 1.329 1.294 1.264 1.257 1.556 1.679 1.655 1.607 1.537 1.508
(0.743) (0.757) (0.735) (0.708) (0.695) (0.695) (0.543) (0.767) (0.703) (0.621) (0.557) (0.535) (0.864) (1.245) (1.184) (1.065) (0.933) (0.874)
Irish 0.483** 0.465** 0.457** 0.440** 0.428** 0.434** 0.836 0.854 0.842 0.830+ 0.828+ 0.831+ 0.702* 0.704* 0.695* 0.688** 0.693* 0.699*
(0.0867) (0.0840) (0.0867) (0.0931) (0.0964) (0.0951) (0.0910) (0.0936) (0.0914) (0.0886) (0.0890) (0.0901) (0.0992) (0.101) (0.100) (0.0997) (0.0999) (0.100)
Ex-Irish 3.252** 3.492** 3.511** 3.689** 3.877** 3.833** 1.539* 1.541* 1.553* 1.548* 1.528* 1.522* 2.050** 2.066** 2.117** 2.177** 2.170** 2.141**
(0.926) (1.126) (1.078) (1.038) (1.045) (1.026) (0.302) (0.324) (0.313) (0.304) (0.299) (0.298) (0.498) (0.537) (0.541) (0.551) (0.544) (0.533)
∆Log Casualties 1.091 1.084 1.081 1.075 1.064 1.059 1.055+ 1.077** 1.080** 1.078* 1.071* 1.065* 1.043 1.062 1.068+ 1.068+ 1.062 1.056
(0.0657) (0.0653) (0.0648) (0.0639) (0.0635) (0.0638) (0.0318) (0.0289) (0.0303) (0.0315) (0.0315) (0.0312) (0.0431) (0.0394) (0.0406) (0.0416) (0.0418) (0.0420)
∆Log Casualties 1.185** 1.187** 1.184** 1.176** 1.164* 1.157* 1.067* 1.064* 1.070* 1.075** 1.073** 1.071* 1.089* 1.086* 1.097** 1.106** 1.104** 1.099**
  30 Days Ago (0.0675) (0.0697) (0.0702) (0.0717) (0.0735) (0.0740) (0.0305) (0.0293) (0.0291) (0.0295) (0.0295) (0.0294) (0.0403) (0.0388) (0.0384) (0.0381) (0.0378) (0.0377)
Ex's - 7d 0.840 1.239* 1.428**
(0.177) (0.116) (0.166)
Cm's - 7d 0.966 1.239** 1.201**
(0.152) (0.0696) (0.0544)
Ex's - 14d 0.876 1.088 1.188+
(0.134) (0.0857) (0.107)
Cm's - 14d 0.954 1.169** 1.150**
(0.102) (0.0448) (0.0378)
Ex's - 30d 0.871 0.973 1.022
(0.112) (0.0685) (0.0755)
Cm's - 30d 0.935 1.111** 1.104**
(0.0672) (0.0296) (0.0282)
Ex's - 60d 0.830 0.929 0.962
(0.109) (0.0597) (0.0642)
Cm's - 60d 0.917 1.067** 1.064**
(0.0499) (0.0225) (0.0219)
Ex's - 90d 0.806 0.918 0.945
(0.106) (0.0573) (0.0615)
Cm's - 90d 0.914+ 1.047* 1.043*
(0.0437) (0.0199) (0.0189)
N 536 536 536 536 536 536 1640 1640 1640 1640 1640 1640 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654
Appendix Table 11: Effects of Execution vs. Commutation on Elapsed Time Until Next Absence, Full Sample, Weak SUTVA (Hazard coefficients)
War Diaries Police Gazettes FGCM Trial Registries (Desertion Trials)
Notes: All specifications use the "+14" commutation date imputation method and all specifications use exponential models to parameterize baseline hazard rates. All specifications include division and year fixed-effects. 
Log Casualties is calculated as log(1+Casualties). ∆Log Casualties is defined as the difference in Log Casualties 1 to 29 Days Ago vs. 30 to 59 Days Ago. ∆Log Casualties 30 Days Ago is defined as the difference in Log 
Casualties 30 to 59 Days Ago vs. 60 to 89 Days Ago. The regressors labeled ex's-Yd or cm's-Yd measure the cumulative effects of previous deterrence events in the unit. Y is the half-life of the effect. War Diaries analysis 
restricts to July 1916-June 1917, which is the time window for the surviving data. Standard errors clustered at the division level in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21)
Execution 0.109 0.240 0.261 -1.040 13.53+ -27.20 0.0463 -0.357 -0.448 -0.454 2.367 -4.031 -0.200 -0.321 -0.483 -2.128+ 1.870* 4.112
(0.260) (0.222) (0.214) (0.778) (7.019) (21.87) (0.156) (0.239) (0.385) (0.605) (1.506) (2.908) (0.295) (0.309) (0.506) (1.096) (0.743) (4.648)
Ex-Casualties -0.0629 -0.0493 -0.0204
(0.0672) (0.0464) (0.0638)
Ex-Distance to Coast -0.00492 0.00287 0.000282
(0.00312) (0.00298) (0.00424)
Ex-Distance to Berlin -0.000654+ 0.000414 0.000255
(0.000390) (0.000519) (0.000703)
Ex-Private 0.990 0.302 1.919+
(0.760) (0.623) (1.121)
Ex-Age -0.620* -0.0913 -0.0506+
(0.279) (0.0558) (0.0260)
Ex-Time -0.00172 -0.000244 0.000281
(0.00139) (0.000184) (0.000294)
Ex-Regular Army 0.441* -0.0889 -0.202
(0.192) (0.188) (0.181)
Ex-New Army -0.583+ -0.275+ -0.578**
(0.307) (0.146) (0.210)
Ex-Territorial Army 0.0560 -0.232+ -0.0432
(0.350) (0.127) (0.222)
N 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 1640 1640 1640 1640 1640 1640 1640 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654 1654
Appendix Table 12: Effects of Executions vs. Commutations on Elapsed Time Until Next Absence Differing by Individual or Environmental Characteristics
Notes: Outcome is elapsed time from death sentence resolution (execution or commutation) until next absence. All specifications use exponential models to parameterize the baseline hazard, assume the commutation 
occurred 14 days after the trial, and include division and year fixed-effects and ∆Log Casualties and ∆Log Casualties 30 Days Ago. All specifications include the level term for the respective heterogeneity being examined. 
Indicator for missing age data is also included along with the interaction with execution. Time is days from the start of World War 1. War Diaries analysis restricts to July 1916-June 1917, which is the time window for the 
surviving data. Standard errors clustered at the division level in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
War Diaries FGCM Trial Registries (Desertion Trials)Police Gazette
Panel A: +14 Imputation All Desertion Trials Irish Desertion Trials
All Death Sentences
Irish Execution 13.8% 19.6%
Non-Irish Execution 18.3% 20.1%
Irish Commutation 22.5% 22.0%
Non-Irish Commutation 22.9% 18.7%
Desertion Death Sentences
Irish Execution 14.6% 19.1%
Non-Irish Execution 19.4% 20.8%
Irish Commutation 22.2% 22.6%
Non-Irish Commutation 22.3% 17.9%
Panel B: NN Imputation
All Death Sentences
Irish Execution 12.1% 16.1%
Non-Irish Execution 17.4% 19.1%
Irish Commutation 21.6% 19.6%
Non-Irish Commutation 22.0% 17.0%
Desertion Death Sentences
Irish Execution 12.5% 14.9%
Non-Irish Execution 18.3% 19.7%
Irish Commutation 21.8% 19.8%
Non-Irish Commutation 20.6% 15.4%
Panel C: C=T Imputation
All Death Sentences
Irish Execution 13.8% 14.3%
Non-Irish Execution 23.3% 18.0%
Irish Commutation 19.5% 21.2%
Non-Irish Commutation 19.9% 16.6%
Desertion Death Sentences
Irish Execution 14.6% 12.8%
Non-Irish Execution 23.0% 18.4%
Irish Commutation 18.0% 22.6%
Non-Irish Commutation 19.5% 15.3%
Notes: In panels sub-titled "+14", the announcement of the commutation is assumed to occur 14 days after trial. In panels 
subtitled "NN" the nearest-neighbor method is used, which means the imputed announcement of the commutation is same 
as the most nearby execution announcement, while in panels labeled "C=T", the trial date is used as the announcement 
date of the execution and commutation. 
% of Next Desertion Trial Resulting in a Death Sentence
Appendix Table 13: Effects of Execution vs. Commutation on Death Sentencing of Next Desertion Trial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Pooled Data Exp/+14 Wb/+14 Cox/+14 Exp/NN Wb/NN Cox/NN Exp/C=T Wb/C=T Cox/C=T
Execution -0.365 -0.314 -0.243 0.00152 0.00389 0.0187 0.147 0.124 0.0877
(0.316) (0.274) (0.224) (0.267) (0.232) (0.186) (0.162) (0.153) (0.133)
Desert -0.141 -0.122 -0.0970 -0.0858 -0.0784 -0.0609 0.0322 0.0315 0.0386
(0.108) (0.0940) (0.0804) (0.101) (0.0890) (0.0767) (0.0944) (0.0887) (0.0792)
Ex-Desert 0.243 0.197 0.119 -0.0475 -0.0520 -0.0863 -0.309 -0.279 -0.250
(0.351) (0.303) (0.250) (0.297) (0.258) (0.210) (0.192) (0.182) (0.158)
Irish -0.0554 -0.0510 -0.0559 -0.0759 -0.0706 -0.0698 0.143+ 0.132+ 0.0939
(0.0964) (0.0812) (0.0616) (0.0783) (0.0675) (0.0500) (0.0764) (0.0699) (0.0615)
Ex-Irish 0.344+ 0.300+ 0.262+ 0.347+ 0.316+ 0.292* 0.0314 0.0331 0.0558
(0.206) (0.179) (0.140) (0.197) (0.173) (0.137) (0.174) (0.164) (0.145)
N 2228 2228 2228 2228 2228 2228 2228 2228 2228
Appendix Table 14: Effects of Executions vs. Commutations on Elapsed Time Until Next Absence Differing by 
whether Case was a Desertion Trial and whether Soldier was Irish
Notes: Outcome is elapsed time from death sentence resolution (execution or commutation) until next absence. "Exp", "Wb" and "Cox" use the exponential, 
Weibull and Cox models respectively to parameterize the baseline hazard. In columns sub-titled "+14", the announcement of the commutation is assumed 
to occur 14 days after trial. In columns subtitled "NN" the nearest-neighbor method is used, which means the imputed announcement of the commutation 
is same as the most nearby execution announcement, while in columns labeled "C=T", the trial date is used as the announcement date of the execution 
and commutation. All specifications include division and year fixed-effects and ∆Log Casualties and ∆Log Casualties 30 Days Ago. Death sentences that 
precede another death sentence instead of an absence and death sentences that precede the end of the war are treated as censored events. Standard errors 
clustered at the division level in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01



























ΔLog Casualties 0.0332* 0.0136
(0.0141) (0.00950)
ΔLog Casualties 0.0121 0.00114
  30 Days Ago (0.0133) (0.00898)
Distance to Coast -0.130
(0.501)
Distance to Berlin 0.848
(0.874)
Year Fixed Effects N N Y N N N N Y Y Y
Month Fixed Effects N N N Y N N N N N N
Day Fixed Effects N N N N Y N N N N N
Division Fixed Effects N N N N N Y N Y Y Y
Joint Test of Fixed Effects 0.399 0.731 0.0428 0.624 0.462
Joint Test of Casualties 0.0638
Joint Test of Distance 0.221
Constant 0.227** 1.083** 0.133 0.161** 0.174** 0.333+ 0.0962* 0.302 0.383+ 0.217
(0.0724) (0.167) (0.0878) (0.0613) (0.0497) (0.197) (0.0472) (0.267) (0.230) (0.684)
N 466 466 466 466 466 466 406 466 466 466
R-sq 0.004 0.531 0.009 0.017 0.028 0.130 0.004 0.219 0.148 0.650
Appendix Table 15: Are Observable Characteristics Correlated with Execution Decisions? (All Irish)
Notes: All regressions use ordinary least squares on death sentences occurring in France & Flanders before the end of World War I. Death sentences 
recorded without Divisions or from the Labour Corps were removed. Log Casualties is calculated as log(1+Casualties). ΔLog Casualties is defined as the 
difference in Log Casualties 1 to 29 Days Ago vs. 30 to 59 Days Ago. ΔLog Casualties 30 Days Ago is defined as the difference in Log Casualties 30 to 59 
Days Ago vs. 60 to 89 Days Ago. Distances are calculated based on the soldier's unit's participation in battles and are interpolated between battles. 
Distances are set to missing before the first battle and after the last battle. Territorial/New/Regular Army status is not assigned for Indian, Australian, 
Canadian, or New Zealand Divisions. Regressions including age also dummy out age when it is missing (i.e., assign a constant and include an indicator for 
age being missing). Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Results are similar with Logit or Probit.           




Brigade Commanding Officer 0.542
Division Commanding Officer 0.897
Division 1st General Staff Officer 0.843
Corp Commanding Officer 0.654
Corp 1st General Staff Officer 0.690
Army Commanding Officer 0.784
Army 1st General Staff Officer 0.366
GHQ Commanding Officer 0.194
GHQ 1st General Staff Officer 0.209
Irish Soldier x Irish Officer FE 0.112
Military Indiscipline 30-59 & 60-89 days ago 0.990
Death Sentences 30-59 & 60-89 days ago 0.0409
Execution Rate 30-59 & 60-89 days ago 0.132
Panel B:













Appendix Table 16: Are Observable Characteristics Correlated with Execution Decisions? (All Irish)
Notes: Data is restricted to Irish death sentences occurring in France & Flanders before the end of World War I. Death sentences recorded 
without Divisions or from the Labour Corps were removed. In Panel A, each row reports a separate ordinary least squares regression and tests of 
joint significance of the fixed effects or measures of the recent battle environment. Military indiscipline and death sentences are calculated as 
log(1+number). Military indiscipline is the average of absentees and trials measured from the War Diaries, Police Gazettes, and FGCM trial 
registries. Lag execution rates is a set of controls comprising the numbers of executions and commutations within each time window. Units or 
officers that appeared with less than 10 frequency were categorized in a separate "other" category. All regression models include year, division, and 
Irish fixed effects. In Panel B, each row reports a separate ordinary least squares stacked autocorrelation regression. The strings of events within 
each unit were stacked and the first event within each unit was excluded as a dependent variable. If more than one event occurred on a day 
within a unit, the average outcome was calculated for that day. All regression models include year fixed effects and the leave-one-out mean 
execution rate of the unit. Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Results are similar with Logit or Probit.
